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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis conducts an in-depth empirical analysis of the way in which energy was 
constructed as a security issue in the United States and China between 2004 and 2012. The 
core argument is that energy security is contested: it means different things to different 
people in different contexts. State energy security discourse and practice in both states 
constructed energy largely as a national security issue, emphasising the need to secure the 
state in economic and/or strategic terms by providing secure energy supplies at stable prices. 
This is found to be problematic and ‘negative’, as encouraging competition over finite fuels 
perpetuates insecurity for states, and fails to secure human beings and the environment. 
Thus, it does not produce security. However, there are a number of competing marginalised 
energy security constructions, which forward a more ‘positive’ notion of energy security – 
emphasising sustainability and human welfare. By illustrating the contested nature of energy 
security, this thesis contributes the first in-depth critical empirical analysis of energy security 
constructions. It thus brings together insights from critical approaches to security with the 
empirical area of energy security to understand how energy security is constructed, while 
raising important theoretical questions about the importance of context for understanding the 
value of security and the potential for moving towards more ‘positive’ energy security 
discourse and practice. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 …energy supply is a matter of national security  
(George W. Bush 2006) 
 
energy security is our permanent concern as our country's natural resources are 
inadequate 
(Chinese energy official, Xinhua 2011b) 
 
 
 
The planet cannot survive if we continue to consume fossil energy at current rates. Yet, 
continued energy supplies are essential to maintain human life as we know it. The world 
still depends largely on finite and dirty sources of energy, and the growing pace of human 
development has been accompanied by ever faster resource depletion. Today, ‘we are 
seeking more, but finding less’ (Klare 2008: 39). This is an increasingly serious concern 
for states, who depend on continued energy supplies to survive. Energy has moved from 
being a part of domestic economic policy, to ‘an issue of the “high politics” of national 
security’ (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 13). We are facing a changing world order 
characterised by a ‘new geopolitics of energy’ (Klare 2008: 6), and nowhere is this taken 
more seriously than in the United States and China. They are not only the two largest 
energy consumers; they are also the largest net oil importers. This makes them particularly 
vulnerable to changing global energy dynamics – which risk affecting both economic and 
political stability. Growing tension over rising energy demand and depleting resources 
impact state behaviour, with growing fears of a ‘resource race’ which may well result in 
conflict between major powers (Klare 2008: 30). Energy security is one of the most 
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important issues today, bearing direct impact on the continued survival of human 
civilisation as we know it.  
 
Energy security is usually understood as the availability of secure energy supplies at stable 
or reasonable prices. It remains closely linked with national security, both because of its 
importance to state survival, and because of the political nature of energy resources. 
Traditional energy resources are an inherently geopolitical issue – they are not only finite, 
but also considered the ‘property’ of the state in which they are located (Mulligan 2010: 
89), rather than being part of the global commons. Meanwhile, states are heavily involved 
in energy policy-making, whether through market-regulation, taxation, energy subsidies, 
technology research and development, or more directly through state-ownership
1
. The 
existing debate on energy security has been characterised by competing perspectives on 
how to best provide secure energy supplies at stable prices. The realist, or ‘strategic’ camp 
assume that competition over resources is inevitable in an anarchic world, and thus 
advocate controlling supplies, whether through investment and/or political links with 
exporting states, or through energy independence. Meanwhile, the liberal, market-based 
approach suggests cooperation over energy is possible and desirable, and so advocates 
liberalising energy markets and increased energy integration. The meaning of energy 
security, however, is rarely questioned. The domain of energy is ‘saturated with the 
language of security’, and a look at existing debates suggest ‘that there simply is no need 
to debate what energy security is, because we know both that energy is a security issue and 
what security is’ (Ciută 2010: 125).  
 
                                                          
1
 National Oil Companies (NOCs) today own over 80 per cent of confirmed oil reserves (Klare 2008: 17). 
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The very meaning of energy security implies a focus on providing fossil fuels for the state. 
The idea of ‘security of supplies’ depends on a notion of finite, geographically-bound 
hydrocarbon resources – owned and extracted by states, and supplied by states to other 
states. Security is achieved when a state has access to stable supplies, whether through 
own production or reliable import. The notion of stable prices assumes the existence of a 
global market, which puts the focus on oil and the states which import it, as the main 
source of energy openly traded on a global market
2
. Here security is achieved when prices 
remain stable, and this stability depends partly on supply continuity. Thus, as currently 
understood, providing energy security involves ensuring secure supplies of fossil fuels at 
stable prices to importing states – whether through strategic or market-based means. The 
existing energy security literature focuses largely on strategies for achieving energy 
security on these terms. Problematically, contemporary understandings of energy security 
are closely linked with a traditional understanding of both energy and security: the 
emphasis remains on fossil fuels, and the security of the state remains at the centre. Not 
only is this understanding of energy security outdated, it is also counterproductive.  
 
Energy cannot be understood as a security issue in isolation – how energy security is 
pursued has a direct impact on climate and human security. The world is increasingly 
interconnected, and the growing speed of environmental change caused by climate change 
has profound implications for how we understand security. There is a need for ‘immediate 
action to drastically curtail greenhouse gas emissions for everyone’s security…[t]his is not 
security understood as preparing for war with rival states...[e]nvironmental change now 
makes the necessity of rethinking security unavoidable’ (Dalby 2009: 172). Rather than 
states securing themselves at any cost, such a change requires ‘abandoning many of the 
                                                          
2
 This is not to suggest that other energy sources are not traded, only that they have so far been less open to 
being traded openly on the market for various reasons (not least transportation difficulties) and thus do not 
experience price volatility in the same way. 
INTRODUCTION 
4 
 
traditional geopolitical premises of security thinking’ and putting sustainability ‘at the 
heart of a security strategy’ (Dalby 2009: 158). Growing interconnectedness and the 
changing nature of threats require new forms of state behaviour and new priorities. To 
provide security, states can no longer maximise their own security at the cost of other 
states:  ‘to secure nations, states must ensure that the world is secured’ (Burke 2013: 13). 
 
Energy security as currently understood relies on a traditional, state-centric notion of 
security whereby the state has to maximise its security to protect itself from external 
threats – in this case supply instability and price volatility. This notion of energy security 
enables and encourages zero-sum competition between states over fossil fuels to stabilise 
or even maximise their own supply, driving up demand. This works to increase tension and 
mistrust between states, producing insecurity in traditional terms. Moreover, the link 
between energy and national security also enables a focus on securing state fossil fuel 
supplies at the expense of the future of the climate and human security. Paradoxically, 
state maximisation of fossil fuel supplies in the name of national (energy) security is a 
direct cause of climate change
3
, which, if allowed to continue on present paths, will be a 
major cause of insecurity for states, the planet and the human beings who rely on it to 
survive. Thus as energy increasingly becomes incorporated in state security agendas, 
attempts by states to respond paradoxically produce insecurity. 
 
This thesis interrogates this puzzle in a detailed analysis of the relationship between energy 
and security. It draws on a range of literature under the heading of critical security studies, 
a broad and divisive subfield, which developed largely as critiques of traditional security 
studies in the post-Cold War era (Krause and Williams 1997). Using this framework, it 
                                                          
3
 See International Energy Agency (2007: 28). 
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suggests that there is a need to reconsider the meaning of energy security, highlighting the 
political nature of security. ‘Security’ is not neutral or objectively existing, but 
constructed. To have meaning, it ‘presupposes something to be secured; as a realm of 
study it cannot be self-referential’ (Krause and Williams 1997: ix). In conventional 
security studies, as in energy security discussions, this ‘something’ to be secured is always 
the state. Moreover, the state is not only the object to be secured; it is also the sole security 
actor, working to maximise its security to ensure its own survival (Mearsheimer 1990: 12). 
Following this, security has become considered both an expected and accepted policy goal. 
However, it is argued here that security is never neutral, but always political. 
 
Calling something a security issue suggests a number of things – that the speaker believes 
the issue is important, that it is one of survival, and that the issue needs to be dealt with 
urgently. The process and language used to invoke security in turn makes very particular 
policy possible (see Buzan et al. 1998). This thesis raises questions over the meaning and 
ethics of energy security, looking at who or what should be secured, who speaks security 
and for what purpose, and whether security practice is useful or positive when it comes to 
energy. In this process it suggests that security is not unequivocally ‘good’, or ‘positive’, 
but that security means different things and works in different ways depending on how it is 
used. It affirms an ethical commitment to making human beings the primary subject of 
security, following Walker (1988: 128). The growing interdependence of human beings 
and the environment, moreover (see Dalby 2009), make a stable environment and climate a 
necessity for people to be secure, today and in future years.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
6 
 
Research Questions 
Following this, the central research question of this thesis is: 
 
  How is energy security constructed in discourse and practice in the US and China? 
  
Approaching this question with a focus on the relationship between energy and security 
has led to the following sub-questions: 
 
 What does it mean to attach ‘security’ to energy? 
 What is the value of (energy) security? 
 Should security be attached to energy? 
 
 
This research is driven by the conviction that it is necessary to look at the concept of 
energy security and how it works in an empirical context. Problematically, the mainstream 
literature on energy security accepts both the meaning and the value of energy security as 
given. It does not question whether energy is a security issue, nor what it means to speak 
and/or write ‘security’ in the context of energy. In contrast, the focus here is on 
investigating how energy security is represented and practiced, in short, how it is 
constructed; and how security works in this process. While the existing literature contains 
some interesting conceptual discussions on energy security (see Mulligan 2010; Ciută 
2010), these lack in-depth empirical engagement. In contrast, this thesis builds upon a 
conceptual interest in energy security to analyse how it works in two different empirical 
contexts, using this to construct an account of the relationship between energy and security 
which is both conceptually developed and empirically informed. Ultimately, the purpose is 
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pragmatic - to generate useful knowledge to understand how energy security works. The 
empirical focus here is on energy security in the United States and China as they are the 
top two energy consumers and importers globally, which makes them particularly 
vulnerable to energy (in)security issues. This follows Friedrichs and Kratochwil’s ‘most-
important’ case design which aims to help conceptual clarity (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 
2009: 718). The analysis starts in 2004, as the year of ‘the global demand shock’, with a 
huge increase in global oil consumption, putting energy security at the top of the national 
security agenda (Yergin 2011b: 193).  
 
In being interested in how the concept of energy security works, this research takes a 
different methodological approach to the mainstream energy security research. This results 
in a ‘refusal of [a positivist] causal epistemology’ (Hansen 2006: 17) and thus in asking 
different questions, since I am not testing a hypothesis or evaluating a causal claim in the 
traditional sense. Rather than asking ‘why’ energy security is constructed in a particular 
way, this research focuses on ‘how’ energy security is constructed, following Doty: 
 
why questions generally take as unproblematic the possibility that particular policies and practices 
could happen. They presuppose the identities of social actors and a background of social meanings. 
In contrast, how questions examine how meanings are produced and attached to various social 
subjects and others, thus constituting particular interpretive dispositions that create certain 
possibilities and preclude others (Doty 1996: 4)  
 
 
Ultimately, discourses work to construct subjects in particular ways, allowing particular 
‘possibilities of practice’ to emerge because of the reality that is constructed (Doty 1993: 
304). Consequently, this research looks at how particular representations of energy 
security work to make particular policies possible and others less likely. In this process it 
follows Hansen’s understanding of discourse and policy as ‘co-constitutive’ (Hansen 2006: 
22; also Milliken 1999). This simply means that particular discourses and policies 
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reproduce each other, with discourses enabling particular policies, which in turn make 
those discourses possible and accepted as ‘common sense’. Thus, discourse and policy 
stand in a constitutive, rather than a causal, relationship. As a result, I use the word 
‘construction’ in this dual sense, with the phrase ‘energy security constructions’ referring 
to both discursive and policy practices. Because of the focus on how energy security works 
in practical empirical contexts, a range of critical approaches to security were considered 
and used where helpful
4
. Following this, analysis began ‘with a set of discourses’, asking: 
‘“what do they do?”’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 10). 
 
In this understanding of security I follow a critical constructivist approach, drawing on 
post-positivist epistemology and research methods, ‘recognizing the constitutive power of 
discourses while also acknowledging the possibility for political actors to affect change’ 
(McDonald 2012: 16; see also Weldes et al. 1999; Doty 1998; Fierke 2007). As such, the 
research aims to disrupt ‘common sense’ understandings (Milliken 1999: 229) of energy 
security to illustrate that energy security could, and perhaps should, be constructed 
differently. Approached in this way, opening up potential for change involves challenging 
‘some of the naturalised assumptions of the dominant representations of the world’ and 
could go as far as reimagining the world (Weldes et al. 1999: 21).  In pursuit of this goal, 
the research analysed both dominant and marginalised energy security discourses in the 
US and China, moving between the different discourses to illustrate the contested nature of 
energy security, opening up the meaning and providing potential for change. 
 
                                                          
4 Securitisation theory was a useful starting point and guide to how security works in some cases. However, 
the focus of the research was not whether or not energy is securitised, but rather how ‘security’ works when 
applied to energy in the US and China. Consequently, securitisation theory was used only as a guide and a 
reference point (Wilkinson 2013b: 8), providing one way to explain security processes rather than the 
definitive account of all such processes. This also enabled me to go outside securitisation theory and study 
articulations of security which do not fit within the framework, where the theory was of limited use. This is 
discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
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This process followed a critical approach, which allows for ‘a normative choice in favour 
of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but…limits the range of 
choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world’ (Cox 
1986: 130). The focus on existing alternative constructions of energy security already ‘out 
there’ in the discursive space was underpinned by a concern with power and an 
unwillingness as a researcher to impose an ‘ideal’ type definition of energy security. 
Moreover, building an alternative understanding of energy security on discourses already 
‘out there’ is seen as a more feasible path for change, as opposed to constructing an ‘ideal’ 
alternative and simply sitting back and waiting for it to be ‘adopted’. Considering what an 
alternative approach to energy security might look like was an essential part of advocating 
change, as ‘[o]ne...needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants 
to establish’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: xix). Thus, this was in a sense a process of 
envisioning the future, to ‘make the future meaningful and to lay out [alternative] 
possibilities of being in the world’ (Berenskoetter 2011: 648).  
 
This research is underpinned by a strong normative commitment, driven by a lack of 
normative considerations in the field of energy security. Based on this, this research looks 
first at how security works when attached to energy in the United States and China, 
focusing on how security is used in different discourses and practices: who or what is 
being secured, how the process of securing is undertaken, by whom, and what the 
outcomes are. This is then used to argue that energy security is contested – it means 
different things to different people in different contexts, and thus in this case security is 
neither inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The final chapter uses these existing competing notions 
of energy security to develop a framework for what a more ‘negative’ or a more ‘positive’ 
energy security looks like - and to suggest that we can move towards more positive energy 
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security practices by understanding how security works and drawing on and building on 
more positive constructions of energy security. Consequently, while many critical 
approaches dismiss security as a problematic concept, I argue that the concept of security 
is often positive. As a result, locating more positive constructions of security in practice 
begins to disrupt traditional, more negative notions of security, and as such can open up 
space to move towards more positive constructions of security. 
 
Argument and contribution 
Argument 
The argument in this thesis proceeds in three parts as follows. 
 
Firstly, it is argued that energy security means different things in different contexts, and it 
is sometimes more ‘positive’, and sometimes more ‘negative’. Critical academic debate on 
the value of security has characterised security either as an essentially ‘positive’ value to 
be fought for (see Booth 1991, 2005a, 2007), or as having inherently ‘negative’ 
consequences and therefore as best avoided (Buzan et al. 1998)
5
. It is argued that both of 
these understandings of security are problematic for analysing energy security, as they 
impose a fixed and narrow interpretation of security. It works to limit the study of security 
to how security works when situated actors ‘happen to act in theoretically prescribed 
ways’, with theory taking precedence over situated security practice (Ciută 2009: 316). 
This then closes down and limits the study of security to pre-determined categories. 
Instead, it is argued here that security does not have an intrinsic ‘essence’ or meaning 
(Ciută 2009: 303-4). Language is ‘inherently unstable’ (Hansen 2006: 17), and as a result, 
while particular constructions of energy security rely on specific meanings of security, 
                                                          
5
 There is also an emerging literature on positive /negative security which will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter two (see Roe 2008, 2012; Floyd 2007, 2011; Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). 
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these meanings are neither fixed nor final but have to be continually reproduced. All 
representations and discourses can be contested, and thus there is always space for change 
(Doty 1996: 6). Vitally, if security has no ‘essence’, it can never be objectively, or 
intrinsically ‘negative’, as in the Copenhagen School’s understanding, nor fundamentally 
emancipatory as in the Welsh School’s approach. Rather, some energy security 
constructions are more ‘positive’, and some are more ‘negative’. This works to open up 
analysis beyond existing frameworks to analyse a wider range of security constructions. 
 
Secondly, I posit that energy security as currently constructed is problematic and can be 
characterised as negative. This can be seen in more detail in chapters four and five which 
discuss state constructions of energy security in the US and China between 2004 and 2012. 
There is a link between energy security as currently constituted and a very particular 
understanding of national security which justifies and underpins a negative construction of 
security, enabling policies which cause insecurity. Energy security is constructed and 
defined by elite actors working in various parts of the security establishment, with little or 
no input from non-elite, non-state actors, or even from other government departments 
working on related issues such as climate security. These actors construct the state as the 
referent object to be secured, against external threats in the form of (fossil fuel) 
supply/price disruptions. Energy security is thus narrow both in terms of actors and in 
terms of referents – a small number of situated actors define energy security and its 
referent. This is neither democratic nor does it produce security beyond protecting the 
continued existence of the state. They also reproduce insecurity, through the reproduction 
of friend/foe, threat-defence thinking, prioritising the security of the state above the 
security of human beings and the environment they depend on to survive. This enables 
policy choices which secure the state’s fossil fuel supplies at the expense of international 
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cooperation and climate stability, endangering the future of the planet which human beings 
depend on to survive. In this way it produces insecurity for states, the environment and 
individual human beings. Thus, the argument that security needs to move away from 
traditional geopolitical premises is not simply a case of ethical preferences, but of 
‘strategic necessities’ (Burke 2013: 21). Ultimately, if security is about survival, then the 
national security project has failed. However, while the way energy security is currently 
constructed in dominant discourse and policy in the US and China is undoubtedly 
negative, these meanings are not fixed but constructed through discourse and practice, and 
can therefore be contested. 
 
Thirdly, if we look outside traditional actors and places of study in international security, 
energy security is sometimes constructed more positively. Chapter six presents an active 
search for more positive, alternative constructions of energy security in the United States 
and China. It looks both at marginalised state energy security discourses, and discourses 
produced by non-state actors, focusing on non-governmental organisations advocating for 
a change in energy policy. In these discourses, security is no longer ‘exclusive’, but 
concerning multiple or inclusive referents. They emphasise the need to secure beyond the 
state, reframing security away from national security and towards securing human beings 
and ecosystems, both in their own right and for human needs. A growing number of actors 
are involved, often operating across national borders, though states remain important as 
political actors. Sustainability is a key principle behind these notions of energy security, 
emphasising the need for humans to coexist with nature in a way that does not compromise 
the social, economic and environmental needs of future generations. This is used to 
illustrate that energy security does not have to be negative. Building on these existing 
positive energy security practices provides potential for change. Vitally, it enables a 
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positive energy security to harness the power in ‘security’, recognising that ‘it is not 
necessary to reject the concept of security in order to think about peace and justice; just the 
particular understanding of security through which the concept has more or less been 
turned into its opposite’ (Walker 1988: 161).  
 
Contribution 
Following this, the primary contribution of this thesis lies in bringing together conceptual 
insights from critical approaches to security with empirical cases from the subfield of 
energy security studies to understand how energy is constructed as a security issue. As has 
been noted, despite the growing significance of ‘energy security’ within the realm of 
policy, the concept itself has largely escaped critical scrutiny. Likewise, critical work has 
tended to look at ‘security’ as an abstract whole rather than in terms of energy specifically. 
Where critical work has touched on the issue of energy it has thus far not engaged in the 
level of empirical detail offered by this thesis. As an increasingly important area of 
research, energy security provides new insights for critical security studies, most notably 
raising questions about how security in particular ‘works’ – and what it ‘does’ – when 
attached to energy. 
 
To this end, the thesis provides in-depth and empirically rich analysis of how energy 
security is understood and constructed in discourse and policy in the US and China, 
drawing on over 700 documents and original interview data with experts and policy-
makers. In this process, it illustrates a clear problem with the way in which energy security 
is approached: it does not, and cannot, produce security. Problematically, the existing 
energy security studies literature overlooks the construction of energy as a security issue 
and remains focused on solving state fossil fuel supply problems, rather than questioning 
INTRODUCTION 
14 
 
or interrogating what this very specific understanding of energy security does. Moreover, 
as discussed previously, it fails to recognise that such a (negative) understanding of energy 
security contributes to and reproduces insecurity. Likewise, it cannot provide any potential 
for changing existing policy to move away from the current energy security dynamic. By 
drawing on critical approaches to security, this thesis highlights the constructed and 
contested nature of energy security, in the process opening up potential for movement 
towards more ‘positive’ energy security practices.  
 
In turn, applying critical approaches to understand energy security raises theoretical 
questions about how ‘security’ works and what it ‘does’ when attached to energy. Energy 
poses new challenges for understanding security; most notably illustrating that ‘security’ 
does not work the same way in all contexts. Overall, energy security is contested – it 
means different things to different people in different contexts. While some constructions 
of energy as security are negative, others are more positive. This raises important 
theoretical questions about the importance of context for understanding the value of 
security and the potential for moving towards more ‘positive’ energy security discourse 
and practice. By drawing on literature emphasising the contested and contextual nature of 
the meaning of security, suggesting that security has no ‘essence’ (Ciută 2009: 303-4), I 
argue that if security has no fixed meaning, it cannot have a fixed value. Thus security 
cannot be inherently ‘negative’ or ‘positive’, as the value varies depending on how 
security is used – it is contextual (see Floyd 2007 for a similar argument using 
securitisation theory). Following this approach and argument, this thesis moves away from 
abstract theorising of security towards a more pragmatic, policy-relevant approach, using 
empirical analysis of a range of sources to illustrate that energy security constructions 
range from more negative to more positive, using already existing constructions of energy 
INTRODUCTION 
15 
 
security to develop an idea of what a more negative and a more positive energy security 
policy looks like.  
 
Like all research constrained by time and practical concerns, this research has a number of 
limitations. It does not address solutions to energy security as traditionally understood, 
providing no solutions to or in-depth discussion of how to provide states with secure 
energy supplies at stable prices. This does not mean that this is of no concern, merely that 
this is dealt with better elsewhere and is outside the boundaries of this research. Likewise, 
the research looks only at two empirical cases during a limited time period and with 
limited resources; focusing primarily on how the concept of energy security is constructed. 
Lastly, the research only provides one, situated answer to how energy security is 
constructed. As such, it does not claim to provide a neutral or objective ‘truth’, but rather 
to suggest one possible solution to how we can rethink energy security and move forward 
towards more positive energy security practices.  
 
Wagers  
This section briefly outlines the underlying methodological assumptions, or ‘wagers’, on 
which this research is based, starting with a discussion of the role of knowledge claims, the 
use of critical constructivism as an approach, and a discussion of normativity.  
 
For clarity, methodology is here understood broadly as ‘philosophical ontology, setting the 
context within which particular practices of knowledge-making might make sense’ 
(Jackson 2010: 32). All research rests on philosophical-ontological wagers that can never 
be ‘settled’, or proven definitively (Jackson 2010: 34). These wagers ‘constitute worlds, in 
that they quite literally set the stage for the kinds of empirical and theoretical puzzles and 
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challenges that a scholar takes to be meaningful and important’ (Jackson 2010: 34). It is 
essential to be open and clear about the wagers on which research undertaken rests: they 
ultimately define ‘the researcher, the world to be researched, and the character of the 
relationship between them’ (Jackson 2010: 35). The vast majority of work on energy 
security rests on neopositivist assumptions, viewing the researcher and the world to be 
researched as separate. On these assumptions, valid knowledge claims have to correspond 
to an objectively existing reality, and this is ensured through hypothesis-testing or by 
producing cross-case comparisons. In contrast, this research rests on different 
methodological assumptions, understanding the researcher as an inseparable part of the 
world being researched. Following this, we cannot speak of a ‘world’ existing separately 
from ‘the activities of making sense of that world’ (Jackson 2010: 36; Yanow 2006). As 
researchers, we do not have ‘privileged, objective access’ to an independently existing 
empirical world (Neal 2013: 44). This does not mean that research is impossible, but that 
we need to acknowledge the role of the researcher in the process. Ultimately, no research 
is neutral and there is always an ‘ineluctable debt to interpretation’ (Campbell 1998b: 4). 
Research involves making a number of choices throughout the research process and as 
such any results and answers necessarily reflect a researcher’s interests and choices. 
 
Following these wagers, the approach taken in this research is pragmatic. As our 
knowledge cannot have secure foundations, the aim is instead to ‘seek knowledge that will 
enable us to deal with relevant problems and, ultimately, to find our way through the 
complexities of the social world’ (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 726). Thus, the 
emphasis is not on producing or uncovering an objective ‘truth’ that is ‘out there’ in an 
independently existing world, but on gaining practically useful knowledge, which is 
always provisional and always historically contingent (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 
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713). Rather than following a positivist approach defining the concepts at the beginning of 
the research process and holding them constant, the conceptual framework and field of 
research were allowed to adapt throughout, with concepts adjusted throughout the 
research, to avoid ‘self-imposed conceptual blinders’  (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 
717). This included the conceptual framework, following Wilkinson’s approach of using 
securitisation theory as a reference point rather than a definitive answer (2013b: 8). The 
concepts and questions were thus left open during the research process. Following this 
approach, it is also worth clarifying that this research is not a comparative project, as 
empirical generalisation is not the goal. The framework developed here is helpful for 
understanding my case studies, and may work in other concrete cases, but it is not a 
‘general law’.  
 
Following these methodological assumptions, the approach used in this research drew on 
critical constructivism, as this allowed me to ask the questions I was interested in and to 
analyse my puzzle. Pursuing critical social constructivist analysis involves committing to 
the following analytical principles: 
1. What is understood as reality is socially constructed.  
2. Constructions of reality reflect, enact and reify relations of power. In turn, certain agents or 
groups of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities. 
3. A critical constructivist approach denaturalises dominant constructions, offers guidelines for the 
transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-worlds. It also 
problematises the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also reflexive 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 13, emphasis added) 
 
It is important to note that attempts to reimagine the world are necessarily always ‘partial 
and situated’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 21), but visualising an alternative is still a crucial part of 
advocating change. Critical constructivists do not focus on testing causal theories but 
rather on denaturalizing ‘dominant constructions, in part by revealing their connection to 
existing power relations’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398). It also points to ‘potential 
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alternatives to prevailing structures’ (Adler 2002: 102), which informs the normative 
agenda of this research. In this process it draws on critical theory, claiming ‘an interest in 
change, and a capacity to foster change, that no conventional constructivist could make’ 
(Hopf 1998: 184). Critical constructivism will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
 
Lastly, a focus on the ethics of security implies a normative approach, as it necessitates the 
analyst both evaluating security and making some form of judgement about what security 
should or shouldn’t be. In this sense, analysts are understood as ‘active participants in the 
security discussion’ (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012: 851), rather than passive, or ‘neutral’ 
observers. While ‘all enquiries into security are normative’ (Fierke 2007: 3) as studying 
security necessarily involves making choices about what the world ‘is’, producing 
meaning (see also Crawford 1998: 134-5), I am going beyond this to ‘re-imagine’ energy 
security based on existing alternative discourses. In this way I am explicitly exploring the 
potential for change, viewing language as unfixed and changeable. This process also draws 
on work by Doty and Trombetta, who illustrate the reflexive, two-way process of meaning-
construction in contrast to top-down approaches like securitisation theory (Doty 1998; 
Trombetta 2008, 2010). Once meanings of security are opened up and recognised as being 
contested, security can be a site of ‘(even emancipatory) change’ (McDonald 2008: 580). 
Thus illustrating that energy security both can be, and is being, thought, represented and 
practiced differently opens up potential for change. However, overall the aim here is to 
encourage wider theoretical and conceptual debate over the concept of energy security in a 
changing world, rather than to impose one account of energy security as the only viable 
approach. As such, the approach suggested here is an alternative, not a replacement, and 
certainly not the only alternative.  
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Structure of thesis 
This thesis is divided into six substantive chapters.  The first three chapters deal with the 
literature, theory, research design and methods as follows. Chapter one presents a critical 
review of the existing energy security literature, divided into ‘logics’ of security. It starts 
with the dominant approach to energy security, discussing the literature following realist 
and liberal logics of security, as well as a ‘comprehensive’ logic combining the two. It then 
assesses the limited existing critical work on energy security. Chapter two outlines the 
conceptual framework underlying this thesis, starting with a discussion on methodology, 
before outlining critical constructivism as an approach. It then discusses the relationship 
between this research and securitisation theory, before discussing the Welsh School of 
security studies and normative agendas. Lastly, it discusses the emerging literature on the 
ethics/value of security, outlining where this approach differs from existing ones, 
suggesting that the value of security needs to be studied in context. Chapter three presents 
the research design and methods, starting with a discussion on research design followed by 
research methods divided into data collection and data analysis, addressing both interviews 
and virtual archives. 
 
Chapters four, five and six present the empirical work undertaken. Chapter four presents 
an analysis of dominant energy security practices in the United States, beginning with a 
contextual discussion on the policy-making process and history of energy in the United 
States, before analysing energy security policy between 2004-2012 and the discourses 
which made those policies possible. Chapter five follows the same structure, presenting the 
analysis of dominant energy security discourse and practice in China. Chapter six starts by 
outlining the problems with current energy security discourses and policies, highlighting a 
link between energy and a logic of national security, characterising these discourses as 
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representing a largely negative notion of security. It then looks at existing, marginalised 
alternative constructions of energy security in the US and China, drawing out key themes. 
Finally, it uses this to discuss what a positive energy security might look like, and the 
implications for thinking, analysing, speaking and practicing energy security differently. 
As such, it places the research back into the debate on the value of security, presenting a 
framework for understanding the value of security in context and discussing the possibility 
of using existing discourses as a basis for developing more positive energy security 
practices. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Energy security: the existing debate 
 
 
 
This research project approaches energy through the lens of security studies, looking at the 
relationship between energy and security. Consequently, this chapter surveys the existing 
literature on energy security in IR and security studies, from a critical perspective. It 
locates the vast majority of the existing literature as closely related with a traditional logic 
of security, and problematises this. It focuses on the academic literature, saving the policy 
literature for the empirical chapters, while recognising that the academic conceptualisation 
of energy security is itself influenced by policy debate and ‘academic and policy 
discourses are largely mutually constitutive’ (Shepherd 2008a: 10). As such the texts 
analysed here are in a sense both primary and secondary material (Hansen 2006: 83). The 
following section presents a brief discussion of security studies and explains what I mean 
by ‘logics’ of security, following Shepherd (2008b), and how this approach is used to 
understand the mainstream energy security literature. The rest of the chapter presents the 
existing energy security literature, starting with the mainstream literature. This section 
begins with a discussion on the literature on the concept of energy security, before 
discussing literature on energy security in the US and China, which is divided into 
subsections detailing the realist, liberal and comprehensive logics of energy security. The 
remainder of the chapter looks at the existing critical literature on energy security. The 
conclusion outlines the agenda for this research. 
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1.1 Energy, security studies and logics of security 
Traditional Security Studies emerged as a distinct sub-discipline of International Relations 
(IR) during the Cold War. The key focus of study is ‘the phenomenon of war’ – ultimately, 
‘security studies assumes that conflict between states is always a possibility’ (Walt 1991: 
212). Security is understood as protection from threats, usually of a military or geopolitical 
nature, and the referent object – the thing to be protected – is always the state. Security is 
deeply connected with a realist understanding of anarchy, making self-help the goal of 
foreign policy, as ‘each state must guarantee its own survival since no other will provide 
its security’ (Mearsheimer, 1990: 12). In orthodox security studies security is objective, 
‘defined by state survival in the face of external threats’ - in these terms, ‘the object of 
security is the state and threats, and therefore insecurities, are objective, external, and 
fundamentally related to the use of power, and ultimately force’ (Shepherd and Weldes 
2008: 530). Because of the historical primacy of the state, security has become closely 
linked with state sovereignty, and national security has become privileged in discussions 
about security (Walker 1990: 8). The state is presented as ‘inside’, and the thing to be 
protected, while the international is presented as anarchic, ‘outside’, and Other. This 
distinction has led security discourse to construct the state as the necessary focus of 
security and in need of protecting from an indefinite number of possible threats that exist 
in the anarchic realm, including Other states (Campbell 1998b). The privileging of the 
state in security discourse has worked to set limits on the security debate, and in particular 
limits on how ‘we have been able to think about more desirable alternatives’ (Walker 
1990: 7), including the very meaning of security. Likewise, traditional security studies has 
used ‘disciplining practices’ (Krause 1998: 300; for example, see Walt 1991: 222) to 
delineate and limit the scope and subject of research in security studies. 
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Traditional security studies is distinguished by a divide between realist and liberal 
understandings of the international system. In their current more popular forms, neorealism 
and neoliberalism share an understanding of the international system as an anarchic realm. 
Moreover, ‘neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar assumptions about agents: 
states are the dominant actors in the system, and they define security in “self-interested” 
terms’ (Wendt 1992: 392). In their understanding of security and the international system, 
realists emphasise the need to secure the strategic autonomy of the state, resisting 
interdependence, whereas liberals assume and/or accept a relatively high degree of 
interdependence. As a result, liberal ideas about how to achieve (national) security take a 
different form in practice, emphasising international institutions and economic 
interdependence. This will be discussed in more detail in the following section. However, 
both remain methodologically and epistemologically positivist, viewing threats to security 
as objectively identifiable
1
.  
 
Here, I use Shepherd’s ‘logics of security’2 as an analytical framework for understanding 
the mainstream energy security literature, to highlight clear problems with the traditional 
concept of energy security and its ties to a very traditional understanding of security and 
the international system. Shepherd suggests that every security discourse is ‘organised 
around a particular logic of security’, highlighting the way ‘concepts are organised within 
specific discourses of security’ – ultimately,  
each competing conceptualisation of security has a distinct primary focus, referent object and 
perspective on the arrangement of the international system... The ways in which these claims are 
                                                          
1
 It is worth noting that liberalism has been more accepting of critical security studies, leading to the 
development of ‘human security’ which focuses on securing individuals (see Newman 2010) though this 
engagement is ignored in liberal analyses of energy security.  
2
 It is necessary to recognise where I depart from Shepherd’s framework. While Shepherd states that ‘there is 
no single voice of author-ity, as there is no single truth of the matter/reality, thus I do not offer an alternative 
logic of security’ (Shepherd 2008a: 311) this research has an explicitly normative agenda that goes beyond 
critiquing the existing logics of energy security to rethink energy security and offer an alternative logic of 
security, which will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
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made, the assumptions that inform them, and the policy prescriptions that issue from them, are what 
I refer to as “logics of security” (Shepherd 2008b: 294) 
 
The two central competing conceptualisations of energy security presented in the 
mainstream literature will here be referred to as the realist and liberal logics of energy 
security. The realist logic of security focuses largely on the state-level, with the state as the 
referent object of security and authors focusing on the role of energy in ‘national security’. 
Their understanding of the international system emphasises its anarchic nature as 
inevitably and irrevocably leading to competition between states. The liberal logic of 
security focuses on the state and/or the global level, with the state or global economy as 
the referent object of security. Their understanding of the international system similarly 
tends to emphasise anarchy, but with the assumption that this will not always lead to 
competition, and that states can overcome anarchy through cooperation. Economic 
interdependence is emphasised, together with economic competition. Meanwhile, in the 
realist logic, security equals strategic autonomy, and while the liberal logic assumes and/or 
accepts interdependence between states the realist logic resists interdependence. This focus 
on autonomy spurs competition and hinders cooperation.  
 
These two logics dominate the current literature on energy security. In practice, their 
understandings of (energy) security and the appropriate referent objects of energy security 
are not that different; the claims they make about energy security are both strongly linked 
to a ‘highly conventional logic of security’ (Shepherd 2008b: 294). This has a direct 
impact on policy, as the particular understanding of energy security and the discourse used 
makes very particular policy possible while excluding other policy choices, in effect 
limiting the range of policy choices available. This will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter two. Energy security is here understood as socially and discursively constructed, 
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and as such this research problematises the understanding of energy security presented in 
the mainstream literature.  
 
1.2 The mainstream approach to energy security3 
1.2.1 What is energy security? 
This section discusses the concept of ‘energy security’, before discussing literature on 
energy security specifically in the US and China, which is divided into subsections 
detailing the realist, liberal and comprehensive logics of energy security. 
 
Energy security has traditionally been understood as the availability of secure supplies of 
energy at reasonable or affordable prices. Some branches of academia have attempted to 
expand this definition in recent years, particularly in environmental studies and energy 
technology or policy, with Sovacool finding 45 different definitions in the literature 
(Sovacool 2010a: 3-6)
4
, though the vast majority of these focus on the state. However, the 
emphasis in International Relations and Security Studies remains very orthodox, often 
returning to Yergin’s 1988 definition suggesting that ‘the objective of energy security is to 
assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not 
                                                          
3
 The literature presented here is necessarily selective and certainly does not represent an exhaustive list. The 
emphasis is on key works in IR (though some references are made to related fields where relevant), which 
cover the concept of energy security as well as energy security in the United States and China. Because the 
US and China are the two largest net oil importers globally, much of the energy security literature centres on 
these cases anyway. Likewise, their energy security strategies have implications for each other (see 
Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 6). 
4 This is more common in environmental studies and energy technology/policy work - see, for example 
Kruyt et al (2009) and the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre(APERC 2007) who suggest a broadened 
definition including 4 A’s: availability (geological), accessibility (geopolitical), affordability (economical), 
and acceptability (environmental/societal). Meanwhile, the IR literature focuses largely on the middle two – 
geopolitical accessibility and affordability – often overlooking geological availability and relying on low 
standards of environmental/social acceptability. Kruyt et al. also note that while the literature shows a wide 
range of potential security of supply indicators, but most are not actually used in policy-making, where 
emphasis remains on price and import dependency - ‘governments see security of supply as a major objective 
for their energy policy’ (2009). Other ‘broadeners’ include Helm (2002) and Winzer (2012) though the latter 
returns to the more traditional security of supply. In broadened discussions of energy security, it can include 
anything from nuclear proliferation to environmental protection.  
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jeopardize major national values and objectives’ (1988: 111). Historically, the focus has 
been narrow, stressing security of oil supply. This reflects the fact that ‘the current energy 
security system was created in response to the 1973 Arab oil embargo…[and thus] focuses 
primarily on how to handle any disruption of oil supplies from producing countries’ 
(Yergin 2006). Even today the International Energy Agency defines energy security as ‘the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (IEA 2013b), and this 
narrow notion of energy security remains key in the academic literature (Lee 2005: 266; 
Xu 2006: 43; Bielecki 2002), as does the focus on security of oil supply (Bielecki 2002: 
237; Vivoda 2009; also IEA 2013b). The definition itself remains largely ‘unquestioned’ in 
the mainstream literature on energy security (Dannreuther 2010: 145). Those who do 
suggest that the current definition of energy security is problematic tend to focus on its 
bias towards the developed, energy importing world, suggesting it be ‘expanded to include 
the protection of the entire energy supply chain and infrastructure’ (Yergin 2006; see also 
Dannreuther 2010).  
 
Energy has generally been considered a security issue (at least for importing states) since 
the 1970s oil crises, after which Treverton argued that ‘there can now be no doubt that 
access to and use of energy have clear bearing on the security of nations’ (1980: 1). What 
this means in practice, however, is rarely questioned. Deese suggests that energy security 
has both internal (domestic) and external components: ‘it is the external component – 
energy imports – that poses the most immediate problems for national security’ (1979: 
140). Indeed, discussions of energy as a security issue often relate back to foreign policy, 
with suggestions that the concept itself has a traditional security focus (Mulligan 2011: 
634). States play a central and arguably increasing role in achieving energy security, with 
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national oil companies and state intervention growing in importance
5
. We are said to be 
living in a ‘fossil fuel age’, characterised by the continual struggle by states to secure 
supplies of scarce resources (Yergin 2011b: 4). Many discussions also emphasise the 
economic dimension of energy security, suggesting that energy is a security issue as 
economies rely on secure and stable supplies to function  (Kruyt et al. 2009). Moreover, 
with increasing emphasis on the idea of ‘peak oil’, energy security is, if possible, 
becoming even more entrenched as a national and economic security priority. We are in 
what is said to be the start of a ‘new geopolitics of energy’ (Klare 2008: 6), where energy 
is ‘an issue of “high politics”’ (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 13). Ultimately, ‘energy and 
its challenges will be defining for our future’ (Yergin 2011b: 8).  
 
However, even in the mainstream literature, the relationship between energy and security 
is not straightforward: 
devising a strategy and thinking about energy as a security problem is not as simple as it first 
seems…energy security is only part of national security; in some circumstances we would risk 
energy supplies for other values we consider part of our national security (Nye 1981: 6) 
 
Thus, while it is often high on the national security agenda, energy remains one of several 
issues prioritised. Likewise, energy security has slightly different emphases in the United 
States and China. While both states emphasise security of supply at stable prices, the 
United States is historically more dependent on oil (Rutledge 2006), while China only 
became a net oil importer in 1993 and still remains heavily reliant on domestic coal. While 
Xu has asserted that this makes China more focused on domestic supply than overseas 
supply (2006), China’s huge increases in energy consumption, together with the 
international dimension of China’s energy policy suggests overseas supply – particularly 
                                                          
5
 In the 1970s international oil companies dominated the oil market, but by 2007 ‘state controlled national oil 
companies accounted for 52% of global oil production and held 88% of total reserves’ (Bradshaw 2010: 
276). 
CHAPTER 1 
28 
 
of oil – is increasingly important (see also Zhang 2003). Meanwhile, as an industrialising 
country, Chinese notions of energy security also emphasise the importance of energy 
supply for economic and social development (Zha 2006b: 3). However, while there are 
some differences mainstream Chinese thinking on energy security shares key 
characteristics with Western traditional thinking on energy security (Downs 2004: 23). 
 
The existing and growing body of literature on energy security analyses the growing 
‘energy threat’ using discourse framed around logics of realist/liberal (energy) security 
which present ‘two diverging accounts of the causes of energy insecurity and the means to 
overcome them’, reflecting opposing traditions in International Political Economy 
(Dannreuther 2010: 145) and Security Studies. It is important to note that these two logics 
are extreme ends of the spectrum, and there are many nuances and disagreements within 
the two central groupings presented here. It is a subjective distinction which simplifies the 
literature, but for the purpose of this analysis it is a helpful one, as it centres on their 
understanding of energy security and the logics of (energy) security the discourses they 
present centre around. Ultimately, the mainstream energy security literature remains ‘state-
centric, supply-side biased, overwhelmingly focused on oil and tends to equate security 
with self-sufficiency’ (Downs 2004: 23). There is agreement between authors that security 
of supply is a national security issue, but they differ in terms of how to solve this. This 
next section maps the ‘mainstream’ academic discourses on energy security, looking at this 
literature according to the prescribed logic of security, analysing how they understand 
threat and the referent object of security. It also looks at where these two discourses 
overlap, and the ‘comprehensive’ approach which aims to bring the two logics together. 
The emphasis here is on how energy security is represented in the academic literature, 
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asking, what does it mean to be ‘secure’ in energy terms, according to the dominant 
literature?  
 
1.2.2 The realist logic: securing the autonomous state 
What is here referred to as the realist logic has elsewhere been referred to as the ‘strategic 
approach’ to ensuring energy security. Here energy security is ensured by controlling 
supplies via state owned companies, focusing on energy independence/self-sufficiency, 
political links with, and investment in, energy-exporting states, and using military force 
(Andrews-Speed 2004: 340). Dannreuther describes this approach in the literature as the 
‘neomercantilist and realist tradition, which sees the international struggle for energy 
security as a zero-sum game’ (2010: 145). Both American and Chinese policy approaches 
to energy security have been placed in this category by various authors (see Andrews-
Speed 2004: 343), though there is little agreement – both states have also been 
characterised as following a liberal logic. There is a large body of literature on resource 
wars which feeds into the ominous predictions of the realist logic of energy security (see 
for example Klare 2002). The referent object of energy security here is always the state, 
and the state is the central actor in an anarchic world with scarce resources: ‘we are 
seeking more, but finding less’ (Klare 2008: 39) – which inevitably leads to zero-sum 
competition. The literature presents a world where the strategy of self-interested states 
competing to ensure their autonomy and ultimately survival trumps the power of the 
international market and international cooperation. This section will now discuss some key 
authors who present energy security in terms of the realist logic, looking at how they 
represent energy security, what claims they make and upon what assumptions they base 
these claims and their claims about the international system. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
30 
 
Realist works on energy security in the US and China present energy as a national security 
issue, and tend to focus on the geopolitical aspect of energy security. Energy is presented 
as a key part of foreign policy, which should be pursued to advance national security 
interests (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005). The state is the central actor considered, and the 
object to be secured by a constant energy supply at a stable price. Vitally, for realists 
securing the state involves ensuring strategic autonomy in the international system, thus 
security necessitates ‘reducing vulnerability to being subject to the power of others’ (Lee 
2005: 289). Indeed, it is central to discussions of power: ‘ever since the industrial 
Revolution, energy and the need to secure its supply have been fundamental to any 
position of power in the world’ (Schlesinger 2005: xiii). The importance of strategy and 
military is closely linked to the representation of energy security:  
traditional energy security concern is about the supply of and demand for energy...A state is said to 
be insecure if it has to rely on external sources of strategic materials which contribute to its ‘war 
potential’ or if the supply of the strategic materials is under threat (Lee 2005: 266) 
 
Likewise, there is ‘mounting pressure on national leaders to satisfy their countries’ energy 
needs’ at any cost, financial or military (Klare 2008: 8, emphasis added). Because of 
mistrust and suspicion in US-China relations energy security is ‘national security’, not 
friendly competition (US Energy Secretary Abraham, Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 
17). Even when analysts include aspects of economic security (see Lee 2005) it is justified 
purely in national security terms, and the referent object remains the state. The security of 
the autonomous state is central, and in turn necessitates ‘a stable and secure supply of oil’ 
(Manning 2000a: 4). Following this, the US is said to need a ‘national energy strategy of 
autonomy and integrity’ (Klare 2005: 180-1). Ultimately, energy security is about ensuring 
secure access to the energy resources ‘required for the continued development of national 
power’ (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005: 9). 
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Authors in the realist logic tend to focus on the role of foreign policy and foreign oil 
imports in ensuring state energy security (see Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 58; Kalicki 
and Goldwyn 2005). Energy security is said to be increasingly important as a foreign 
policy issue in US-China relations because of growing energy needs (Boekestein and 
Henderson 2005: 28). Likewise ‘procurement of oil is deemed a national security issue in 
China and government policy is driven by strategic measures’, through the three main 
state-owned energy companies (CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec) (Boekestein and Henderson 
2005: 35). The autonomous state and national security are the central organising principles 
around which the realist logic represents energy security: 
Chinese oil executives are told to put their country’s oil security above the economics of their 
business. US Generals are told to expand their bases in order to project power into regions 
containing United States’ energy interests. Clearly, energy security is national security (Boekestein 
and Henderson 2005: 80, emphasis added) 
 
 
The realist logic shows claims based on very particular assumptions and principles, 
including the importance of strategy and geopolitics, and the increasing role of resource 
nationalism. The international system is characterised by a ‘resource race’; ‘a voracious, 
zero-sum contest that, if allowed to continue along present paths, can only lead to conflict 
among the major powers’ (Klare, 2008: 30). Global dynamics have changed – before 
nations cooperated more over energy security, today it is increasingly competitive (Kalicki 
and Goldwyn 2005: 5). The energy resource game is a zero-sum game, where a growing 
China needs increasing energy supplies which can only be satisfied ‘at the expense of 
other energy-starved nations’ (Klare 2008: 12). Following this logic, ‘every barrel of oil 
China buys in the Americas means one less barrel available for the US’ (Luft 2005). The 
possibility of disrupted supply is continually highlighted as a geostrategic vulnerability 
(Samuelson 2011). In response, the US and China are said to be adopting increasingly 
strategic energy security policies; ‘[f]or the first time, China is pursuing its energy security 
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policy outside of its borders’ (Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 31). These authors point to 
China’s ‘going-out’ strategy, adopted in 2002, encouraging its National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) ‘to build up secure supplies abroad through purchasing equity shares in overseas 
markets, exploring and drilling abroad, constructing refineries, and building pipelines to 
Siberia and Central Asia’ (Leverett and Bader 2005: 193). China’s energy policy has taken 
a bilateral, state-centred focus, and the state uses ‘regular high-level official visits’ to 
support its energy companies in the Gulf (Leverett and Bader 2005: 192). Overall, China’s 
oil security strategy aims to ensure autonomy by minimising vulnerability ‘to American 
power’ (Lee 2005: 269). In the US, with economic decline the military plays an 
increasingly important role in protecting energy foreign policy objectives (Boekestein and 
Henderson 2005: 21).  
 
The realist logic also notes increasing state involvement in energy policy, in the rise of 
NOCs, resource nationalism and neo-mercantilism, not just from China and other 
developing states but also in the West, particularly in the US (Klare 2008: 19-24). The 
Chinese leadership is said to attempt to ensure strategic autonomy by focusing on securing 
‘effective ownership of critical hydrocarbon resources’ instead of relying on the market 
(Leverett and Bader 2005: 188); but likewise, successive American administrations have 
assisted US firms seeking African energy assets (Klare 2008: 158). The need to integrate 
energy security into US political-military policy is emphasised (Nye 1981: 7). Leaders 
increasingly see energy as a ‘zero-sum contest – one in which a gain for one country 
almost always represents a loss for others’  (Klare 2008: 211). This is accompanied by 
alarmist discourses of danger emphasising the likelihood of resource wars (see for example 
Klare 2002). Manning points to the energy industry as ‘the apocalypse industry’ (2000a: 
1).  
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In terms of their view of the international system, this literature presents a world 
characterized by competition and inevitable and perpetual possibility of conflict. Changing 
energy dynamics are said to have strategic geopolitical consequences (Burrows and 
Treverton 2007). Decreasing supplies are presented as affecting our understanding of 
power and influence in the international system (Klare 2008: 14). Consequently, in the 
near future ‘the struggle over energy…[will] override all other considerations’ (Klare, 
2008: 7). In this world oil will no longer be largely a commodity traded on the 
international market, but will increasingly be in the hands of ‘senior government and 
military officials’ (Klare 2008: 7). This ‘world of rising powers and shrinking resources is 
destined to produce intense competition’ (Klare 2008: 7). Even with diversification and 
increasing renewables, ‘competition for global oil supplies will intensify…[w]e cannot 
escape that reality’ (Samuelson 2011). The US and China will continue to compete over 
energy in Central Asia and the Middle East and tension over energy issues will be 
amplified by their respective domestic political situations (Boekestein and Henderson 
2005: 8). The energy security strategies of both states are said to threaten each other 
(Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 6), and China’s increasing energy drive already causes 
bilateral tension (Leverett and Bader 2005: 196).  Ultimately competition between the two 
states over energy resources is said to be increasingly likely (Lee 2005: 279). Conflict over 
energy is increasingly seen as a possibility
6: ‘The dragon is thirsty and the eagle is hungry 
– but it will be difficult to satisfy both’ (Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 84).  
 
However, there are some authors who while presenting a broadly realist logic, argue that 
cooperation is possible. Friedberg refers to these authors as ‘optimistic realists’ (2005). 
                                                          
6
 Boekestein and Henderson point to Caverly, from the US Department of energy, as saying that 
‘geopolitically, this [energy security] could soon bring United States and Chinese interests into conflict’ 
(Caverly 2002, in Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 84). 
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Policy recommendations suggest that the US initiate cooperation, though it may not be 
successful (Leverett and Bader 2005: 197). There is a need for dialogue between the two to 
avoid ‘a gradually escalating clash of interests between the United States and China in the 
Middle East’ (Leverett and Bader 2005: 199), and markets could be a solution (Manning 
2000b: 73). There is also an element of (state) choice: ‘whether this prospect poses a 
security threat depends to a considerable degree on whether China elects to view energy 
security geostrategically or geoeconomically’ (Manning 2000b: 82). Meanwhile, the only 
way to avoid ‘inevitable’ conflict between US and China over energy would be previously 
unprecedented cooperation and partnership (Klare 2008: 245). If either or both state/s 
‘become convinced that their counterparts are implacably hostile and that conflict is 
therefore inevitable, they will no doubt act in ways that make it far more likely’ (Friedberg 
2005: 42). As a result, ‘it is likely that oil wars, instead of oil, are in the pipeline. 
Possibilities of bilateral or multilateral energy cooperation are, in contrast, rather remote’ 
(Lee 2005: 289). 
 
The realist logic represents energy as a national security issue, and the referent object to be 
secured in energy terms is always the state. For the state to be secure, strategic autonomy 
is necessary, which spurs competition and hinders cooperation. Energy is increasingly 
considered a foreign policy issue, and energy security policy is characterised by 
geostrategic concerns, and increasingly, resource nationalism. These claims are 
underpinned by an assumption that the international system is an anarchic realm 
characterised by zero-sum competition between autonomous states over scare resources. 
Cooperation is possible in some circumstances, and often considered desirable, but 
unlikely. Threats to (state) energy security are conceptualised in purely objective, strategic 
CHAPTER 1 
35 
 
terms as supply disruptions or other forms of lack of access to energy supplies, or price 
hikes.  
 
1.2.3 The liberal logic: securing the economy and interdependence 
The liberal logic has also been referred to as the ‘market’ approach to energy security, and 
derives from the ‘liberal political economy tradition’ (Dannreuther 2010: 145). Rather than 
political-military solutions or independence, it focuses on liberalizing energy markets, 
integration and interdependence as the solution to energy security (Andrews-Speed 2004: 
340). It is a specific, economic form of neoliberalism that is emphasised. The international 
system is generally still seen as anarchic, but cooperation is deemed not only possible but 
likely, as the world is becoming increasingly interdependent. Vitally, here energy security 
‘is not a zero-sum effort; if appropriate policies are instituted, the improvement of one 
country’s energy security need not be at the expense of other countries’’ (Gault 2006: 9, 
emphasis added). The referent object of energy security in the liberal logic is always the 
economy, but it can vary from securing the national economy or economic growth of 
particular states through economic integration, to focusing on securing the stability of the 
global economy (sometimes as a means to secure the energy security of states). Again, as 
with the realist logic, both Chinese and American strategies are sometimes seen in the 
terms of the liberal logic (for example, see Andrews-Speed 2004: 339). 
 
The liberal logic represents energy security again as reliable and adequate supply of energy 
at ‘reasonable prices’ (Bielecki 2002: 237). The emphasis is largely on liberal economics 
and market integration as a solution to energy security. Energy security is understood as a 
stable global energy/oil market, with one article by the Economist during the early stages 
of the Arab Spring stating that ‘to gauge the risks today you need to answer three 
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questions. How vulnerable is the oil market to an interruption in supply? How sensitive is 
the world economy to oil-price spikes? And how well can policymakers cope with a shock 
if the worst happens?’ (Economist 2011: emphasis added). Again, the referent object of 
energy security is clearly the world economy, and economic policy the way to protect it: 
‘[w]hat can central banks do to protect the economy?’ (Economist 2011). Instability during 
the Arab Spring was represented as a threat to energy security, with little discussion of the 
impact of oil security strategies, including economic competition over oil, on the security 
of individuals and the environment. Some work in the liberal logic of energy security 
moves completely above the state-level of analysis, emphasising globalisation and 
removing the state as a referent object of security: 
There is only one oil market, a complex and worldwide system that moves and consumes about 86 
million barrels of oil every day. For all consumers, security resides in the stability of this market. 
Secession is not an option (Yergin 2006: emphasis added) 
 
Here the market itself is given agency, moving and consuming oil. It is this market that is 
the object to be secured through various energy security measures. Likewise, individuals 
only exist as consumers. 
 
Some authors take a macroeconomic approach to energy security, emphasising the 
‘impacts of high energy prices and the danger of economic losses resulting from potential 
shortfalls in energy supply’ (Bielecki 2002: 237). Bielecki thus focuses on the security of 
oil markets, on supply and demand, prices, and the ‘supply security of IEA states’ (2002: 
238). Following this, ‘the meaning of reliable and adequate supply is rather 
straightforward: it simply means uninterrupted supply that fully meets the needs of the 
global economy…[t]he interpretation of reasonable prices is somewhat less clear…[i]n 
general, however, it means that prices are cost-based and determined by the market based 
on supply/demand balances’ (2002: 237). However, despite the emphasis on securing the 
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global economy, here it is secured ultimately in order to secure states – it is ‘consuming 
countries’ that are ultimately ‘vulnerable’ – and states, together with industry, are key 
actors to minimise risks of supply disruptions and their possible negative impact on the 
global economy (Bielecki 2002: 236-49). As such, while the global market or economy 
remains a core referent object, the understanding of security remains state-centric. 
Similarly, Lieberthal and Herberg dismiss the link between equity oil and energy security 
(used largely in the realist logic) as ‘based upon a pre-1970 understanding of global oil 
markets—an era before the creation of today’s dynamic, flexible global commercial oil 
markets’ (2006: 21). In the past five years ‘no major economy has suffered a physical 
shortage of oil—despite severe oil price increases and a rapid succession of geopolitical 
and weather-related supply disruptions’, though unfortunately US and Chinese thinkers do 
not seem to understand this (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 21, emphasis added). Again, the 
focus is on the security of state oil supply.  
 
Authors in the liberal logic present international markets and multilateral initiatives or 
institutions as the solution to energy insecurity (Yergin 2006). Overall, it is contended that 
market liberalization will help deal with energy security threats, and  
markets need to be recognized as a source of security in themselves...Today, large, flexible, and 
well-functioning energy markets provide security by absorbing shocks and allowing supply and 
demand to respond more quickly and with greater ingenuity than a controlled system could (Yergin 
2006: emphasis added) 
 
In effect, markets themselves are a source of energy security, and with globalization the 
‘share of energy traded internationally is increasing’ (Gault 2006: 3). Overall, ‘energy 
trade has served the world well’ (Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007: 99), and ‘to maintain 
energy security countries must diversify their suppliers of energy, create security margins, 
and remain integrated into a global system of energy consumption’ (Yergin 2006). In other 
words, they must integrate into the neoliberal energy market to ensure security. This kind 
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of thinking is institutionalised, with International Energy Agency energy security 
indicators showing ‘firm trust in the functioning of (liberalised) energy markets’, while 
‘dynamics of other aspects of SOS [security of supply], such as depletion, are ignored’ 
(Kruyt et al. 2009). The threat of energy insecurity is downplayed, in comparison to the 
alarmist peak oil discourse seen in the realist logic – we are told that the present condition 
does not represent an energy crisis (Bielecki 2002: 249). Equity investment by NOCs is 
not considered a threat as ‘all consumers will benefit from increases in global production 
capacity’ (Gault 2006: 8; see also Yergin 2006), and many authors point to a need to 
engage China ‘in the global network of trade and investment’ (Yergin 2006). Moreover, 
China’s NOCs are often ‘far more market driven and corporate centred than a superficial 
understanding of the go-out strategy might suggest’ (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 18). 
More recently, Chinese analysts increasingly promote ‘a more positive approach to 
international markets and institutions’, which is considered unequivocally positive 
(Kennedy 2010: 138).  
 
As a result, liberals argue that states cannot achieve security through energy independence, 
and interdependence and cooperation over energy is emphasised. The liberal logic’s 
representation of energy security is underpinned by the assumption that energy 
independence or autonomy is not possible in today’s world and a belief in the ‘pacific 
benefits of liberal interdependence’ (Dannreuther 2010: 146). There is a need for ‘national, 
regional, and international energy strategies that foster cooperation on energy issues’ 
(Pascual and Zambetakis 2009: 32). Cooperation, not competition, is presented as the 
natural response to energy security concerns, as the world becomes increasingly ‘energy-
interdependent’ (Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007: 95). Thus, growing Chinese energy needs 
and influence ‘should encourage both China and the United States to begin to develop 
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mechanisms for managing potential disagreements’ and shared interests will likely lead to 
cooperation (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 24). Even today, there are increasing signs of 
such bilateral cooperation over energy, though largely below policy level (Lieberthal and 
Herberg 2006: 31). Multilateral institutions and initiatives are also considered as a solution 
to energy insecurity. Multilateral initiatives are said to enhance cooperation and reduce 
mistrust (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 31). The US and China both have an interest in 
preserving price stability and supply security, both of which can be helped by increased 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 42). China’s energy 
development is hoped to move towards increased reliance on the international energy 
market for energy resources, ‘willingness to cooperate with other consumers to increase 
price stability’, as well as energy conservation and efficiency measures (Lieberthal and 
Herberg 2006: 28-29). This also relates to the global energy governance literature (Florini 
and Sovacool 2009) which emphasises the need for institutionalised global energy 
governance with a working energy agency regulating the global energy market (Helm 
2002: 184). 
 
The liberal logic of energy security presents an international system that is increasingly 
globalised and interdependent, while anarchy is still a factor. Overall states are more likely 
to cooperate than compete over energy resources as it is in their interest to do so, though 
economic competition remains a key principle. While ‘interdependence does not guarantee 
cooperation, it does provide more opportunities and incentives for cooperation than 
conflict’ (Xu 2006: 266). The US and China have common interests as the world’s largest 
energy consumers and it is ‘in the best interests of both countries to try to understand each 
other’s energy insecurities and find new ways to work toward cooperative outcomes’ 
(Lieberthal and Herberg 2006: 10). As a result of growing interdependence and 
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integration, and the growing share of developing states in oil demand, ‘it is becoming 
necessary to develop a global approach to long-term oil and energy security’ (Bielecki 
2002: 246, emphasis added).  
 
Overall, authors in the liberal logic represent energy security in economic and cooperative 
terms, focusing on securing either the global economy/oil market or national economies. 
The emphasis is on neoliberal macro-economics, with liberalisation of markets and 
multilateral initiatives as solutions to energy security issues. Problematically, it rarely 
recognises the limitations of relying on markets, as ‘energy security is a public good which 
is not properly valued by the market and the benefits of which are available equally to 
those who pay for it and to those who do not…[c]onsequently, the market may tend to 
produce a level of energy security that is less than optimal from the society’s point of 
view’ (Bielecki 2002: 236). Likewise, as noted by Kruyt et al., even the IEA’s indicators 
for energy security fail to note depleting resources (2009). The international system is 
presented as one characterised by globalisation and increasing interdependence, with 
cooperation over energy resources as the natural response to energy insecurity. Threats are 
presented in objective terms, focusing on securing supply and price stability.  
 
The majority of the mainstream literature on energy security falls in either the realist or 
liberal logics of security, or somewhere on the spectrum between the two (see below for 
comprehensive approach). While they differ in many ways, they share a similar 
understanding of the organisation of the international system and the objects worthy of 
study in international relations. They both present an anarchic international system, and 
often focus on the state. State competition is also privileged in both discourses, whether 
strategic or economic. They represent energy security in the same way, focusing on 
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security of supply and stability of price. Both understand security threats as ‘objective’ and 
‘external’, and do not consider how threats become constructed as such through discourse, 
leaving no possibility for change. This places clear limits on their analysis. By focusing on 
the state/economy/market as the referent object of security, in some cases assuming that 
this will provide security for individuals and the environment, in effect they fail to secure 
individual human beings and the environment by perpetuating an economic system driven 
by increasing consumption and competition over energy. They do not question the 
relevance of the accepted definition of energy security as a focus on security of supply and 
stable price. Moreover, the realist logic has no normative agenda and works as a self-
fulfilling prophecy perpetuating endless security dilemmas, which serves to reproduce the 
world as it is with no possibility of theorising change.  
 
However, for the purpose of this thesis the problems of the liberal logic of energy security 
are somewhat less clear. Liberal strategies for dealing with (state) energy (in)security 
emphasise cooperation between states, liberalising energy markets and multilateral 
initiatives to secure economies. While anarchy is still considered a central organising 
principle, the liberal logic views the international realm as interdependent, and cooperation 
as not just possible, but likely. While the liberal logic of energy security may appear less 
problematic, the continued emphasis on states as central actors ultimately gives states 
preferential treatment when it comes to securing and being secured – even in the liberal 
logic, individuals and the environment are ignored as potential referents of energy security. 
Threats are still considered objective, and the focus is still on securing supply and price 
stability. Securing (in energy terms) the global market/economy or national economies 
again does not necessarily lead to environmental or individual security. Problematically, 
‘fossil fuels are cheap and relatively easily deployed sources of energy, largely due to 
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market failures that fail to take account of their social and environmental externalities’ 
(Vanderheiden 2011: 609). The emphasis on economic competition over fossil fuels drives 
up consumption and is not sustainable. When liberal understandings of energy security 
focus on the global level they emphasise securing the international economy and current 
standards of consumption, which is not sustainable for people or planet. This is not to say 
that securing energy markets is just a negative – collapsed energy markets would clearly 
also cause human insecurity – but that markets should not be the sole focus of energy 
security policy. The emphasis liberal literature on energy security has on securing 
economies effectively works to marginalise energy security debates on resource limitation, 
environmental sustainability and human inequality and insecurity. As a result, while the 
liberal logic on energy security may assume or even promote cooperation and 
interdependence, this does not result in secure individuals or a secure environment. 
 
1.2.4 The comprehensive approach: still securing the state or the economy 
Some authors mix the realist and liberal logics. This is increasingly referred to as a 
‘comprehensive approach’ (Tunsjø 2010: 28). The state and/or the national/global 
economy is/are still the referent/s of security, and the claims made about the international 
system and the assumptions that underpin these claims remain the same. Threats to energy 
security are still objectively identified. These authors still work broadly within a traditional 
understanding of security, so for the purposes of this analysis I have here included them 
under the mainstream energy security literature.  
 
The most common approach in the comprehensive literature is describing the current 
situation as energy competition between the US and China, but arguing that cooperation 
and integration is possible and more likely in the future and thus will provide energy 
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security. ‘[i]nterstate competition is natural, of course’, but there is still room for 
cooperation (Zweig and Bi 2005: 27). Jaffe and Lewis state that ‘being a net oil-importer 
should, logically, bring China’s interests closer to those of the oil-dependent West’ (Jaffe 
and Lewis 2002: 115). Energy cooperation has many advantages, and could encourage a 
more constructive relationship between the US and China (Jaffe and Lewis 2002: 116). 
Integration and multilateral institutions are presented as an ‘alternative strategy for energy 
security’ for China (Jaffe and Lewis 2002: 128). Chinese analysts are said to focus on ‘oil 
price volatility and physical supply disruptions to be the main threats to energy security’, 
but more reliance on global markets are the solution to China’s energy insecurity issues 
(Downs 2004: 31 and 40). Following this, ‘China must now view energy security in terms 
of economic threats and market solutions rather than military threats and diplomatic 
responses’ (Zha 2006a: 181). In US-China relations, energy could well lead to competition 
and prospects for ‘more serious clashes are high’ – as a result, they should improve energy 
cooperation (Zha and Hu 2007: 104).  
 
Tunsjø argues that in practice, ‘energy security combines market and strategic aspects’, 
and most states combine the two in their energy security strategies (2010: 26). Moreover, 
the traditional literature ‘does not provide the tools needed to examine the tension and 
balance between market and strategic approaches’ (Tunsjø 2010: 28). In practice, ‘China 
hedges against adverse consequences of both strategic and a market approaches’ (Tunsjø 
2010: 29-30). Again, however, the focus is on securing states/markets and this is never 
questioned. Likewise there is no normative agenda and no attempt to understand how these 
policy choices are made possible through discourse. Some also attempt to provide a more 
comprehensive approach to energy security by quantifying the concept itself to measure it 
with indicators, developing cross-country comparisons based on this (see Jansen and 
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Seebregts 2010; Sovacool and Brown 2010). However, this does not explain how 
particular policies become possible, as it just examines how effective they are at fulfilling 
specific criteria.   
 
While the comprehensive approach presents an interesting analysis of energy security 
issues, and a more balanced assessment than the realist/liberal logics, it still does not move 
beyond a traditional understanding of security, or question how the policies analysed are 
made possible. It ignores the role of discourse and fails to progress beyond the traditional 
paradigms, ignoring the security of human beings and their need for a secure and stable 
climate and environment. Effectively, basing energy security policy on a conventional 
logic of security reproduces a particular understanding of energy security that privileges 
national security, in effect enabling policies that ignore individuals and environmental 
concerns, and limiting energy security policy options to those that work to secure the state 
and national/global economy. The meaning of energy security and threats to energy 
security are presented as objectively identifiable. The finite nature of conventional energy 
resources is ignored and competition (whether in economic or resource terms) encouraged, 
spurring consumption and resource over-use. Throughout, the focus remains on fossil 
fuels, particularly oil security – though occasionally this is expanded to include gas  
(Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005: 10). The mainstream understanding of energy security 
effectively reproduces a world where states are unproblematically assumed to be the 
necessary referent object of security. There is therefore a need for analyses of energy 
security which problematise the concept of energy security.  
 
CHAPTER 1 
45 
 
1.3 Problematising energy security 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s security studies saw the emergence of a new subfield of 
literature that questioned the underlying assumptions of traditional security studies, 
commonly referred to as ‘critical security studies’. Critical security studies scholars 
critiqued the way in which ‘both the object of security (what is to be secured) and the 
means for studying it are treated as largely given and self-evident’ in conventional security 
studies (Krause and Williams 1997: ix). This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. As part of a wider critical security studies agenda, this thesis questions the way 
the vast majority of literature on energy security relies on a traditional logic of security, 
suggesting that this understanding of security is not only insufficient, but likely to cause 
insecurity for states, individuals and the environment in which they live. The way that 
energy security is constructed is paradoxically making the world less secure, even in 
orthodox terms. Consequently, there is a need for energy security studies to recognise and 
engage with the contributions of critical security studies to develop a more critical energy 
security studies that recognises the problematic nature of the mainstream approaches to 
energy security and moves beyond securing states and markets.  
 
Energy security studies as a field has not only largely escaped critical scrutiny but actually 
become more closely tied to traditional understandings of security – today ‘energy security 
is national security’ (Boekestein and Henderson 2005: 80). This is even more so the case 
with increasing emphasis on peak oil (Dannreuther 2010; Mulligan 2011) coupled with 
increasing demand from emerging economies including China and India. This link 
between energy and national security is problematic, as it is accompanied by a logic of 
security organised around the principle of anarchy, where threats and insecurity are 
‘inevitable’, justifying particular security behaviours and making it possible for scholars to 
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ignore even the possibility that energy security and energy security threats are constructed 
and therefore unable to conceptualise change – or even the possibility or desirability of 
change – to the status quo (Shepherd 2008a: 62). In contrast, this thesis argues that threats 
are ‘fundamentally interpretive’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 532) and socially 
constructed through discourse and practice. This does not mean that threats are not ‘real’7, 
but that to become understood as threats they need to be represented and constructed as 
such.  
 
Likewise, the concept of security is itself ‘intersubjective and socially constructed’ (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 31). The referent of security is essential to the meaning of the concept itself: 
‘[t]o have any meaning, security necessarily presupposes something to be secured’ (Krause 
and Williams 1997: ix). This leaves us with two questions: what thing or body needs to be 
secured; and what is the danger or threat? In the mainstream literature on energy security 
threats are unstable supplies or prices. In both cases these threats are presented as 
threatening the state, whether in terms of its economic and/or its political-military survival. 
Once a state defines something as a ‘threat’ to security this ‘enables certain political 
processes and policies’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 534). Policy in/security discourses, or 
‘discourses of danger’ (Campbell 1998b: 130), are closely tied to conventional 
understandings of security; ultimately ‘these links serve to prescribe certain policy 
responses and proscribe others’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 536).  
 
In this way, the state remains privileged as the referent object of security, which is justified 
in terms of states ‘supposedly providing citizens with physical safety’ within the state itself 
                                                          
7
 External constraint on change (power) is not about whether or not threats are real, but about ‘how that 
which occurs became possible and is made meaningful both in theory and in practice’, which allows 
‘analysis of the processes through which meaning is made and therefore ‘reality’ is (re)produced’ (Shepherd 
2008a: 73). 
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(Dalby 1997: 8). However, if we look beyond the state as the object to be secured, both to 
individuals and to the environment, traditional ‘national security practices’ cannot always 
secure (Dalby 1997: 15). Dannreuther highlights this particularly well, both noting that 
energy and climate security are ‘potentially incompatible’, and pointing to human security 
as ‘one of the most neglected dimensions of the energy security debate’ (2010: 147). 
Ultimately, energy security as the mainstream literature presents it is incompatible with a 
secure and stable environment and climate, as it serves to drive up competition for fossil 
fuels, contributing to climate change. Meanwhile, this jeopardises the future of the planet 
that human beings depend on to survive. As a result there is a need to problematise the 
state-centric nature of energy security, and its ‘geographical definitions of proximate 
safety and external threat’ (Dalby 2010: 54) as inadequate for conceptualising energy 
security. Vitally, ‘what it is that should be rendered secure is an essential component of 
any discussion on security’ (Dalby 1997: 22). 
 
As demonstrated the mainstream literature on energy security neglects to analyse how 
energy security is represented and constructed, making very particular policies possible 
and excluding other policy options. Overall the mainstream energy security debate has not 
incorporated or engaged with critical security studies: ‘energy has always been considered 
a security issue, even if as a ‘non-traditional’ issue compared with military security’ 
(Simpson 2013: 251). Despite this, there is a small and diverse emerging critical literature 
on energy security. Some of these authors focus on broadening understandings of energy 
security, while others analyse the concept itself. This is where this research fits into the 
energy security literature. Some of these approaches draw on various critical security 
literatures, while others draw on environmentalist approaches. Overall, however, 
‘abundant analyses of pipeline politics stand in stark contrast to the very few attempts to 
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make sense of energy security conceptually’ (Ciută 2010: 124). Critical work is much 
more common in the field of environmental security compared to energy security, which is 
more dominated by a traditional understanding of security (Trombetta 2008)
8
. Developing 
the critical literature on energy security is essential to problematise entrenched traditional 
understandings of energy security, highlighting what they overlook. This section groups 
critical literature on energy security into three sub-sections, beginning with work that 
discusses the constructed nature of energy security and the relationship between energy 
and national security, followed by conceptual critiques of ‘energy security’, and lastly, 
critiques that argue in favour of broadening the meaning and referent of energy security. 
Overall, the critical literature presents a range of interrelated concerns; the division by 
focus here is for analytical purposes. 
 
1.3.1 Constructing energy security and national security  
Existing critiques that note the relationship between energy and national security often 
come from environmental security studies, the concerns of which are closely related to 
energy and where critical work is much more common (for example, see Vanderheiden 
2011). In The meaning of environmental security, Barnett notes that the current notion of 
energy security as security of supply at stable prices stems from the oil crises era. As a 
result, ‘energy security is the theory and practice of securing energy for the nation state’ 
(2001: 34). However, once the starting point is not national security but environmental 
security, it becomes clear that ‘the problem of energy security is not only the need to 
alleviate scarcity, however, but also concerns the ecological impact of burning fossil fuels’ 
(Barnett 2001: 35). Following this, the solution is not maximising fossil fuel supply, but 
rather ‘clean renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind power, or abstinence 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note that environmental security has been used in a range of different ways and remains 
contested (for a discussion on this, see Floyd 2007: 340-2). 
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and great efficiency of energy use’ (Barnett 2001: 35). From a similar perspective, 
Trombetta notes that unlike environmental or climate security, energy security has always 
been closely linked ‘with national security and its logic’ (2008: 597). This has had an 
impact on how energy security is governed: ‘the energy sector contributes a substantial 
portion of states’ income and policy’, and as a result is characterised by bilateral 
agreements between states and limited multilateral institutions (Trombetta 2008: 597).  
 
Following a similar argument, Mulligan highlights how discourses of energy security 
focus on state security ‘while largely overlooking discourses of environmental or 
ecological security’ (2010: 79). He demonstrates a historical separation between energy 
and environment, which relies on an ideological separation of ‘man’ and ‘nature’, linking 
fossil fuels to the human world (Mulligan 2010: 86). This has had a direct effect on energy 
policy, emphasising human agency, innovation and reinforcing the idea that we are in 
control (Mulligan 2010: 86)
9. Economic arguments suggest ‘any problems of resource 
decline would be solved through technological advances and market-driven substitution’ 
(Mulligan 2010: 87). Similarly, in security studies, 
analysts have long viewed energy (and especially oil) as a national security concern, and the 
military role in ensuring (or preventing) access to energy resources is well established. By the time 
environmental security came on stage, then, energy supply was already understood as a matter of 
national security (Mulligan 2010: 88-89).  
 
The history of energy and the structure of the international system, meanwhile, separates it 
from environmental security, as ‘energy security could be provided for by military means, 
while also being essential for military superiority’ (Mulligan 2010: 88-89). Even more 
importantly, the role of sovereignty and sovereign rights over territory have made it very 
difficult to consider these as joint or global resources: ‘fossil fuels have historically been 
                                                          
9
 Interestingly, Mulligan also notes that discourses of ‘peak oil’ focus on the role of human agency in 
producing oil scarcity, as opposed to understanding it as an ecological scarcity (Mulligan 2010: 87).  
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seen in terms of “property”, and as subject to states' sovereign right to exploit their natural 
resources’ (Mulligan 2010: 88-89). 
 
Problematically, discourses of ‘energy security’ remain centred on fossil fuels, and oil in 
particular (both in traditional discourses and alternative ones), and so in a sense 
mainstream energy security is also finite. Arguing that a traditional understanding of 
security cannot address today’s threats, Mulligan suggests that energy and environmental 
security need to be reconnected through a focus on climate change which ties the two 
together, and can be represented ‘as a threat to the world, rather than just to specific states 
and economies’ (2010: 94). As such, international agreements modelled on those dealing 
with other environmental resources offer a possibility of dealing with resource scarcity and 
climate change, rather than turning to conflict and competition (Mulligan 2010: 94). Still, 
for this to happen there is a need to reconceptualise energy security:  
such a shift in the practice of energy security necessitates a shift in the concept of security that, 
instead of emphasizing state-centered and military aspects, is grounded in discourses of global and 
human security (Mulligan 2010: 94) 
 
While providing a clear analysis of the historical separation between energy and 
environment and the need to change the concept of energy security, Mulligan’s account 
fails to go into any depth on either the possibility of such a change, or the way in which 
this could or should be done. Trombetta provides a more interesting account of the 
potential for change, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
Mulligan has also produced a later paper looking at the securitisation of energy, again 
noting the separation of energy and environment and arguing that while state energy 
security policies are increasingly analysed, the actual decline of energy resources has been 
neglected in the literature (2011: 633). In this paper, he asserts that energy is already 
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securitised, pointing to current state energy practices as characterised by coercion, contract 
breaches, neglect of international law, ignorance of human rights, and resource wars 
(Mulligan 2011: 645). As a result, he argues that ‘the impending decline in available 
global energy’ can be also be viewed as a threat to ‘political order and human welfare’, 
and argues in favour of ‘an ecologically informed securitisation of energy’ as a way of 
putting declining resources back on the agenda (Mulligan 2011: 634). However, he 
provides little evidence that energy is fully securitised other than noting some problematic 
state energy practices. Likewise, little explanation is provided of what an ecologically 
informed securitisation of energy might look like, and how such a securitisation would 
occur, given the lack of global governance of energy. The ethical aspects of securitising 
energy are dismissed in one line, and there is no discussion of how securitising resource 
scarcity would lead to energy being approached as an issue of human ecology rather than 
state security (Mulligan 2011: 645). 
 
Beyond this, few authors have looked at the construction of energy using securitisation
10
. 
Radoman has looked at EU-Russia relations using securitisation, suggesting that ‘the trade 
in energy supplies is no longer merely a question of economics but also become political’ 
(2007: 36). She highlights the problems of potential securitisation of energy as it would 
change state behaviour, to ‘irreversibly renounce rational and responsible efforts to find a 
model of relations that would achieve energy security, as well as general security’, causing 
mistrust and fear in bilateral relations, ultimately producing an energy security dilemma 
(Radoman 2007: 44).  
 
                                                          
10
 For two studies looking at the securitisation of energy in the EU, see Natorski and Herranz Surrallez 
(2008) and Stoddard (2012). 
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1.3.2 Conceptual critiques: What is energy security? 
A growing number of works question the concept of energy security itself, with Valentine 
noting the ‘fuzzy’ nature of the concept (2010) and Ciută noting that ‘energy security 
clearly means many different things to different authors and actors, and even at times to 
the same author or actor’ (2010: 127). Even more problematically, ‘some politicians refuse 
to define energy security at all’ (Sovacool 2010a: 2). 
 
Chester points to the ubiquitous nature of the term ‘energy security’ in contemporary 
debates about energy issues, suggesting a few key characteristics usually related with the 
term (2010: 887) that correspond with the areas covered in the discussion of the 
mainstream literature here. He also notes that the meaning is rarely explained or discussed, 
remaining ‘implicit’, while ‘the limited discourse about its nature or any underlying 
assumptions has been totally eclipsed by an almost overwhelming focus in the literature on 
securing supplies of primary energy sources and geopolitics’ (Chester 2010: 887). He 
argues that the concept itself is slippery as it is ‘polysemic’ in nature (Chester 2010: 893) – 
that is to say, it has multiple, related, meanings. Ultimately, energy security ‘takes on 
different specificities depending on the country (or continent), timeframe or energy source 
to which it is applied’ (Chester 2010: 893). Thus, at various levels of analysis energy 
security ‘may contain similar notions of availability, adequacy, affordability and 
sustainability but the specificities of each will understandably differ at any point in time’ 
(Chester 2010: 893). Similarly, Knox-Hayes et al. studied attitudes towards energy 
security in ten countries, finding that ‘energy security is a highly context-dependent 
condition that is best understood from a nuanced and multi-dimensional perspective’ 
(Knox-Hayes et al. 2013: 609). 
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Ciută provides a somewhat different analysis of energy security. Vitally, he asks: ‘in what 
sense is energy a security issue?’, looking at the relationship between energy and security 
(2010: 123). He argues that simultaneously, ‘the proliferation of energy security discourses 
has...established the legitimate association of energy and security and...prevented a closer 
conceptual and normative attention to energy security’ (2010: 124). In this way, the 
literature suggests ‘there simply is no need to debate what energy security is, because we 
know both that energy is a security issue and what security is’ (Ciută 2010: 124). 
However, the relationship between energy and security is problematic and needs to be 
analysed more closely – bringing energy into the domain of security ‘is likely to affect the 
manner in which energy policies are pursued’, but moreover, energy itself can conversely 
affect how we think about security in general (Ciută 2010: 124). Ciută’s analysis of energy 
security presents a concept that is multiple and context-dependant. He argues that energy is 
‘a total field’ as ‘nothing exists that is not energy, or not affected by energy…[t]he totality 
of energy has thus the potential to normalise security and render it politically 
unexceptional’ (2010: 124). He points to references to energy security as carrying 
‘different connotations in different contexts’ (Ciută 2010: 124). However, the review of 
the literature presented here shows a much more specific understanding of energy security 
running through the literature of energy security, both conceptually and in the US and 
China, with the understanding of security remaining very particular and attached to a 
highly conventional logic of security that, rather than normalising security, attaches energy 
to security understood as exceptional national security politics. 
 
His analysis presents three logics of energy security that ‘structure the understandings of 
energy security in different (and at times the same) contexts’: a ‘logic of war...a logic of 
subsistence and a logic of “total” energy security’ (Ciută 2010: 125). These logics are 
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broader than the ones presented here, as he does not focus on a specific geographical 
context or a specific literature, combining analysis of discourses produces by states, 
institutions, think-tanks and academic literature. Other approaches to energy are said to be 
too wedded to the idea of a fixed understanding of security, and ultimately ‘afford only a 
limited understanding of the effects security and energy exercise on each other, and in 
particular the fact that the domain of energy produces mutations and multiplications of the 
meaning of security, not just the multiplications of threats, subjects and objects of security 
policy’ (Ciută 2010: 125). However, this ignores the way in which energy security in IR 
and security studies is rooted in a particular traditional understanding of security. Energy 
security as conceptualised in the majority of the literature does not really challenge the 
traditional state-centric understanding of security, or the referent object of security – as can 
be seen in the discussion on the mainstream energy security literature presented here. 
While Ciută’s analysis has a broader focus, it exaggerates the multiplicity of 
understandings of energy security. In the majority of the literature, whatever focus or 
solutions are presented, the ultimate purpose of energy security is still securing the state or 
economy in supply and/or price terms. 
 
He does not discuss the relationship between each logic and particular assumptions about 
the international system and consequently, specific views of what ‘desirable’ policies and 
outcomes are. Because of the differences between solutions presented by realist and liberal 
logics – titled ‘logic of war’ and ‘logic of subsistence’, respectively, by Ciută - he argues 
that ‘energy security policies remain non-specific as security policies’ (2010: 134). 
Conversely, I argue that security policies in energy security are not non-specific but based 
on very particular understandings of security which are directly based on particular 
referent objects of security. He concludes that energy security shows a transition towards a 
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third logic, ‘total energy security’ (Ciută 2010: 135). In this logic, energy is 
multidimensional, ‘energy affects everything, everything affects energy, and ultimately, 
everything is energy’ (Ciută 2010: 135); as a result, energy security is everywhere, with 
indefinite targets, threats and vulnerabilities: 
energy security means the security of everything:  resources, production plants, transportation 
networks, distribution outlets and even consumption patterns; everywhere: oilfields, pipelines, 
power plants, gas stations, homes; against everything: resource depletion, global warming, 
terrorism, ‘them’ and ourselves. At its maximum, this logic invests every single object of any kind 
with and in security (Ciută 2010: 135)  
 
While this can be considered true in theory, in particular if understandings of energy 
security beyond IR are considered, in practice energy security remains much more 
specific. It is strongly tied to a traditional understanding of security with the state or 
economy as a referent object, and the logics of energy security remain tied to a 
conventional understanding of security.  
 
Interestingly, Ciută concludes that energy security presents ‘a puzzle for security theory in 
general’, as they run against ‘the disciplinary quest to establish peremptorily the “essence” 
of security’ (2010: 139). Overall, the meaning of security needs to be understood 
contextually, recognising the (potential) variation in meaning (Ciută 2010: 139). This also 
provides potential for changing the meaning of energy security, as ‘energy can potentially 
attach itself to any definition of security’, including competition/war but also ‘cooperative 
and non-conflictual understandings of security’ (Ciută 2010: 138). This is also noted by 
Trombetta, who argues that while securitisation of energy can be problematic for energy, 
attaching security to energy does not just change how we view energy but also has 
potential to change security (2008).  
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Hildyard et al. also note the normative problems of the way energy security is 
conceptualised, following Ciută’s argument that the concept of energy is vague, but taking 
it further by introducing normative concerns: ‘measuring “energy” and “energy sources” 
cannot by itself help decide which types, amounts or uses of energy are more important for 
humanity’s future…[i]t may even get in the way’  (Hildyard et al. 2012: 6). They have 
produced a report exploring ‘the pitfalls of “energy security” as rhetoric and as policy’ 
(Hildyard et al. 2012: 6). In this process, they present clear normative concerns that are 
ignored in energy security policy and literature, arguing that ultimately, the phrase ‘energy 
security’ (and policies framed around it), 
obscures increasing inequality, diverts attention from the need to slow global warming and nurtures 
underlying conflicts. In sum, it gets in the way of effective discussion about, and organisation for, a 
democratic, fossil-free future. A critical examination is needed to find ways to talk about poverty, 
climate and other issues connected with “energy” that are more coherent and analytically fruitful as 
well as better attuned to progressive goals (Hildyard et al. 2012: 6) 
 
This highlights clear problems with the way energy security is understood and used and 
the need for change recognising ‘the collective security and survival of all above the 
individual short-term gain of a few, and acknowledging the deep political, economic, 
social – and even psychological – entrenchment of today’s locked-independence on coal, 
oil and gas’  (Hildyard et al. 2012: 6-7). 
 
Valentine vitally notes the problem of ontological and epistemological ‘blindness’ in the 
existing literature on energy security, which works to obscure underlying assumptions and 
choices in terms of how energy security is represented. Most energy security studies ‘fail 
to acknowledge critical assumptions that skew or bias the findings’ and present 
‘assessments as if they reflect absolute objectivity’ (Valentine 2010: 70). Ultimately, 
policies are undertaken in the name of energy security with little or no clarification of what 
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the term itself means. These conceptual critiques of energy security highlight a clear need 
for more research into the concept of energy security itself. 
 
1.3.3 Broadening energy security: securing what or whom? 
The last group of critiques focus specifically on broadening the meaning and changing the 
referent of energy security. In practice, energy security remains close to traditional 
military-political notions of security and closely linked with fossil fuels (Simpson 2013: 
249). However, a range of work is increasingly advocating broadening the concept of 
energy security (see chapter on various dimensions of energy security in Sovacool 2010b), 
particularly emphasising the need to add sustainability to definitions of energy security, 
though the security of people and the planet are largely ignored in mainstream analyses. 
 
Bradshaw and others highlight the need to recognise a wider range of interests in the 
energy security debate, focusing energy security away from supply security to recognise 
the interests of energy importing states and energy exporters as well as incorporating 
climate change into the debate (Bradshaw 2009: 1920).  However, the mainstream 
literature on energy geopolitics ‘still fails to engage with the potential consequences of 
climate change’ (Bradshaw 2010: 281). Problematically, environmental sustainability 
remains separated from concerns over security of supply (Kruyt et al. 2009). Bradshaw 
emphasises globalisation and the need to address energy security concerns above the state 
level, arguing that energy security and climate change are global problems that cannot be 
solved by a single state or region (2010: 287). The international system is presented as 
globalised, and the underlying assumption is one where globalisation and climate change 
will force cooperation over energy security. The referent object of energy security is thus 
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taken to a global level, securing the planet, while recognising the vital role of energy in 
development and human welfare. 
 
Dannreuther questions the focus of energy security, focusing largely on broadening the 
concept of energy security beyond ‘the interests of the rich, primarily Western, energy-
importing states’ (2010: 145). He also argues that energy security needs to move away 
from a traditional understanding of security and move ‘beyond the limitations of the 
conventional debate with its competing realist and liberal approaches’ (2010: 146). He 
emphasises the human security dimension of energy security, recognising that ‘the 
conventional focus on rich, oil-importing states fails to recognise that the citizens of these 
wealthy states generally enjoy the benefits of a continual and assured access to reliable, 
cheap and modern energy’ (2010: 147). Overall, ‘it is only the citizens of developed 
countries, the third most wealthiest portion of the world’s populations, who enjoy 
affordable and reliable energy supplies’, while a quarter of the world’s population lacks 
access to electricity (Dannreuther 2010: 147; see also Wirth et al. 2003: 133). He points to 
the impact of this ‘endemic energy insecurity’ on the human security of the poorest most 
vulnerable people, and its constraints on ‘economic and social development’ (Dannreuther 
2010: 147). Adding to this, Simpson notes the state-centric, US or European focus of the 
vast majority of the energy security literature, highlighting that rather than secure oil 
supplies, citizens of the global South still largely rely on fuel wood for energy (2013: 249). 
He also suggests that ‘a critical energy security perspective relates more to the ability of 
individuals, particularly in marginalised or deprived communities, to secure sufficient 
access to energy for their personal needs’ (Simpson 2013: 250). 
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Other areas ignored in the traditional energy security debate include societal security, in 
particular ‘the security interests of the citizens of the energy-rich oil exporting states 
themselves’, where state elites tend to benefit disproportionally (Dannreuther 2010: 148). 
Demand security of oil producing states is also overlooked, as these states need ‘stable and 
secure revenues for development’ (Dannreuther 2010: 149). This difference in interests 
between oil producing states and the west is pointed to as the ‘North-South dimension of 
energy security’ (Dannreuther 2010: 150). This is also highlighted by Simpson (2007). 
Dannreuther points to environmental security as in conflict with energy security, in 
particular in the common use of coal to ensure energy security (2010: 150). The 
fundamental long-term question for energy security is ‘whether the political norms, 
structures and institutions that we currently have will be capable to rise to this complex 
and demanding set of challenges’ (Dannreuther 2010: 153). Dannreuther highlights some 
important and interesting neglected areas of the traditional energy security debate, in 
particular the human security dimension. However, he fails to provide any analysis or 
explanation of why or how these issues are ignored. The construction of energy security as 
a traditional security issue through the realist and liberal logics limits the parameters of the 
energy security debate, and without reconceptualising energy security these issues will 
remain ignored. 
 
Similar gaps in current energy security policies are noted by Wirth et al., who also note 
‘the danger to political and economic security posed by the world’s dependence on oil’ 
(2003: 133). Air pollution and global warming are also noted as major threats to health and 
political stability, which cannot be dealt with without changes in the energy sector 
(Jacobson 2009: 149). Large-scale changes to the energy sector are also needed ‘to secure 
an undisrupted energy supply for a growing population, particularly as fossil-fuels become 
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more costly and harder to find/extract’ (Jacobson 2009: 149-50). Discussions note the need 
to rethink security and what is considered a ‘threat’, as ‘both geopolitical interests and 
environmental sustainability call for a radical departure from current patterns in the use of 
fossil fuels, which compromises the national security of most states and threatens the 
entire planet’ (Pascual and Zambetakis 2009: 32). Simpson also critiques the traditional 
focus on fossil fuels, arguing that critical analysis of energy security ‘should include some 
discussion of the intrinsic bias given to energy technologies’ – ‘fossil fuel and nuclear 
technologies all favour large-scale industrial development and have centralising political 
and economic consequences’ (Simpson 2013: 254). He also argues that critical approaches 
focusing on justice and sustainability provide ‘an antidote to the traditional definitions of 
energy security that are associated with militarism, wars and unsustainable, unnecessary 
and inappropriate levels of industrial development’ (Simpson 2013: 260). However, while 
such a definition does provide an alternative discourse, it does not provide any solutions or 
paths for changing the dominant discourse. Likewise, a focus on the South neglects the 
fact that the biggest global energy consumers – the US and China – are key contributors of 
energy insecurity. Hildyard et al. presents a similar human security focused critique of 
energy security to Simpson, suggesting that policies securing fossil fuel supplies 
are triggering a cascade of new insecurities for millions of people – whether as a result of the 
everyday violence that frequently accompanies the development of frontier oil and gas reserves, or 
because the pursuit of “energy security” through market-based policies denies many people access 
to the energy produced. Indeed, the more that the term “energy security” is invoked, the less clear it 
is just what is being “secured” (Hildyard et al. 2012: 5) 
 
In broadened discussions of energy security, the referent ranges from states to individuals 
to global humanity and the global or local ecosystem. The focus ranges from 
environmental protection to human welfare, and the agenda is strongly normative: ‘energy 
security is not a desirable goal if it is to be only achieved at the expense of some other 
significant environmental insecurity’ (Simpson 2013: 250). These analyses highlight just 
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how much is overlooked by the mainstream energy security literature, presenting a clear 
case for the importance of critical analyses of energy security.  
 
1.4 Conclusion: towards a critical energy security studies 
Energy underpins fundamental human needs and is essential for the continued functioning 
of society as we know it. It also underpins state survival in economic, political and military 
terms. As a result, ‘energy security as a concept has been traditionally approached from a 
state-centred national security perspective’ (Simpson 2013: 248). However, as is clear 
from the discussion presented here, there is an emerging debate over ‘what energy security 
is and ought to be’ (Sovacool and Lin 2010: 414).  
 
The mainstream literature on energy security is organised around a conventional logic of 
security, which, whether realist, liberal or comprehensive, is based on very similar 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. Energy security is understood as closely 
linked with national security, and with fossil fuels – particularly oil supply. While some 
argue energy security needs to be broadened, emphasising sustainability in particular 
(Umbach 2012), in the vast majority of the literature concerns about sustainability are side-
lined. Moreover, Luft et al. go as far as asserting that energy security need to retain a 
narrow focus on secure fossil fuel supplies as too much focus on climate change could 
‘compromise’ energy security (2010: 43). Rather than questioning the traditional notion of 
energy security, they argue the concept needs a ‘guarded perimeter’, advocating ‘a more 
factual and dispassionate discourse’ that notes the problems with broadening (Luft et al. 
2010: 52-54). Overall, running out of oil is not considered a key concern of energy security 
studies – Yergin suggests that the real risk to supplies in next two decades ‘is not geology 
but geopolitics’ (2005: 51). Problematically, the literature remains closely wedded to a 
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traditional notion of (state) security that relies on continued fossil fuel supplies, seen in 
both realist and liberal approaches. This works to limit energy security conceptually, 
effectively closing off and limiting the parameters of the energy security debate. No 
normative agenda is presented – the way energy security is currently understood is 
represented as ‘inevitable’, with little potential for change. 
 
Meanwhile, the critical literature as it stands is still only emerging and lacks coherence, 
with little or no recognition in the mainstream energy security literature. It remains 
severely underdeveloped, but opens up the space and agenda of energy security to question 
the traditional understanding of energy security. Problems with the current notion of 
energy security are identified, and it presents an interesting account of how energy security 
has become linked with national security, as well as providing the beginning of a 
conceptual interrogation. However, it remains abstract and theoretical, with few studies 
looking at how energy security is constituted in particular empirical cases. Radoman 
highlights some problems with securitising energy (2007), but there are no discussions of 
the ethics of security or securitisation regarding energy – Mulligan even dismisses the need 
for such a discussion (2011: 645). Likewise, while there are some interesting arguments 
made in favour of changing the referent of energy security to global, common or 
ecological security, there is little discussion of how this is to be done. Overall, a more 
assertive normative dimension is important, and lacking in much critical work on the topic. 
Highlighting the normative problems of current notions of energy security and 
interrogating the space for change is vital in policy terms. However, the conceptual debate 
on energy security has only begun, leaving a large space for this thesis to contribute to. 
Moreover, there is no existing in-depth empirical research using critical analysis of energy 
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security to study specific empirical cases, so the focus on the United States and China 
undertaken here provides an important departure and starting point.   
 
This chapter has illustrated how the academic literature constitutes energy security 
conceptually and with reference to the US and China. There is clearly a need to develop a 
critical approach to energy security, to problematise the concept itself, looking at the 
construction of energy as security through discourse and practice, with an empirical focus. 
This is where this research fits in. This thesis focuses on how energy security is constituted 
in the US and China, with an emphasis on meanings and referents of security. In this 
process it develops a normative agenda, considering what energy security should be, and 
whom it should secure. The following chapter also considers whether security in the case 
of energy is a ‘good’ thing. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A critical approach to energy security 
 
 
 
 
The last chapter discussed the existing debates on energy security. It illustrated that the 
mainstream academic literature on energy security relies on a traditional notion of national 
security, presenting an anarchic international system where continuous and undisrupted 
fossil fuel supplies are essential for state survival. These assumptions underlie all of this 
literature, whether the solutions presented are realist (strategic), liberal (market-focused), 
or some combination of the two. The literature presents a conventional view of energy 
security whereby something is a security issue because it threatens (the survival of) the 
state, whether in strategic or economic terms. ‘Threats’ to energy security are portrayed as 
objective and common-sense, and are rarely questioned. The literature fails to recognise 
the link between particular underlying assumptions about the international system and how 
energy security itself is understood. In contrast, it is argued here that energy security and 
‘threats’ to energy security are constructed through discourse and practice. Any 
construction of energy as a national security issue relies on a number of subjective value-
judgements about the need to preserve (or secure) the existing order. 
 
Problematically, the literature presents competition between states over energy resources, 
whether economic or strategic, as ‘natural’ (Xu 2008: 266), and therefore inevitable. As a 
result, there is no real possibility of change to the status quo. In contrast, I argue here that a 
static conception of the anarchic international system where states will always compete for 
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survival is both primitive and normatively unattractive, as it is simplistic and can neither 
theorise nor provide any possibility for change
1
. A traditional understanding of energy 
security that serves only the security interests of states is no longer useful or justifiable. As 
energy increasingly becomes incorporated in security agendas, attempts by states to 
respond paradoxically produce insecurity. The existing critical literature on energy security 
remains limited and underdeveloped, particularly in terms of theorising change. However, 
it offers important insight into the historical link between energy and national security and 
the constructed nature of energy security, providing a good starting point for this research. 
 
This chapter develops a methodological, analytical and theoretical framework appropriate 
for investigating how energy security is constructed in the United States and China, with 
an emphasis on the relationship between energy and security. It relates the analysis of 
energy security to the growing debate over the ethics, or value, of security, building on 
work that highlights the contextual and contested nature of security (Ciută 2009; 
McDonald 2012) to argue that security not only means different things in different 
contexts, but also has no fixed value. It is contested, and therefore sometimes more 
positive and sometimes more negative in character and consequences. In this process, I 
draw on critical constructivist work, as well as critical approaches to security broadly 
conceived. There is not space here to discuss all of the literature on the subject, so it 
represents a necessarily selective, rather than exhaustive, discussion of the most relevant 
pieces. By looking at the political consequences of representing energy security in a 
particular way, this thesis argues that using a particular discourse of energy security makes 
                                                          
1 Of course, most realist authors are very aware that traditional realist policies to security can likely lead to 
self-defeating outcomes, producing security dilemmas. That is not the critique here, however. They do not 
think the current situation is changeable, while I argue here that such policies are not only self -defeating, but 
that realist representations of the international system as an anarchic realm where states perpetually struggle 
for survival effectively work to reproduce this world, not only failing to provide a possibility of change but 
also making any change to the status quo unlikely.  
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particular policy processes possible. Defining energy security as ‘security of supply’ at 
stable prices works to limit energy security conceptually, effectively closing off and 
limiting the parameters of the debate.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of methodology, discussing the relationship between 
discourse and practice and what kinds of questions such an approach leads to. It then 
discusses the potential for change and outlines a pragmatic approach. The following 
section introduces critical constructivism as the framework for analysis, showing how this 
provides the starting point for interrogating the socially constructed nature of energy 
security with a strong normative agenda. The rest of the chapter discusses the more 
specific theoretical literature on security that the research draws on, beginning with critical 
security studies and then the emerging literature on the ethics of security. Lastly, it 
discusses a contextual approach to the value of security in more detail. In this way the 
chapter presents the framework used in this thesis for understanding and conceptualising 
energy security, and to examine the space for change. 
 
2.1 Methodology 
As an academic discipline, International Relations (IR) contains a growing multiplicity of 
methodological approaches to studying international security. As a result, there are 
‘multiple perspectives on how questions should be asked and analysis developed’ (Hansen 
2006: 17). Like all research, this thesis is based on a number of methodological 
assumptions, or ‘wagers’, that inform how I view knowledge claims. This section draws on 
Jackson’s The conduct of inquiry in international relations, understanding methodology as 
‘philosophical ontology, setting the context within which particular practices of 
knowledge-making might make sense’ (Jackson 2010: 32). All research is underpinned by 
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particular philosophical-ontological wagers, which cannot be proven definitively; these 
assumptions define ‘the researcher, the world to be researched, and the character of the 
relationship between them’ (Jackson 2010: 32-35). In this way, they ‘quite literally set the 
stage for the kinds of empirical and theoretical puzzles and challenges that a scholar takes 
to be meaningful and important’ (Jackson 2010: 34). The vast majority of work on energy 
security rests on neopositivist assumptions, viewing the researcher and the world to be 
researched as separate. On these assumptions, valid knowledge claims have to correspond 
to an objectively existing reality that manifests itself as external to the observer, and thus 
validity is ensured through hypothesis-testing or by producing cross-case comparisons. In 
contrast, this research rests on different methodological assumptions, understanding the 
researcher as an inseparable part of the world being researched
2
. Following this approach, 
we cannot speak of a ‘world’ existing separately from ‘the activities of making sense of 
that world’ (Jackson 2010: 36; see also Yanow 2006). Likewise, from this position 
researchers do not have ‘privileged, objective access’ to an independently existing 
empirical world (Neal 2013: 44). This does not mean that research is impossible, but that 
we need to acknowledge the role of the researcher in the process. Research involves 
making a number of choices throughout the research process and as such any results and 
answers necessarily reflect a researcher’s assumptions, interests and choices.  
 
Viewing the world as inseparable from the activities of making sense of that world, this 
research argues that ‘neither ideas nor materiality have a meaningful presence separate 
from each other’ (Hansen 2006: 22). Language and materiality are both understood as 
ontologically significant, with language giving materiality meaning; as such, language is 
                                                          
2
 This is not to say that positivist approaches have no merit – they highlight some important issues around 
energy security that this research cannot and does not deal with. However, it is essential to note the 
difference in underlying assumptions to highlight how and why this work differs from that, as different 
approaches are better fitted to answering different questions/problems. 
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‘constitutive for what is brought into being’ (Hansen 2006: 17), the world is given 
meaning through discourse. Discourses are understood following Milliken, as ‘structures 
of significations which construct social realities’ (1999: 229). She notes that a 
constructivist notion of meaning underpins this commitment: ‘things do not mean...rather, 
people construct the meaning of things’ (1999: 229). This is primarily done through 
discourse but also through other meaning-making systems – including visual practices and 
physical action. Vitally, meaning is intersubjective – it is socially constructed. Discourse 
and materiality stand in a ‘co-constitutive’, rather than a causal relationship as traditionally 
understood: ‘representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked’ 
(Hansen, 2006: 28), they enable each other
3. In this way, actors represent ‘energy security’ 
through discourse, enabling particular policy choices which in turn re-enable and 
reproduce ‘energy security’ as a concept. Thus, discourse and materiality cannot be 
separated. Throughout, I therefore use the word ‘construction’ in this dual sense, with the 
phrase ‘energy security constructions’ referring to both discursive and policy practices. 
 
Energy security threats do not simply ‘exist’ in the form of disrupted supply lines and 
similar ‘material’ problems. Rather, such ‘threats’ are situated within a discourse of 
national security, where the continued existence of the state in an anarchic international 
system is privileged. Through this discourse defining the materiality of energy security 
‘threats’ becomes commonsensical and difficult to question from within the existing 
discourse. To use an example provided by Dalby, ‘in a society not addicted to the private 
automobile and with heating systems and machinery fuelled in other ways, scarcity of 
petroleum isn’t a threat’ (2009: 18). Of course, in societies fuelled by petroleum, disrupted 
                                                          
3
 It is worth noting that the division between causal and constitutive approaches is not clear cut. As 
illustrated by Kurki, this divide rests on a very specific notion of causality, while if a more reflective notion 
is used it becomes clear that ‘“constitutive” relations are intimately tied up to causal relations’ (Kurki 2006: 
215). 
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supplies do pose a threat – but the threat could be interpreted and constructed in a number 
of ways – to the state, the economy, or to consumers. Moreover, it could equally be argued 
that continued oil supplies present a threat to the climate. As noted in the previous chapter, 
the current mainstream energy security literature (whether realist or liberal) largely frames 
energy security around a highly conventional logic of security. Energy security is 
understood as closely linked with national security, and with fossil fuels – particularly 
continuity in oil supply. Such discussions about ‘threats’ are underpinned by (often 
implicit) geographical representations which ‘“geo-graph” or “write the earth”’ (Dalby 
2010: 52), limiting our categories of analysis. This in turn limits the possibilities of 
thinking outside the ‘national security box’, reproducing states as the centre and limit of 
both political thinking and acting, and as the limit of security. Consequently, discourse and 
representation cannot be separated from the “real world” - ‘for problems or facts to 
become questions of security, they need therefore to be successfully constructed as such 
within political discourse’ (Hansen 2006: 34). In the case of energy, this is done within a 
discourse of national security. 
 
Viewing discourse and policy as mutually constitutive leads this research to ask different 
questions. Rather than asking ‘why’ energy security is constructed in a particular way, this 
research focuses on ‘how’ questions, following Doty (1993: 303). Thus, this research asks: 
how do particular representations of energy security work to make particular policies 
possible and others less possible? It analyses how discourses construct subjects and 
position these against each other hierarchically - and also ‘how, from this construction and 
positioning, various possibilities of practice emerge’ because of the reality that is 
constructed (Doty 1993: 304, emphasis added). As such, the focus here is on how 
particular constructions of energy security work to enable certain practices and policy 
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choices while making other policy choices less likely. In the analysis of state energy 
security discourses, this is used to highlight the link between these policy discourses and a 
conventional notion of (national) security, and the way in which this link enables particular 
policy responses. Thus, this thesis looks both at energy security discourses and the policy 
choices which they enable. 
 
Language is fluid and constantly evolving. All representations can be contested, ‘and so 
must actively be reproduced…[m]eanings, in other words, are neither static nor final; 
rather, they are always in process and always provisional’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 
533). The unstable nature of language means that discourses can only ever be partially 
fixed, which means that there is always space for change (Doty 1996: 6). The normative 
commitment of this thesis leads the analysis towards disrupting ‘common sense’ 
understandings of energy security, to recognise that energy security could, and maybe 
should, be constructed differently. As a part of this, it looks at both ‘dominating or 
hegemonic discourses’, together with an analysis of ‘alternative discourses excluded or 
silenced by a hegemonic discourse’ (Milliken 1999: 230). This is used to highlight the 
potential for re-imagining energy security, following Milliken’s suggestion that 
‘concretising other possibilities is surely the best way to enable people to imagine how 
their being-in-the-world is not only changeable but, perhaps, ought to be changed’ (1999: 
244). By showing how energy security is constructed, and by whom, this research will also 
show that alternatives are possible.  
 
Following these wagers, the approach taken in this research is pragmatic, in that the 
overall aim is to ‘seek knowledge that will enable us to deal with relevant problems’ 
(Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 726). Thus, the emphasis is not on producing or 
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uncovering an objective ‘truth’ that is ‘out there’ in an independently existing world, but 
on gaining practically useful knowledge, which is always provisional and always 
historically contingent (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 713). Rather than using a 
positivist approach defining the concepts at the beginning of the research process and 
holding them constant, the conceptual framework and field of research were allowed to 
adapt throughout, with concepts adjusted throughout the research, to avoid ‘self-imposed 
conceptual blinders’ (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 717). This included the conceptual 
framework, following Wilkinson’s approach of using securitisation theory as a reference 
point rather than a definitive answer (2013b: 8). Following this approach, it is also worth 
clarifying that this research is not a comparative project, as empirical generalisation is not 
the goal. The framework developed here is helpful for understanding my case studies, and 
may work in other concrete cases, but it is not a ‘general law’. 
 
2.2 Critical constructivism 
Following these methodological assumptions, the analytical framework used in this 
research draws on critical constructivism, which allowed me to ask the questions I was 
interested in and to analyse my puzzle. Critical constructivism is associated with a number 
of authors, including Jutta Weldes, Roxanne Doty, Karin Fierke and more recently, Matt 
McDonald. Pursuing critical social constructivist analysis involves committing to the 
following analytical principles: 
1. What is understood as reality is socially constructed.  
2. Constructions of reality reflect, enact and reify relations of power. In turn, certain agents or 
groups of agents play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities. 
3. A critical constructivist approach denaturalises dominant constructions, offers guidelines for the 
transformation of common sense, and facilitates the imagining of alternative life-worlds. It also 
problematises the conditions of its own claims; that is, a critical constructivism is also reflexive 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 13) 
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In following these principles and advocating a critical constructivist approach to energy 
security, this research asks very different questions to conventional work on energy 
security. While the more conventional work provides some important insights, it asks very 
particular questions that rest on the assumption that insecurity is an ‘unavoidable fact’ in 
an anarchic international system, thus focusing on securing the state in this context 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 10). Such an approach fits under what Cox would refer to as 
‘problem-solving’ – in contrast, a critical approach ‘stands apart from the prevailing order 
of the world and asks how that order came about’ (Cox 1986: 129). In this vein, this 
research interrogates current energy security policy practices in the United States and 
China, and looks at how dominant energy security discourses enabled and made-possible 
these practices. In this vein this research aims to illustrate the constructed nature of energy 
security through questioning the assumptions on which it is based. Likewise, by disrupting 
the hegemonic ‘common-sense’ notion of energy security, illustrating the way in which is 
it constructed and the assumptions which underpin this construction of energy security as 
ensuring state fossil fuel supplies, it also opens up potential for challenging the accepted 
understanding of energy security. 
 
To explain in more detail what I mean by taking a critical constructivist approach, it is 
necessary to first briefly consider what I refer to here as ‘conventional’ or ‘thin’ 
constructivism and how this approach differs from that. In International Relations (IR), the 
label ‘constructivism’ has been applied to a broad spectrum of approaches, with a range of 
epistemological positions taken varying from broadly positivist to post-positivist (see 
Checkel 2004: 230-1). While constructivism was introduced to IR by Onuf (1989), 
Alexander Wendt (1992, 1995, 1998, 1999) has arguably been the most influential 
conventional constructivist so far. Constructivists are united by an understanding of world 
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politics as ‘socially constructed’, which is based on two claims: ‘that the fundamental 
structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material..., and that these 
structures shape actors’ identities and interests’ (Wendt 1995: 71-2). Moreover, ‘material 
resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are embedded’ (Wendt 1995: 73). As a result, analysing the 
social construction of world politics involves analysing ‘how processes of interaction 
produce and reproduce the social structures – cooperative or conflictual – that shape actors 
identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts’ (Wendt 1995: 81). 
So far, this research follows Wendt’s understanding of constructivist theorising.  
 
Critical constructivism shares much common ground with mainstream constructivists, in 
particular ‘the view that the material does not come classified, and that, therefore, the 
objects of our knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language’, 
likewise believing that ‘there is some foundation for knowledge’ (Adler 2002: 95). 
Ultimately, ‘both aim to “denaturalize” the social world’, by illustrating that it is 
constructed; that understanding the world involves studying intersubjective meanings and 
reality, emphasising context over generalisation; equally, both ‘accept the nexus between 
power and knowledge, the power of practice in its disciplinary, meaning-producing, 
mode. …Finally, both stress the reflexivity of the self and society, that is, the mutual 
constitution of actor and structure’ (Hopf 1998: 182).  
 
However, critical constructivism is distinguishable from conventional constructivism when 
it comes to epistemology and research methods. While mainstream constructivism is 
conventional when it comes to epistemology and methodology (Hopf 1998: 182), as can be 
seen in Wendt’s insistence on ‘scientific realism’, critical constructivism has been strongly 
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influenced by ‘linguistic constructivism’ which focuses on the role of discourse in 
constructing social reality (Adler 2002: 98). For critical constructivists, ‘meanings are 
fundamentally discursive: they are made possible by particular discourses that provide the 
categories through which the world is understood’ (Shepherd and Weldes 2008: 533). 
However, Wendt’s positioning of constructivism as a ‘middle way’ of IR theory ties him to 
particular ontological and epistemological choices which in practice work to exclude 
constructivist perspectives that are critical and post-structuralist (Zehfuss 2002: 260).  
 
This is problematic for this research, as it ties conventional constructivism closely to a 
traditional causal epistemology. In contrast, critical constructivists do not focus on testing 
causal theories but rather on denaturalizing ‘dominant constructions, in part by revealing 
their connection to existing power relations’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398). In this 
way, critical constructivists reject explanation in favour of understanding – leading to an 
emphasis on ‘how-possible’ questions over ‘why’ questions. It also means that 
conventional constructivists draw more closely towards positivist attempts to produce 
‘objective’ analysis, which does not fit with the aims and wagers of this research. As a 
result, while offering an explanation of how and why change is possible, constructivism in 
its conventional form also  remains ambivalent on the question of ethics
4
 and thus 
‘agnostic about change in world politics’ (Hopf 1998: 180). In contrast, critical 
constructivism opens space for a directly normative agenda. It begins with critique, 
challenging the ‘common-sense’ of hegemonic representations of the world, and 
sometimes goes further to re-imagine that world, thinking about possible alternatives to the 
status quo (for example, see Weldes et al. 1999: 21; and Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 
398). The space that critical constructivists open up for a normative agenda is key for this 
                                                          
4
 This has been disputed by Price (2008a, 2008b) and Reus-Smit (2008). Price has argued that also 
conventional constructivists should engage more with normative theorising (Price 2008a: 216). 
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research project, which is driven by a strong normative commitment to making human 
beings the primary subject of energy security, following Walker (1988: 128). The growing 
interdependence of human beings and the environment, moreover (see Dalby 2009), make 
a stable environment and climate a necessity for people to be secure, today and in future 
years. This will be discussed in more detail later. Thus advocating change is a central pillar 
of this project, which conventional constructivism cannot assist. 
  
In the emphasis on change, critical constructivism is influenced by critical social theory, 
which adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power’  
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 398). This adds a normative dimension that conventional 
constructivism lacks. Thus, critical constructivists ‘share the view that striving for a better 
understanding of the mechanisms on which social and political orders are based is also a 
reflexive move aimed at the emancipation of society’ (Adler 2002: 98). In this way, it 
expressly claims ‘an interest in change, and a capacity to foster change, that no 
conventional constructivist could make’ (Hopf 1998: 184). In turn, understanding meaning 
as constructed opens up potential for rethinking energy security. Discourses always 
contain internal contradictions and gaps, and ‘these contradictions make possible both 
resistance to a dominant discourse and the transformation of discourses’ (Weldes et al. 
1999: 16). While emphasising the constructed nature of meanings, critical constructivists 
also recognise that discourses are sites of power - and some, particularly state discourses, 
have more power than others as ‘they are located in and partake of institutional power’ 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 17), which makes them harder to challenge. 
 
While opening space for a normative agenda, critical constructivism remains vague on 
what such an agenda might look like. This is where this research turns to Walker and 
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Dalby. This research is underpinned by a normative agenda, arguing that the purpose of 
security policy should be to provide security for people, regardless of state borders, 
following Walker (1988: 121). In the twenty-first century, moreover, the security of people 
is inextricably bound up with the security and stability of the global environment which 
human beings depend on to continue to exist (Dalby 2009). While ‘world politics is always 
already based on ethical argument’ (Crawford 1998: 135), this is rarely openly recognised. 
In the discipline of IR, an overarching acceptance that the international system is anarchic 
has made state borders the limits for any discussion of ethics (Booth et al. 2000: 1). While 
there have been a few exceptions, including peace research which has often been positivist 
but fundamentally concerned with right and wrong (Galtung 1964, 1969), the idea of 
normative or ethical discussions in the international realm has only recently become more 
accepted (among others, see Falk 1981; Brown 1992; Pogge 1992; Wheeler 2000). 
Normative arguments are used to make particular practices and policy choices about what 
is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ seem normal and/or legitimate, often helping to reproduce and 
maintain power relations (Crawford 1998: 134). However, they can also be used to 
destabilise and question the legitimacy of dominant norms and constructions, providing an 
alternative (Crawford 1998: 134-5). Moreover, combining an emphasis on discourse with 
the scepticism of critical perspectives ‘actually expands the possibilities for ethical world 
politics’ by showing ‘how our arguments can change the world’ (Crawford 1998: 140). In 
this process, this research also relies on Cox’s understanding of critical theory as theory 
which ‘allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different 
from the prevailing order, but…limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are 
feasible transformations of the existing world’ (1986: 130). The notion of feasibility is 
central to this research, and links to the pragmatic aims outlined earlier. 
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Following Fierke, I argue that to some degree, ‘all enquiries into security are normative’ 
(2007: 3) as studying security necessarily involves making (subjective) choices about what 
the world ‘is’, producing meaning. Positivist research would understand these choices as 
objective and based on factual grounds, while a critical constructivist approach argues that 
such choices are always subjective and therefore involve normative decisions. Therefore, 
being open about these normative choices is a key starting point for being reflexive. As 
noted, reflexivity in the research process is essential, and following a more critical 
approach also involves recognising a researcher’s role in the research process, and ‘their 
own participation in the reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they 
observe’ (Hopf 1998: 184). Consequently, it is also essential to note that attempts to 
reimagine the world are necessarily always ‘partial and situated’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 21), 
but visualising an alternative is still a crucial part of advocating change. Ultimately, 
‘One...needs to know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to establish’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001: xix). This research, therefore, looks at how different discourses 
understand energy security; both in terms of what ‘kind’ of security is constructed or 
hoped for, in short, what security means in these cases, and what or who precisely energy 
security constructions aim to secure. As part of this, it looks at both dominant and 
marginalised constructions to highlight the contested nature of energy security, and how 
different notions of energy security enable different policy options. This in turn has clear 
implications for how security works when attached to energy. Marginalised discourses are 
used to highlight how an alternative energy security might feasibly look, based on already 
existing discourses.  
 
Viewing theoretical positions as a spectrum rather than distinct positions, with positivist 
approaches on one end and radical constructivism or poststructuralism on the other, it is 
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clear that critical constructivism is closely related to poststructuralism. While some critical 
constructivists, including Adler, are closer to political sociology, the branch used here has 
taken a ‘deeper, more discursive’  approach which often draws directly on poststructual 
work (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 198). As a result, there is a lot of overlap, particularly in 
more sophisticated variants of the two approaches (see Weldes et al. 1999; Doty 1996; 
Hansen 2006). David Campbell also notes the way in which ‘much critical work combines 
in a productive way the different positions’ (1998b: 223). Consequently, this research also 
draws on authors more commonly classified as part of the poststructural turn, including 
Hansen (2006), Shepherd (2008a) and Walker (1988, 1993, 1997). It is worth noting that 
many poststructuralists emphasise the danger of metanarratives, and are therefore deeply 
suspicious of universal notions of ‘progress’ or ‘good’, which aligns their normative 
agenda more closely with resistance, deconstruction and critique. This is a key difference, 
as critical constructivists openly advocate visualising progressive alternatives. Overall, the 
aim of this thesis is to encourage wider theoretical and conceptual debate over the concept 
of energy security in a changing world, rather than to impose one account of energy 
security as the only viable approach. As such, the approach used here presents an 
alternative, a starting point for re-imagining energy security in a way that may work to 
secure people rather than states. This is where this research departs most clearly from a 
poststructural approach. 
 
2.2.1 From critique to reconstruction 
It is clear that there is some tension between a broadly interpretivist approach and 
‘reconstruction’, or envisioning alternative realities. If there is no objective reality beyond 
what is constructed, is it possible to establish what is ‘ethical’ or ‘good’ beyond an 
individual interpretation? How does one go about producing an ethical alternative vision 
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without imposing another problematic metanarrative? Firstly, it is important to note that 
authors often accused of ethical nihilism, in presenting poststructural or interpretive work 
that emphasises critique, in reality both address and are deeply concerned with ethics. 
Deconstruction and critique are ultimately an ethical demand (Critchley 1999: 12). In fact, 
Critchley’s reading of Derrida goes as far as stating that ‘there is a duty in deconstruction’ 
(1999: 41, emphasis added)
5
. Honneth agrees, noting that ‘The very intention of criticizing 
metaphysics also carries with it certain normative-political consequence’ (Honneth 1995: 
290). This also ties in with Fierke’s argument that all enquiries into security are normative, 
as outlined in the previous section. Likewise, looking at the later work of Derrida and 
Lyotard, Honneth suggests that while postmodernism as a philosophical movement may 
have begun as ‘strictly directed against every kind of normative theory,…this initial 
reticence has since given way to a dramatically changed attitude’ (1995: 289). He goes as 
far as referring to this change as ‘an ethical turn’ (1995: 289). Meanwhile, work in IR that 
draws on poststructural writers have often also made ethical arguments, including Walker 
(1988), Campbell (1998a; 1998b), Campbell and Shapiro (1999) and Dillon (2002). There 
is not enough space here to do justice to the range of approaches in poststructural ethics, 
for a fuller discussion see Honneth (1995) and Critchley (1999).  
 
While critical constructivism provides a rationale and an agenda for thinking about 
reconstruction and potential alternatives to existing reality, it does not fully tackle the 
problem of grounding ethics. Tension remains over the extent to which critical theory is 
compatible with a critical constructivist approach – this is an important discussion and an 
area where much more research is needed. This thesis cannot do full justice to the issues 
raised by this debate, given the need to focus on its own enquiry within constrained word 
                                                          
5
He goes on to note that ‘the ethical conception of justice that drives the deconstructive enterprise, and which 
is defined in terms of responsibility to the other, would seem to be essentially connected to the  possibility of 
political reformation, transformation and progress’ (Critchley 1999: 275). 
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limits, though this research does open up a space for continuing discussion about this. 
However, the emphasis on intersubjectivity in critical constructivism is key. Reality is 
socially constructed, and the influence from critical theory provides some rationale for 
change. Critical constructivism draws on critical theory to ground its commitment to move 
beyond critique to seek progressive alternatives. However, while critical constructivists 
frequently reference power and emancipation, the implications or practicality of this are 
rarely addressed. In the simplest form, critique itself works to make alternatives possible 
by disrupting ‘common-sense’ or accepted notions of energy security. Thus, critique in 
itself involves taking an ethical stance
6. Going beyond this to ‘reconstruct’, however, is 
more problematic, as any reconstruction risks imposing a new hegemony or dominant 
narrative.  
 
Thinking explicitly about alternatives is, however, an essential part of advocating change 
and therefore not something that could be justifiably neglected here. It has to involve a 
discussion about what kinds of definitions of (energy) security create ethical potential: 
which are better and which are worse when it comes to providing security. Of course, 
making any kind of judgement involves some form of decision about what is good, or at 
least about what is bad or undesirable. It is better to be open than implicit about these 
decisions – this is also a starting point for being reflexive and open to critique, and even to 
make critique and self-critique of such choices easier. Encouraging these conversations is 
essential to avoid imposing a problematic new ‘hegemony’ or metanarrative. In cases 
where change is necessary analysts have a responsibility to identify alternatives, in this 
case to move beyond a state-centric notion of energy security to one that provides security 
for individuals and the environment too. Of course change is difficult given relations of 
                                                          
6
 For more on this, see Campbell (1998a) for a discussion on the ethos of political criticism.  
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power, but even deeply entrenched power structures are not fixed, and it would be 
unethical to treat them as such or accept them rather than try to resist them. 
 
Fundamentally, even if there is no ‘reality’ or ‘real’ outside interpretation, this does not 
mean that we cannot interpret. Of course there are problems with this, and any potential 
alternative may also have inherent problems. However, feasibility and change are both key 
goals of this research, and it would be problematic to advocate change without suggesting 
an alternative. The approach used here
7
 builds on existing marginalised discourses 
interpreted as ‘better’ and more able to provide the kind of security that should be strived 
for, which is hoped to both provide a more feasible path for change as well as one that has 
been to an extent ‘tested’ though on-going articulations, protests and demonstrations 
calling for change in energy policy
8
. In this sense, the research remains committed to the 
pragmatic aims outlined earlier. Much more research is needed on ethics and change in 
security studies, and I cannot do full justice to this discussion here. It is a complex issue 
and some contradictions persist, but as the emphasis here remains on practical utility the 
rest of this chapter will move onto discuss ethics and energy security more specifically.  
 
2.3 Energy and security 
As shown in the previous chapter, energy security is a field dominated by a traditional 
approach to security. It relies neopositivist assumptions, understanding both ‘threat’ and 
‘security’ as objectively existing material realities, while relying on a conventional logic of 
security centred around ensuring the survival of the national-security state and/or the 
                                                          
7
 See Chapter 6. 
8
 This is the kind of argument forwarded by Habermas’ notion of communicative ethics (1979, 1981). For a 
fuller discussion, see White (1989). Naomi Head has also drawn on Habermas ‘to interrogate the 
intersubjective validity of claims to legitimacy raised by actors in particular contexts’ in a study on justifying 
violence in Kosovo (2012: 198). This is discussed further in chapter six. 
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global economic status-quo. This understanding of security is both largely accepted and 
deeply problematic. Energy remains closely linked with national security, as fossil fuels 
are an essential part of functioning modern economies and societies, underpinning 
economic growth (Mulligan 2011: 635). Consequently, we are repeatedly told that ‘second 
only to national defense, energy plays a crucial role in the survival and well-being of the 
United States and virtually all other countries, both developing and developed…’ 
(Hamilton 2005: xxi). However, taking a critical constructivist approach it becomes clear 
that the pursuit of energy security is underpinned by number of methodological 
assumptions as well as ethical choices regarding the value of security and security practice, 
and the suitable referent object of security. Because of the historical primacy of the state, 
security has become closely linked with state sovereignty, and national security has 
become privileged in discussions about security (Walker 1990: 8) – however, this link is 
not inherent. 
 
As currently understood in the literature, energy security relies on a traditional, state-
centric notion of security whereby the state has to maximise its security to protect itself 
from external threats – in this case supply instability and price volatility. Even in liberal 
notions of energy security the emphasis on stable markets relies on continued supplies of 
fossil fuels (from states to other states) and continued consumption and economic growth 
to secure the national/global economy. Both notions enable and encourage zero-sum 
competition between states over fossil fuels to stabilise or even maximise their own 
supply, driving up demand. This works to increase tension and mistrust between states, 
producing insecurity in traditional terms. Moreover, the link between energy and national 
security also enables a focus on securing state fossil fuel supplies at the expense of the 
future of the climate and human security. Paradoxically, state maximisation of fossil fuel 
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supplies in the name of national (energy) security and economic growth is a direct cause of 
climate change
9
, which, if allowed to continue on present paths, will be a major cause of 
insecurity for states, the planet and the human beings who rely on it to survive. Thus as 
energy increasingly becomes incorporated in security agendas, attempts by states to 
respond paradoxically produce insecurity. Rethinking energy security in more ethical 
terms becomes increasingly important. It also moves the argument that security needs to 
move away from traditional geopolitical premises beyond a case of ethical preferences, 
towards ‘strategic necessities[sic]’ (Burke 2013: 21). At the centre of this is an ethical 
commitment to making human beings the primary subject of security. The growing 
interdependence of human beings and the environment, moreover (see Dalby 2009), make 
a stable environment and climate a necessity for people to be secure, today and in future 
years.  
 
Critical security studies was briefly introduced in the previous chapter
10
. It is an umbrella 
term defining a research agenda based around three core commitments: firstly, a 
fundamental critique of the traditional approach to security, its ontological assumptions 
and emphasis on protecting the state from political-military threats; secondly, 
understanding ‘what security does politically’, and finally, the ethics of security – 
understanding what constitutes the ‘good’ of security (Browning and McDonald 2013: 1; 
see also Krause and Williams 1997). While increasing debate over the meaning of security 
has highlighted key problems and features of security construction, the critical security 
studies project has not done enough to address the ethics and the politics of security 
(Browning and McDonald 2013). Some have rejected security, arguing that it is essentially 
                                                          
9
 See International Energy Agency (2007: 28). 
10
 For a fuller treatment of critical security studies and its research agenda, see Browning and McDonald 
(2013), Krause and Williams (1997), Burgess (2010), Salter and Mutlu (2013). 
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negative and best avoided (Neocleous 2008; Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998)
11
. Others 
have argued that security is an essentially positive value to be fought for (see Booth 1991, 
2005a, 2007; Wyn Jones 1999). Following this, there is a small but growing literature on 
positive/negative security (see Roe 2008, 2012; Floyd 2007, 2011; Hoogensen Gjørv 
2012), which will be discussed in more detail later. This section discusses theories and 
approaches used in this research to understand the politics and ethics of energy security. It 
begins with a discussion on the concept of security, before discussing the Copenhagen 
School and their views on the politics of security, followed by more directly normative 
approaches discussing what security and security practice should be. Lastly, it introduces 
the emerging positive/negative security debate and discusses the need to analyse the value 
of security in practice. 
 
2.3.1 What is so special about ‘security’? 
The concept of ‘security’ has a lot of power. Countries are invaded in its name, an ever-
increasing range of domestic and foreign policies are justified in its name, and it has an 
entire academic sub-discipline dedicated to its study. The previous chapter noted the 
discipline’s preoccupation with defending the borders of the meaning and study of 
‘security’ as traditionally conceived, in the name of ‘intellectual coherence’ (Walt 1991: 
213). These arguments have essentially focused on the need to retain the focus of study as 
war and political-military threats to national security. While this focus has been 
increasingly questioned by a number of critical authors, others have suggested that the 
history of the concept makes security necessarily particular. ‘Security’ is said to have a 
heavy conceptual baggage, with strong connotations of national security and militaristic 
threat-defense thinking (Wæver 1995: 47). Going further, some claim that the meaning of 
                                                          
11
 Moreover, many critiques of security as negative in critical security studies rely on a commitment to the 
Copenhagen School’s understanding of  security-as-securitisation (for example, see Aradau 2004).  
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security requires insecurity: ‘it can never escape it: it must continue to produce images of 
“insecurity” in order to retain its meaning’ (Burke 2002: 20). Similarly Lipschutz suggests 
that security necessitates exclusion and others made threatening: it is ‘meaningless without 
an “other” to help specify the conditions of insecurity’ (1995: 9). 
 
One of the peculiarities of ‘security’ as a concept is its vagueness: it has long been 
recognised that ‘the term “security” covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent 
policies can be interpreted as policies of security’ (Wolfers 1962: 150). While Wolfers 
referred to the way ‘security’ is used by states, increasing debate and discussion over the 
meaning of security has suggested that security is a ‘contested concept’ (Dalby 1997; 
Smith 1999; Buzan 1991)
12
. This indicates that it is contested and essentially contestable 
by its very nature, and furthermore, because it is the very ‘essence’ or meaning of security 
that is contested. It has always had many, contested and even contradictory meanings (Der 
Derian 1995: 28)
13
. Moreover, the referent of security is essential to the meaning of the 
concept itself: ‘To have any meaning, security necessarily presupposes something to be 
secured’ (Krause and Williams 1997: ix). The referent object used to be the state, and 
things considered threats to security used to be limited to political-military issues. 
However, this has been increasingly questioned in arguments to broaden and deepen 
security, questioning both the role of the state as referent and security provider. 
Increasingly, ‘what it is that should be rendered secure is an essential component of any 
discussion on security’ (Dalby 1997: 22). A growing number of issues are labelled security 
issues, leading to debate over the extent to which the label is justified as well as the 
                                                          
12
 The notion of ‘contested concepts’ derives from Gallie, who argues that essentially contested concepts are 
recognisable by the way ‘any proper use of this concept is in the nature of the case contestable, and will, as a 
rule, be actually contested by and in another use of it, which in the nature of the case is contestable, and will, 
and so on’ (1955: 169). 
13
 See Der Derian (1995) for a short but interesting genealogy of the concept of security. 
CHAPTER 2 
86 
 
usefulness of the label itself and the extent to which it is helpful or bad to consider them 
security issues (see, for example, Hudson 2009).  
 
However, energy has long been established as a security issue, because of the role it has 
played and continues to play in fuelling both national militaries, societies and economies. 
Secure energy supplies are essential for states’ military and economic survival in an 
industrialised world. This makes it difficult to remove energy from the security agenda. It 
is also worth noting that the way in which security works with energy may differ from 
other cases, as ‘security’ in this case derives from security of supply, though it is 
increasingly linked with national security too. Ultimately, ‘security’ is invoked in a range 
of ways. Here, I am looking at how it works in relation to energy, and when it does – or 
doesn’t – provide security. Throughout, this research draws on a range of critical literature 
on security, but the focus here is on securitisation theory and the Welsh School, as key 
approaches discussing the politics and ethics of security. 
 
2.3.2 Securitisation theory and the politics of security 
Securitisation theory presents perhaps the most influential account of how security works 
and what security does. It was developed by the Copenhagen School (for key texts, see 
Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998) for conceptualising how and when issues ‘become’ 
security issues, and what this does to the issues themselves
14
. Security is defined as a 
‘speech act’ (Wæver, 1995: 55), and securitisation as the discursive process through 
which, 
an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labelling it as security 
an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) 
                                                          
14
 As a result, securitisation theory has been used to study the increasing number of issues which have been 
labelled security issues, or securitised, including the environment, HIV/AIDS and migration (see Floyd 2010; 
Elbe 2006; Huysmans 2000). 
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By drawing on Austin’s speech-act theory, the Copenhagen School went beyond 
suggesting that security is constructed, to argue that security has a special quality. A 
security speech-act is ‘performative’, not descriptive: to utter security is ‘to do it’ (Austin 
1962: 6, emphasis added)
15
. Thus the label ‘security’ is not simply a reflection of whether 
an issue is a security issue, but is rather a ‘political choice’ which has specific 
consequences in terms of how the issue is addressed (Wæver 1995: 65). Securitisation is 
considered successful if the designated issue is accepted as a threat to security by the 
relevant audience, to a point where emergency measures are possible
16
. If securitisation is 
successful, the ‘threat’ then tends to be addressed in specific ways: ‘threat, defense, and 
often state-centred solutions’ (Wæver, 1995: 65).  The limitations of securitisation theory 
have been discussed elsewhere (see Nyman 2013), with key critiques pointing to security 
constructions beyond speech, including visual representations and physical action, as well 
as the problematic normative implications of leaving power in the hands of elites 
(Williams 2003; McDonald 2008; Hansen 2000, 2011; Stritzel 2007; Aradau 2004; 
Balzacq 2005, 2010). However, securitisation theory has remained central to attempts to 
understand processes and consequences of security construction. 
 
What really defines a security issue, for the Copenhagen School, is survival: it is ‘the 
survival of the unit as a basic political unit – a sovereign state – that is the key’ (Wæver 
1995: 53). Their definition of security is narrow and fixed, arguing that because of how 
                                                          
15
 Austin further distinguished between the illocutionary and perlocutionary nature of speech-acts– the 
former being speech-acts which do something by virtue of being spoken, and the latter referring to the effect 
speech-acts have on the audience or even the speaker him/herself (1962: 101). Likewise, context, or 
‘circumstances’ are key to the performativity of speech-acts, and , often other actions are necessary to 
accompany speech-act – these could be physical or mental actions, or ‘acts of uttering further words’ (Austin 
1962: 8). 
16
 This is more likely if the issue is framed using the grammar of security, if speaker is in a position of 
authority and if the external context and features of the threat makes the designation seem realistic (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 25-33). 
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‘security’ is used in the field of practice, it ‘has to be read through the lens of national 
security’ – it cannot escape its historical connotations (1995: 49). Moreover, it ‘is 
articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’ (1995: 57). For 
Wæver, then, the particularity of security means that desecuritisation is usually preferable 
(1995: 57). Securitisation theory distinguishes between a realm of normal politics 
characterised by democratic political procedures, and a realm of security which operates 
above normal politics. The realm of security is both politics made more intense, and 
opposed to normal politics, in its urgency and lack of democratic procedures (Buzan et al. 
1998: 29). As a result, the Copenhagen School posit that ‘security should be seen as a 
negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). The 
realm of security thus represents the exception, a ‘logic of war’ with emergency, state-
centred ‘threat-defense’ thinking where regular rules do not bind and democratic decision-
making procedures do not apply (Wæver 1995: 47-54). Ultimately, ‘…neither individual 
nor international security exist’ (Wæver 1995: 49). Consequently, most issues are best 
dealt with outside of the security sphere, or desecuritised. The Copenhagen School’s 
understanding represents a very particular view of security and its relationship to politics. 
Taken to its logical extreme, this argument suggests that ‘democratic politics is 
incompatible with the politics of security’ (Aradau 2004: 399).  
 
In terms of this research, securitisation theory is particularly attractive as it both presents a 
clear account of the social construction of security and a way to understand how security 
works, as well as providing the tools for ‘practical security analysis’ (Taureck 2006: 53). 
However, it also leaves a number of problems. My central research question focuses 
specifically on how energy security is constructed in the United States and China. My 
knowledge of the subject area suggests that securitisation does not fully explain how 
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security works in the case of energy – while it is widely accepted as a security issue in 
both states and often indeed framed using the language of security as described by the 
Copenhagen School, it is rarely fully securitised and remains subject to political debate. 
Emergency measures are rarely possible (for an exception, see Nyman 2014). While some 
argue that the process of securitisation can occur through slow, bureaucratic processes 
rather than through elite speech-acts claiming the need for an exception (Bigo 2002; 
Huysmans 2006, 2011), this still does not explain why energy remains near the top of the 
security agenda without being fully securitised. Three key problems remain, related to this 
research. 
 
Firstly, for the purposes of this study, the definition of security used by the Copenhagen 
School is too narrow and too fixed. Following McDonald and others, I argue here that a 
lack of distinction between security and securitisation clouds the debate: securitisation 
‘should not be viewed as shorthand for the broader construction of security’ (McDonald 
2008: 564). Securitisation is seen here as one particular process of security construction, 
rather than the process of security construction. Moreover, the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of security-as-securitisation and a ‘logic of existential threat and extreme 
necessity’ has been linked with a Schmittian understanding of the political as characterised 
by ‘existential division, of friendship and enmity’ (Williams 2003: 516; see also 
Huysmans 1998). Thus, Huysmans argues that ‘securitization makes the kind of politics 
that defines the self on the basis of hostility’ (1998: 576). This is noted by Wæver, who 
recognises that securitisation theory has a ‘Schmittian concept of security and an 
Arendtian concept of politics’ (2011: 470)17. This ultimately leaves a choice between 
‘politics of exceptional measures’ or ‘democratic politics of slow procedures which can be 
                                                          
17
 While this does leave a choice, as securitisation ‘takes place in a context where there is space for open 
politics’ (Roe 2012: 255) it leaves no potential for change within the concept of security. 
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contested’ (Aradau 2004: 393). However, security does not have to have be exclusionary. 
In practice, the distinction between politics and security is not so clear: even securitisation 
itself is more of a ‘gradual and incremental’ process than the opposite of politics 
(Abrahamsen 2005: 59; see also McDonald 2012: 5).  
 
In practice, many issues fall in the grey area between regular politics and negative, urgent, 
security-as-successful-securitisation (see, for example, Huysmans 2011)
18
. These issues 
can still be issues of security. Moreover, the narrow and fixed interpretation of security 
used by the Copenhagen School fails to recognise that security also has historically 
‘positive, non-militarised, and non-statist connotations’ (Booth 2007: 165). While it is 
necessary to recognise that security has often had negative, violent and/or exclusionary 
connotations, these meanings are not inherent, but ‘are themselves the result of social and 
historical processes, and can thus be changed’ (Nunes 2012: 350). Because of their 
emphasis on dominant security discourses following a logic of national security – which 
does have clear problems – the Copenhagen School struggle to see security when it does 
not follow their rules (Browning and McDonald 2013: 14-15). Ultimately, security has no 
fixed meaning or ‘essence’ (Ciută 2009: 303-4). Thus, while I agree that securitisation 
does indeed have ‘inevitable negative effects’ (Wæver 2011: 469), understanding security-
as-securitisation neglects security where it does not fit within the Copenhagen School’s 
narrow framework, such as when it is articulated by non-elites, and framed using a 
different language of security that does not rely on friend/foe distinctions and non-
democratic procedures. These alternative security practices are not only overlooked by the 
securitisation framework, but actively dismissed as irrelevant.  
 
                                                          
18
 This grey area is not addressed by the Copenhagen School, and perhaps it doesn’t need to be – if we accept 
that securitisation theory is mostly useful for studying some particular security constructions, rather than 
expecting it to be an all-encompassing theory of security. 
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This leads onto the second problem. Because of the specific understanding of security used 
in securitisation theory, it cannot be used to study these alternative security practices. It 
limits the study of security-as-securitisation to elite speech-acts following the grammar of 
securitisation – which, according to Wæver et al, tends to result in threat-defense thinking 
and state-centred solutions. It privileges a very particular notion of ‘security’ which can 
only be articulated by those in a position of power (see Hansen 2000; Wilkinson 2007). A 
focus on dominant voices contributes ‘to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the 
ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions’ 
(McDonald 2008: 574). The audience is presented as largely passive, ultimately leaving 
security to the elites and the exception. Moreover, this overlooks the way in which other 
actors contest dominant notions of security and threat, articulating alternative concepts of 
security (McDonald 2008: 575) that may also ‘reveal more non-divisive referents and 
cooperative practices’ (Roe 2012: 250). Thus following McDonald, this thesis advocates ‘a 
broader approach to the construction of security’, which in turn ‘lends itself to a concern 
with locating and acknowledging alternative articulations of security, especially those 
outlined by marginalised voices’ (McDonald 2008: 565, 2012).  
 
Lastly, the Copenhagen School doesn’t provide a viable normative agenda for this 
research. Desecuritisation both remains ‘under-theorised’ (Aradau 2004; Hansen 2010), 
and in some instances, it is ‘logically impossible’ to achieve (Roe 2004: 208). Because of 
the role secure energy supplies play in ensuring the political, economic and military 
survival of the state, desecuritisation would be extremely difficult. However, while for the 
Copenhagen School desecuritisation is the ‘optimal outcome19, working as a ‘normative-
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 Even while they define desecuritisation as ‘optimal’, moreover, the Copenhagen School still suggest that 
securitisation is sometimes necessary ‘in order to block the worst’ (Wæver 2000: 285). Here they leave ‘a 
silence on which situations call for ‘the responsibility’ to securitize rather than desecuritization; and an 
absence on the question //which securitizations might be more desirable than others’ (Hansen 2010: 1-2). 
CHAPTER 2 
92 
 
political supplement’ alongside securitisation as the solution to the Schmittian problem of 
security (Hansen 2010), desecuritisation is only optimal if we accept their understanding of 
security. In practice, security is more complex than the Copenhagen School admit. 
Problematically, while arguing that ‘the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not 
something we can define analytically or philosophically according to what would be 
“best”’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24), Buzan et al simultaneously limit the meaning of security to 
very specific usages by particular actors. If it is not inherently negative, desecuritising 
energy can be normatively undesirable. As recognised by the Copenhagen School, security 
can provide mobilising power and resources to deal with issues, and if this power of 
security is applied outside the narrow framework’s notion of security as a negative, it can 
provide actual potential for change. In the words of Booth, ‘desecuritisation can 
disempower’, leading to insecurities being ignored (2007: 168). This is problematic for the 
agenda forwarded here as it involves essentially giving up on security as a positive value 
and a potential site of contestation and change (see McDonald 2008: 580). Consequently, it 
is necessary to engage with security rather than dismissing it. De/securitisation theory 
cannot explain current energy security practices, nor suggest viable change
20
. The 
relationship between energy and security is complex, and it rarely follows the Copenhagen 
School’s framework. 
 
Thus, while it provides a useful starting point, there are a number of problems with relying 
on securitisation theory for this research. One approach to dealing with this would be to 
revise the theory to make it more suitable to my aims, but this may cause further problems. 
                                                          
20
 Williams suggests that the emphasis on securitisation as a process of negotiation and acceptance between 
speaker and audience provides a form of ‘discursive ethics’ suggesting a desire to avoid the realpolitik of 
Schmitt’s world - particularly as the Copenhagen School also suggest security is best avoided (Williams 
2003: 523). However, it still leaves security understood very narrowly, as negative and in opposition to 
politics – it cannot deal with issues ‘positively’ within the realm of security. Further, he asks what the 
political consequences of the Copenhagen School’s understanding of security and politics are (2003: 528) - 
this thesis would argue there are troubling normative implications, as discussed further later. 
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Likewise, the fact that securitisation theory closes off security as a site for progress is 
deeply problematic for my research agenda, as desecuritising energy is likely to be 
difficult, if not impossible in practical terms. This leaves no viable normative agenda. 
Instead, this thesis argues that securitisation theory presents a narrow, particular 
understanding of security, rather than the understanding of security, following McDonald 
(2008) and Ciută (2009). Problematically, the Copenhagen School’s theoretical definition 
of security often takes precedence over situated security practice, limiting the study of 
security to how security works when situated actors ‘happen to act in theoretically 
prescribed ways’ (Ciută 2009: 316; Neal 2013: 42). Thus, while claiming that security is 
‘intersubjective’ and what actors make of it, securitisation theory provides ‘a yardstick for 
estimating whether given policies are about security or not, since ‘security’ is what fulfils 
the criteria of securitisation, and nothing else’ (Ciută 2009: 303)21. In contrast, it is argued 
here, following McDonald and Ciută, that something can be a security issue without being 
‘securitised’ as understood by the Copenhagen School. If we instead understand 
securitisation theory as an analytical framework useful for studying some, but not all, 
security constructions, it allows us to study issues which do not fit the criteria of 
securitisation theory, and to recognise that they can still be issues of security. 
 
As the goal here is to study how energy security is constructed, it was necessary to keep an 
open mind as to how ‘security’ works22. The aim of this research was to provide a 
meaningful analysis of what is going on in my empirical case studies, how energy is 
constructed as security, what this means and how it works in different cases – rather than 
                                                          
21
 It is worth noting that Ciuta uses this insight to suggest securitisation theory take context into account. 
This paper however, suggests securitisation theory may work better in its original form, but that necessitates 
separating out understanding and study of ‘security’ understood more broadly, from security understood as 
securitisation – which could still then be used to study securitisation as a particular security construction. 
22
 There is a debate over the Western-centric nature of securitisation theory, but Juha Vouri (2008) has 
illustrated possibility of using it to study security in China. This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
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studying processes of securitisation. While analysis starts with dominant, state discourses 
the focus here is on how security is understood (how it is articulated, what is considered a 
threat, what the suggested solutions are, and what the referent object of security is), rather 
than assuming that it follows the Copenhagen School’s notion. Moreover, this study also 
includes a search for alternative discourses of energy security, which are not articulated by 
elites (see chapter 6 for more on this). Following a pragmatic approach, the meaning of 
security has been kept open rather than fixed. Thus the focus here is on what is happening 
in the empirical cases studied, following calls by Neal and Wilkinson to put the empirical 
above theory (Neal 2013; Wilkinson 2013b). Being too wedded to securitisation theory 
would clearly be problematic with such an approach
23
. Instead, this research has followed 
Wilkinson, and used securitisation theory as a ‘a reference point’ – treating it as one of 
many ways of interpreting security, rather than the only way (2013b: 8)
24
. Thus, whether 
or not energy is securitised is not a focus – policies are being pursued in the name of 
security, and the focus is on how security is understood in these cases and what policy 
choices this enables. Securitisation theory provides a reference point for studying how 
security works, but leaves no normative agenda if desecuritisation is not possible or 
desirable. The following section considers other normative agendas.  
 
2.3.3 The ethics of energy security: towards a normative agenda  
As noted, this research is underpinned by a commitment to the security of human beings 
and the environment on which they depend. Traditional security scholars have largely 
overlooked the ethics of security, rarely reflecting on the concept of security itself and 
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 Securitisation theory also leaves analysts largely outside of the equation – securitisation is described as a 
‘political choice’ (Wæver 1995: 65) taken by political actors which analysts can then study. However, the 
term ‘political choice’ is vague, and it is worth noting that Hansen has suggested it could refer to analysts too 
(Hansen 2010: 5). 
24
 Thus, rather than being ‘a “container” or framework that structured and auto-selected empirical content’ 
securitisation theory was used as a guide and a reference point (Wilkinson 2013b: 8). 
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what it should be, or what form security practices should take. Early peace studies, 
however, engaged with ethics more directly. Galtung distinguished between positive and 
negative peace, defining negative peace as the absence of violence/war, and positive peace 
as ‘the integration of human society’ (1964: 2)25. This distinction between negative and 
positive is also used by Berlin, but differs from the usage of these terms in this research. 
Here, the term ‘negative’ is used in its more literal sense to denote bad energy security 
policy, in the sense of policy which does not provide security, and ‘positive’ is used in the 
same literal sense to denote energy security policy which is deemed ‘better’, providing 
security for humans and environment. Walker’s early work also considers ethics and 
security, discussing the ‘nature and possibility of a just world peace’ (1988: 2). He also 
emphasised the link between ‘ethical claims and conceptions of political community’ 
(Walker 1993: 51), suggesting that as long as political space remains centred around state 
sovereignty and framed in exclusive inside/outside terms, it may not be possible to escape 
the ‘disjunction between ethics and international relations’ (Walker 1993: 64, 1997: 73). 
Likewise, securing human beings has traditionally been considered to be the role of the 
state, as a part of protecting individuals from a ‘state of nature’ (Burke 2007: 36-37). This 
requires recognition of the power of national security discourses. The existence of states is 
justified by the fact that they are supposed to provide security for their citizens. However, 
states are often a source of insecurity. While the current state system is problematic in 
many ways, the state remains the key actor in the security sphere. Likewise, states do have 
obligations and responsibilities to their people, which, in current energy security policies, 
they are failing to fulfil. States should not be the referent objects of security as such 
policies fail to secure, and neither should they be the only actors or speakers of security. 
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 This was later expanded on to distinguish between negative peace as the absence of personal violence, and 
positive peace as the absence of structural violence, or social justice, understood as a ‘positively defined 
condition’ (Galtung 1969: 183). 
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However, they do remain useful as organised actors and as such have potential to be 
positive security actors. 
 
Following Weldes et al, this research starts with ‘discourses of insecurity...and asks “what 
do they do?”’ (1999: 10). Indeed, such an approach often means beginning analysis with 
state discourses. However, it does not require ending there. In terms of opening up the 
possibility for change, this research draws on critical constructivist notions of discourse as 
‘unfixed’, meaning there is always space for change (Doty 1996: 6). It also draws more 
directly on McDonald, who emphasises the contested nature of ‘security’ by locating 
alternative, marginalised security practices (2012). This is particularly helpful for the 
pragmatic focus of this research, as it allows the normative agenda to focus on locating 
potential for change in existing practices. Vitally, it enables a positive energy security to 
harness the power in ‘security’, recognising that ‘it is not necessary to reject the concept of 
security in order to think about peace and justice; just the particular understanding of 
security through which the concept has more or less been turned into its opposite’ (Walker 
1988: 161). 
 
Studying the ethics of security implies a normative approach, as it necessitates the analyst 
both evaluating security and making some form of judgement about what security should, 
or shouldn’t, be about.26 Consequently, compared with traditional security studies, it 
involves a different approach towards the role of the analyst/s, as being ‘active participants 
in the security discussion’ (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012: 851). This also requires recognition 
that ‘the securitisation[/security] analyst in writing (speaking) about a particular social 
reality is in part responsible for the co-constitution of this very reality’ (Floyd 2010: 47). 
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 For an in-depth discussion on how the role of the analyst has been addressed in security studies, see 
Eriksson (1999). 
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More recently, work explicitly addressing the ethics of security has taken a range of 
forms
27
; this section will focus on the Welsh School of security studies, while also drawing 
on Walker and Linklater to build on this, as these have been most useful for addressing my 
questions. The emerging literature on positive/negative security will also be discussed in 
the following section as a key influence on this research. 
 
As noted in the previous section, while the Copenhagen School is deeply concerned with 
normative questions
28
, expressing a preference for desecuritisation (Wæver 2000: 253), 
their reliance on a narrow a fixed notion of security as inherently negative leaves no room 
for change within security. In contrast, the Welsh School of security studies, sometimes 
referred to as Critical Security Studies, suggest that security should be seen as a positive 
value, defining security as emancipation (Booth 1991, 2005a, 2007; Wyn Jones 1999). 
Booth defines emancipation as ‘the freeing of people…from those physical and human 
constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to 
do...Emancipation, theoretically, is security’ (1991: 319), while Wyn Jones has defined it 
as ‘some notion of the existence of possibilities for progressive alternatives’ (2005: 217). 
The Welsh School’s commitment to security-as-emancipation draws on critical theory and 
is underpinned by a strong normative commitment to ‘thinking about security from the 
perspective of those people(s) without power – those who have been traditionally silenced 
by prevailing structures’ (Booth 2005a: 14). This emphasis on power allows a recognition 
that many securities and insecurities which are not articulated by elites are neglected by 
the Copenhagen School. It also enables a recognition of the role of analysts in advocating 
change (Eriksson 1999: 318), and reprioritises the referent object to security to argue that 
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 This also includes work on human security, for a full discussion of its largely ‘uncritical conceptual 
underpinnings’ see Newman (2010). While it shifts the referent object of security it has problematic baggage 
and has historically been linked to closely with development agendas, which is less useful for this research. 
For a fuller treatment of some of these issues, see also Burke (2010). 
28
 In particular, see Wæver’s discussion of East European social movements (Wæver 1995: 77). 
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‘individual humans are the ultimate referent’ (Booth 1991: 319). However, while 
providing some important insights and normative critiques of security practice, 
emancipation is vague and difficult to implement, particularly from a security policy 
perspective, though some of the ideas underpinning emancipation are useful for 
conceptualising security more positively. Ideas of ‘progress’, ‘emancipation’ and 
‘freedom’ are noble in themselves, but problematic in power-terms. Booth’s notion of 
emancipation in particular is too universalistic and not grounded in political practice. 
Abstract ideas about the ‘freeing of people’ and ‘thinking about security from the 
perspective of those people(s) without power’ would involve both mindreading and 
imposing action and freedom/emancipation on people who would remain passive referents 
of security, rather than involving them in the process and giving them power to speak 
security themselves.  
 
The question often raised regarding emancipation and security, is ‘whether emancipation 
[read security as…] can be at nobody’s expense’ (Peoples 2010: 1129). This is similar to 
Aradau’s rejection of security as inherently exclusionary, meaning that we cannot all be 
‘equal sharers of security’ (2008: 73)29. This is based on an assumption that security relies 
on the existence of insecurity and a threatening ‘other’ that needs to be secured against. 
However, if security is seen as a positive value rather than just the absence of threat, the 
opposite of security is no longer insecurity. The exclusionary nature of (national) security 
is heavily related to its reliance on binary identities. However, while these practices are 
entrenched, ‘once upon a time, the world was not as it is. The patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion we now take for granted are historical innovations’ (Walker 1993: 179), and can 
therefore be challenged. Booth’s approach to this involves rejecting us/them, ‘mono-
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 It is important to mention that Aradau’s book focuses on trafficking, and as such security may work very 
differently in this context.  
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factoral’ identity labels in favour of multiple, overlapping identities  (Booth 2007: 138-40). 
Linklater provides a more in-depth and practical argument for moving beyond 
exclusionary Westphalian states based on difference and exclusion to transform identity 
and political communities (1998). He makes the argument that ‘globalisation and 
fragmentation erode traditional conceptions of community and reduce the moral 
significance of national boundaries’ (Linklater 1998: 5). Vitally, people living in modern 
states have a ‘dual identity as citizens and as human beings’ (Linklater 1998: 179). Taken 
to its logical conclusion, such an argument advocates some form of cosmopolitanism or 
common security (Linklater 1998; Burke et al. 2013)
30
. Of course, states continue to exist, 
but increasing integration and globalisation makes it more and more difficult for states to 
justify securing their own citizens at the expense of others. Most importantly, if identities 
are increasingly seen not in binary terms, but as multiple and overlapping and even 
crossing state boundaries, the binary distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ becomes blurred 
and it becomes harder to represent security in exclusionary terms. 
 
For the Welsh School the power of security is recognised as a useful tool for change. 
However, emancipation in its traditional forms clearly has some problems. While Booth 
argues in favour of securing individuals, these individuals are passive. Likewise, viewing 
security as emancipation and therefore as an inherently positive value is deeply 
problematic. Like the Copenhagen School, it suggests that the value of security is fixed. 
While recognising problems with the way in which security has been used, the Welsh 
School’s interpretation still does not fully recognise the contextual nature of security. 
However, McDonald presents a more critical and reflexive notion of emancipation that is 
grounded in ‘alternative security’ practices to highlight the potential for security as a site 
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 However, cosmopolitan security would be very difficult to combine with a study of energy security, as it 
relies on a global security governance framework which, when it comes to energy security, does not exist. 
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of contestation and, therefore, change (2012)
 31
. Wyn Jones has presented a similar focus, 
drawing on Habermas in suggesting the need to emphasise locating and outlining 'concrete 
utopias' (2005: 223; 1999: 76-8). Drawing on the Frankfurt School and immanent critique, 
he warns against the ‘temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that 
that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present’ (Wyn Jones 1999: 77). This is 
linked to practical potential of achieving change and convincing the target audience that 
change is both possible and achievable, thus ‘for both epistemological and purely 
instrumental reasons, concrete utopias must be based on practices that have some basis in 
pre-existing behaviour’ (Wyn Jones 1999: 77). Moreover, to avoid presenting a totalising 
metanarrative or a theory that becomes reified and loses any critical edge, it is necessary to 
conceive of emancipation as ‘a process rather than an endpoint’ (Wyn Jones 1999: 78). As 
such it can be a reflexive notion of progress that develops conceptually. This is essential 
when moving beyond critique to reconstruction. On similar lines, Peoples’ emphasises the 
notion of ‘resistance’ over emancipation or liberation (2010: 1133). Rather than imposing 
an abstract notion of emancipation, therefore, the emphasis here is on resistance and 
contestation – alternative practices – and giving marginalised voices the power to speak 
security, without ignoring traditional voices. Here, this thesis follows McDonald’s revised 
understanding of emancipation, which defines it as ‘as a process of freeing up space for 
dialogue and deliberation – the diffusion of power to “speak” security’ (2007: 2). This also 
opens up security as a concept, rather than closing it off. Ultimately, recognising that 
security is contested rather than fixed provides potential for change.  
 
However, a similar focus on the contextual meaning of security has been emphasised by 
Ciută (2009) and by Browning and McDonald (2013) without reference to ‘emancipation’ 
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 Critical constructivists have often been somewhat too focused on state discourses, but McDonald provides 
a useful antidote here. 
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which clearly has some problematic baggage. Consequently, this research will use a 
similar approach, differentiating between security and emancipation but drawing on the 
positive notion of security that underlies thinking on emancipation. As such, the term 
‘positive security’ will be used instead, which will be discussed more in the following 
section and in chapter six. In terms of referents, the problems of Booth’s notion of 
individual security have already been noted. In contrast, Walker has emphasised critical 
social movements as suggesting ‘that what counts now is less the existing rigidities of 
power than the possibility of empowering people in their everyday lives’ (1988: 156). Like 
Booth, Walker emphasises the way in which ‘the primary subject of security is people – 
not states, nor elites, nor the affluent, nor the stronger’ (1988: 128). Vitally, he 
distinguishes between securing citizens of states and people in general as focusing on 
citizens necessitates continuing exclusion and insecurity (Walker 1988: 121). However, he 
also recognises the potential for changing the meaning of security rather than rejecting it 
(Walker 1988: 161). Dalby draws on critical geopolitics to highlight similar patterns of 
inside/outside distinctions, asking how these have ‘worked to both facilitate some political 
possibilities and actions and exclude and silence others’ (2010: 51). This is particularly 
problematic in a contemporary context. State pursuit of (national) security not only 
perpetuates insecurity for people in general, which is problematic in itself: we are also 
facing increasing cross-border insecurity issues, including climate change, which cannot 
be dealt with in zero-sum terms. Ironically, when it comes to climate change ‘the threat 
that we need to face is our own doing, not something that can be pinned on an external 
military or a state with evil intent’ (Dalby 2009: 92). Meanwhile, as human activities and 
geological change are increasingly affecting each other, the security of human beings is 
inextricably bound up with stable and secure global ecosystems (Dalby 2009).  
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Considering what a more ethical, positive or valuable energy security might look like is an 
essential part of this project. Envisioning the future is important, and though often ignored 
it is increasingly recognised by constructivist researchers (see Berenskoetter 2011). 
Ultimately, ‘visions motivate actors to realize, or prevent, possibilities of being in the 
world’ (Berenskoetter 2011: 648). Thus they work to ‘make the future meaningful and to 
lay out possibilities of being in the world’ (Berenskoetter 2011: 648) . Problematically, 
while critical approaches to security have been concerned with both the politics and ethics 
of security, they have tended to assume that there is a ‘universal security logic’, while 
disagreeing about whether it is positive or negative (Browning and McDonald 2013: 2). As 
a result, they do not really provide any clear potential for changing the meaning of 
security. The last part of this section considers the emerging literature on positive/negative 
security, which draws on the approaches discussed here. 
 
2.3.4 The positive/negative security debate 
Emerging debates on the ethics of security increasingly go beyond emancipation and 
securitisation, evaluating whether security itself is negative or whether it is, or can be, a 
positive value (see Roe 2008, 2012; Hoogensen Gjørv 2012; Floyd 2007, 2011). As 
traditionally understood, security is ‘nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity, a 
negative value so to speak’ (Wolfers 1962: 153). Defined as the absence of threat, security 
is essentially a ‘lack’. However, the emerging debate draws also on both Galtung’s notion 
of positive/negative peace, and Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive 
freedom, which are well established in the discipline. In this sense, negative security 
equates to ‘“security from” (a threat), and positive security as “security to”, or enabling’ 
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(Hoogensen Gjørv 2012: 836; also Roe 2008: 778)
32
. As noted in the previous section, this 
research uses the terms negative and positive in their more literal sense. Problematically, 
despite increasing literature on positive/negative security, there are clear variations 
between key authors in how they define the terms. They often emphasise different aspects, 
but this is rarely made explicit. 
 
Firstly, these authors rely heavily on securitisation theory, rarely distinguishing between 
security and securitisation (in particular, see Roe 2012; Floyd 2007, 2011). Thus the 
positive/negative security debate cannot be removed from debates on securitisation, and 
more particularly, normative critiques of securitisation (Roe 2012: 2). Many arguments 
suggesting security is negative are rooted in an acceptance of the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of security. Following these, security is negative because of its processes 
(non-democratic, fast-tracked procedures) and its outcomes (reproduction of threat-
defence, friend/enemy dichotomies) (for more on this, see Roe 2012: 2). Vitally, just like 
the approach taken here, this designation of security as negative refers to something other 
than simply the ‘absence of threat’, viewing instead negative security as involving negative 
or problematic processes and outcomes. However, the conflation of these two different 
uses of ‘negative’ are never discussed by these authors. The varying notions of positive 
security presented tend to emphasise enabling values, in some ways similar to 
emancipation, including individual human needs and ontological security (McSweeney 
1999), trust (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012), just values (Roe 2008), or positive outcomes (Floyd 
2007). 
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 Interestingly, Booth uses a similar distinction, though without the labels positive and negative, defining 
security as the ‘absence of threat’ and emancipation as the enabling, positive concept, arguing that they are 
‘two sides of the same coin’, so true security requires both (Booth 1991: 319). 
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McSweeney suggests that security has two images. ‘Security’ is more negative, denoting 
an absence of threat but there is also an alternative ‘positive image’ as the term ‘secure’ 
resides at a more human level, suggesting ‘enabling, making something possible’ and has 
clear ‘positive connotations’ (McSweeney 1999: 14). He similarly draws on Berlin in this 
distinction. He suggests both images are necessary to make sense of security – it ‘must 
make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the 
international level’ (McSweeney 1999: 16). Roe, drawing on McSweeny, takes this further 
to suggest that the more positive content of security resides not only at the human level: 
‘other entities, especially the state, can, and indeed should, pursue positive security’ (Roe 
2008: 779, emphasis original). For Roe, positive security is more than protecting core 
values (which has been argued by McDonald 2012: though without the label 'positive 
security'). It is about maintaining ‘just, core values’ (Roe 2008: 793, emphasis added). 
Following this, he differentiates between positive and negative in terms of ‘a normative 
judgement over the values that are pursued [by states, in the name of security], suggesting 
that positive values be defined according to the promotion of “justice”’ (Roe 2008: 779). 
In this process he also draws on Galtung and notions of common security, using positive to 
refer to the ‘pursuit of a more ‘just’ world order’ (Roe 2008: 791). 
 
In contrast, Hoogensen emphasises the role of actors, suggesting that negative security is 
hierarchical, rendering ‘passive any possible agents of security outside of the state’ (2012: 
842). Again, the use of ‘negative’ conflates the literal meaning with the ‘security-
from/absence of threat’ meaning – which is particularly confusing as Hoogensen draws 
directly on Berlin’s distinction between the terms. Meanwhile, positive security is 
understood as centred on trust, as ‘multi-actor’ with actors above and below the state as 
well as active referents (2012). In this way, her approach ‘makes the practices of 
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individuals and communities visible to the political world’ (Hoogensen Gjørv 2012: 858). 
Like McSweeney she draws on Berlin to suggest that positive and negative security can 
work together, though at times she also appears to suggest that negative security is ‘bad’, 
as in the first quote of this paragraph.  
 
Floyd takes a different approach, focusing directly on securitisation and desecuritisation. 
She uses the terms positive and negative to describe ‘how well any given security policy 
addresses the insecurity in question’ (Floyd 2007: 338), which is much closer to the way 
these terms are used here. She usefully highlights that the consequences of securitisation 
are not always exclusionary or divisive, particularly in the environmental sector (Floyd 
2010: 193). While filling a problematic gap in securitisation theory, this approach is not 
that useful here as energy is rarely securitised. Floyd assesses securitisations and 
desecuritisations/politicisations of issues in the environmental security sector on the basis 
of whether or not the insecurity in question is addressed. However, her approach is closely 
linked with the Copenhagen School’s distinction between the spheres of politics and 
security, and also their division of security issues into sectors. Both of these present 
problems for this research. Floyd suggests that a positive securitisation is ‘faster, better’ 
and more efficient than politicisation (Floyd 2007: 342). She thus still subscribes to the 
Copenhagen School’s binary distinction between security and politics processes. Using the 
case of energy security, I would argue this distinction is often blurred. Likewise, she 
continues the Copenhagen School’s focus on elites as the ‘speakers’ and users of security, 
who need to be watched, as they may ‘abuse’ that power (Floyd 2007: 344), whereas this 
research wants to look also at non-state discourses of energy security. While she puts 
forward a clear and useful agenda to judge security by ‘the maximisation of genuine 
security’ (recognising that ‘security is neither always positive nor always negative but 
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rather issue dependent’), she suggests approaching the differences between security 
discourses through the Copenhagen School’s framework of sectors (Floyd 2007: 339). She 
acknowledges that sectors other than the environmental are likely to face different 
problems, including the possibility that ‘one actor’s security is another actor’s insecurity’ 
(Floyd 2007: 340). But as her work deals only with the environmental sector, this 
discussion is not taken further. In the environmental sector, it is easier to judge a policy 
based on whether or not it addresses the environmental insecurity it intended to address. 
However, energy security is more complicated. It doesn’t fit neatly into a sector, and the 
referent object is almost always the state, while reproducing insecurity for states 
themselves, human beings and the environment. Moreover, focusing on consequences 
neglects the role of processes and referents of security as factors which affect the value of 
security policy (though Floyd addresses this more in later work. See in particular Floyd 
2011: 431). 
 
All of these approaches have their merits, particularly in starting a discussion on the value 
of security and securitisation. This, in turn, helps to highlight the ‘complexity of security’ 
rather than close off the debate (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004: 169). However, they neglect 
the role of practice, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Apart from 
Hoogensen, these authors also continue the Copenhagen School’s problematic focus on 
elites as the only actors/speakers of security. The (often inconsistent) reliance on 
Berlin/Galtung’s notions of positive/negative is also problematic for this research. It fails 
to fully recognise the very problematic consequences of security in its negative sense, as 
highlighted by securitisation theory – although these are at times hinted at, they are rarely 
addressed explicitly. The emphasis in this project is on locating positive notions of energy 
security in existing practices, rather than developing abstract criteria. This also follows the 
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approach to studying security outlined by Wilkinson and Neal, discussed earlier. The final 
section discusses this approach in more detail. 
 
2.3.5 Analysing the value of energy security in context  
Both the Welsh School and the Copenhagen School view the meaning and value of 
security as fixed. However, viewing meaning as socially constructed, it is never fully 
fixed, and thus security has no ‘essence’ (Ciută 2009). Language is fluid and constantly 
evolving, and all representations and discourses can be contested which means that there is 
always space for change (Doty 1996: 6). Security means ‘different things to different 
groups in different contexts’ (McDonald 2012: 11). Moreover, if security has no universal, 
fixed logic or essence, it cannot be inherently negative or positive. Consequently, a 
theoretical, ‘fixed’ definition of the value of security ‘risks clouding out detail’ (Neal 
2013: 43). As shown in the emerging positive/negative literature, some security 
constructions are more positive and some are more negative. However, this literature is 
often abstract rather than grounded in practice, though it does provide some indication of 
potential differences between positive and negative security. However, following both the 
methodological and analytical approach outlined here, I argue that for advocating a change 
in security policy towards more positive practices, it is essential to study/locate alternative 
positive energy security constructions in an empirical context. This follows both Cox 
notion of feasibility and Wyn Jones’ promotion of ‘concrete utopias’ as ‘based on practices 
that have some basis in pre-existing behaviour’ (1999: 77). Likewise, it follows the focus 
on the contested nature of energy security. Security is constructed in a number of ways; 
some of these constructions have more positive value, while others are more negative. 
Thus to analyse the value of security it is necessary to look at how security works in 
particular contexts, looking at actual existing practices and analysing ‘how security itself is 
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understood’ (McDonald 2012: 7). Ultimately, security can never be unequivocally ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, but is always contextual and always changing.  This does not mean that it cannot 
or should not be studied – if anything, it makes the study of how security works in 
different contexts even more imperative.  
 
In practice, security is contested: ‘security discourses are a product of a process of 
negotiation between political actors and the broader political community’ (McDonald 
2012: 17). The unfixed and contextual nature of security also opens up potential for 
change. This research thus follows McDonald’s approach of highlighting the contested 
nature of energy security by looking at alternative, marginalised discourses as well as 
dominant ones to highlight the variation in how security is used by different actors to open 
up the space for change (see McDonald 2012)
33
. Doty has noted the unwieldiness of 
language, arguing that elites cannot simply control it in a ‘one-way instrumental process’ 
(Doty 1998: 4). A similar argument has been forwarded by Trombetta, who highlights the 
reflexive nature of security, suggesting that in climate discourses ‘appeals to security have 
emphasised the relevance of preventive, non-confrontational measures and the importance 
of other actors than states in providing security’ (2008: 600). Climate security has ‘avoided 
the identification of enemies and has involved actors other than states, both in the 
securitizing moves and in the security provisions’ (2008: 598). Her research ultimately 
shows that speaking or producing security is not a one-way process, but ‘a reflexive and 
contextualised process that generates meanings and practices’ (2008: 600). Though energy 
security differs from climate security in that official energy security practices are very 
closely linked with a negative national security logic, I argue here that potential for change 
can be found in alternative discourses outside of state discourses, where even an issue as 
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 This also avoids the problems identified with Booth’s notion of emancipation, looking for existing 
contestations and resistance to the dominant understanding of energy security in the discursive space instead 
of imposing an abstract notion of emancipation. 
CHAPTER 2 
109 
 
linked with negative security as energy security can be found to be articulated in more 
positive terms. The research agenda here therefore draws on the contested meanings of 
energy security already out there in the discursive space, focusing on those articulating a 
more positive notion of security, as the basis for changing dominant discourse and policy 
on energy security. In turn, this could work to ‘transform existing security practices’ 
(Trombetta 2008: 587; see also Huysmans 2002: 59).  
 
Security used in this way can be a powerful tool for change. Mulligan has questioned  
‘whether the discursive environment is amenable to a new understanding of the 
relationship between energy, the environment, and security’ (Mulligan 2010: 90-91). 
However, the range of discourses presented in chapters four, five and six, as well as the 
growing literature advocating broadening the concept of energy security discussed in the 
previous chapter, suggests the concept of energy security is increasingly contested. Ciută 
has taken this even further to suggest that energy is ‘a total field’ as ‘nothing exists that is 
not energy, or not affected by energy. Energy security is therefore a homologous field, 
which means that security ceases to be a bounded domain of meaning and practice’ (Ciută 
2010: 124). However, as shown both in the previous chapters’ discussion of the 
mainstream literature and in chapters four and five, state energy security discourses 
contain key unifying themes. This also requires a research strategy of looking directly for 
more positive, alternative notions of energy security that contest dominant understandings, 
which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter and in chapter six. 
 
Some key questions remain. How have more positive notions of energy security been 
identified or selected? What criteria have been used in this process, given the need to take 
a contextualised approach grounded in practice with open concepts to avoid limiting 
CHAPTER 2 
110 
 
analysis? This will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. The search was 
undertaken with the suggestions put forward by McDonald, Roe, Hoogensen and Floyd in 
mind, emphasising multiple actors and active audiences to look directly at non-state 
advocacy groups contesting official notions of energy security by drawing on the need to 
secure human beings and ecosystems, phrased in non-exclusionary terms. Referent objects 
and actors have been key here
34
. Following this, security can also contain positive value, 
enabling and maintaining values the actor considers important, as well as the freedom to 
act and to define those values. McDonald draws on similar ideas, defining security as ‘a 
site of contestation over the definition of a group’s core values, threats to those values, and 
the means through which they are to be defended or advanced’ (2012: 5). However, this is 
somewhat problematic as McDonald provides little clarity in terms of which values are 
more ‘emancipatory’ or ‘positive’35. My understanding of positive security also draws on 
the Welsh School’s emancipation. For this kind of positive security some form of open 
political order is necessary to allow broader agency beyond elite-state actors to both define 
and speak security and to secure, though this does not necessarily have to equal Western 
democracy. In the words of Booth’s more recent contribution, positive security ‘enables 
people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live’ (2005b: 23). Positive security needs to 
look beyond the state both in terms of referents and to allow other actors to speak security 
– though the state remains a powerful actor and can, and should, itself also pursue positive 
security. Positive security policy should not produce insecurity, which necessitates wider 
and more active referents as well as other actors alongside the state. Finally, it is vital to 
stop seeing security itself in binary terms as positive/negative, recognising the full 
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 Huysmans notes that the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on sectors of security in the 1998 book implies 
that the referent of security is an empirical question rather than a normative one (Huysmans 1998: 490), 
which this thesis would argue is problematic. 
35
 McDonald makes no ethical distinction between different ‘core values’ – presumably, not all values are 
‘just’, ‘emancipatory’ or ‘positive’. Values are not defined or distinguished between in his aim to open up 
contestation over security, which is problematic as some values are negative. 
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spectrum and variation of security, and working instead towards more positive security. As 
part of this, I argue that positive security constructions have to be non-exclusive in terms 
of referents, securing human beings in general rather than citizens of states, as well as the 
ecosystems they depend on to survive
36
.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a necessarily limited review of the conceptual literature on 
security, focusing selectively on the literature that has been most useful for addressing my 
research questions and for understanding how energy security is constituted in the United 
States and China, with a focus on the role of ‘security’ in this process. It has made the case 
for understanding security as unfixed, both in meaning and in terms of value, arguing in 
favour of a contextualised and pragmatic approach to understand my empirical case 
studies. In many ways, this answers a recent call for critical security scholars to move 
beyond current paradigms and universalised assumptions about security ‘to engage in 
nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security’ 
(Browning and McDonald 2013: 14). The chapter also brings together literature on 
emancipation with the debate over the value of security and calls for contextual analyses of 
security constructions to develop a framework for evaluating the value of security in 
context. As part of a wider critical security studies agenda, this thesis questions the way 
the vast majority of literature on energy security relies on a traditional logic of security, 
suggesting that this understanding of security is not only insufficient, but likely to cause 
insecurity for states, individuals and the environment in which they live. This argument is 
used to further a normative agenda of locating and drawing out alternative more positive 
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 Interestingly, this understanding of positive security is quite similar to the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of desecuritisation (Wæver 2011: 470), though they would argue that positive security 
understood this way is not possible because of the negative logic of security. 
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energy security practices to both highlight the contested and changeable nature of security 
and to use the positive potential in security. Chapter six presents these alternative 
discourses, together with a fuller discussion of negative and positive energy security. 
 
The next chapter will go into more detail in terms of the research design and methods used 
in this process. It is important to recognise that ‘security is always powerful and never 
inconsequential, no matter how messy, frivolous or inconsistent the actors’ use of the word 
may be’ (Ciută 2009: 310). Energy security is an increasing cause of ‘geopolitical tensions 
and conflicts’ (Dannreuther 2010: 144), but has largely escaped critical interrogation. This 
research presents the first in-depth critical empirical analysis of energy security 
constructions, going beyond abstract calls to redefine security to analyse how it is used and 
what security itself means in different constructions, drawing on alternative, positive 
constructions to illustrate and open up the space for change.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Research design and methods 
 
 
 
3.1 Research Design 
Any research involves a number of choices in terms of research design, ‘to ensure that the 
evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible’ 
(De Vaus 2001: 9). These choices include both what to analyse (research design) and how 
to collect and analyse it (research methods). Some of these choices and their underlying 
motivations have been discussed in the previous chapters, but will here be discussed in 
terms of the practical impact they had, firstly on research design, and then on research 
methods. In some cases, these choices appear obvious – flowing naturally from the cases 
chosen and the methodological ‘wagers’ and assumptions of the researcher (as discussed in 
chapter two). However, it is still important to acknowledge these as choices. Though the 
focus of the research project itself makes some choices straightforward, others are more 
difficult to judge. However, research design is ‘an on-going and flexible process’ (Squire 
2013: 40) which evolves throughout the research. This chapter draws on Salter and Mutlu 
(2013), Hansen (2006) and Wilkinson (2013b) as well as work on research design from 
interpretive international relations and social sciences more broadly. The discussion on 
research design begins with an outline of some core principles of interpretive research 
design, linking these to my research questions and the aims of my research. It then 
discusses using case study analysis, choice of cases and choice of discourses to study, 
linking this with my normative agenda and the role of power. The final part of the research 
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design section links this with a pragmatic and reflexive agenda, and a discussion of 
practical issues affecting research design. This is then followed by a section on research 
methods. 
 
Salter outlines three key principles of ‘good’ research design: clear research questions and 
design, use of appropriate research methods, and reflexivity in terms of the role of the 
researcher in the research process (Salter 2013: 15). Because interpretive research design is 
not concerned with hypothesis testing and empiricist causality, replicability is not a useful 
measure of a ‘good’ research design (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 94). Rather, the 
focus is on reflexivity, clarity and openness about choices made during the research 
process (Salter 2013: 15). Reflexivity requires acknowledging the role of the researcher in 
the research process and in interpreting the data
1
. The position(ality) of the researcher 
‘influence[s] both one’s unquestioned assumptions, one’s access, and the way that others 
relate’ (Salter 2013: 20). This is particularly important when discussing research design 
and methods, and in a sense involves writing the researcher ‘back in’ (Wilkinson 2013b).  
 
This research is driven by the need to look at the concept of energy security and how it 
works in an empirical context. Problematically, the existing literature accepts both the 
meaning and the value of energy security as given. It does not question whether energy is a 
security issue, nor what it means to speak and/or write ‘security’ in the context of energy. 
As such, the focus here is on investigating how energy security is represented and 
practiced, in short, how it is constituted; and how security works in this process. Following 
these aims, my central research question is: 
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 For a more extensive discussion on the need for reflexivity in interpretive research design, see Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea (2012: 100). 
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  How is energy security constructed in discourse and practice in the US and China? 
  
My focus on the relationship between energy and security has led to the following sub-
questions: 
 
 What does it mean to attach ‘security’ to energy? 
 What is the value of (energy) security? 
 Should security be attached to energy? 
 
The empirical focus on the United States and China lends itself to a case study-based 
research design. Before discussing this in more detail, it is worth repeating that in using the 
word constructed, I draw on Hansen’s notion of discourse and practice as being ‘co-
constituted’ – representations and policy enable each other (2006: 28). Thus, the focus is 
on how energy security is constructed, or constituted
2
, through representations and policy. 
 
Case study analysis is the research design most suitable for this research project as it will 
allow me to investigate how energy security is constructed in my specific cases to create 
in-depth, empirically rich analysis. ‘Cases’ can be defined in a range of ways; for example 
Abbott defines it as an ‘agent’, asking ‘what cases do’ (Abbott 1992: 53), and George and 
Bennett as  ‘an instance of a “class of events”’ (George and Bennett 2005: 17). Whichever 
approach is used, the cases are ‘the “object” of study’ (De Vaus 2001: 220). Moreover, 
‘most research involves multiple uses of cases…because research combines theoretical and 
empirical analysis’ (Ragin 1992: 11). In this sense, my cases are both the two states under 
study (the US and China) and the specific constructions of energy security being studied in 
                                                          
2
 I use the words constituted and constructed interchangeably as I see discourse and practice linked. 
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the cases. The key problems identified with case study analysis in the literature are ‘case 
selection and the danger of selection bias’, and ‘tension between parsimony and richness in 
selecting the number of variables and cases to be studied’ (Bennett 2004: 19; see also 
Klotz 2008). However, all research necessarily has selection bias because of the central 
role of the researcher in both defining the questions to be answered and the way in which 
they are to be answered. Moreover, a case study design will contribute conceptual validity, 
allowing ‘for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number 
of cases’ (George and Bennett 2005: 19). This does make generalisation a problem, but 
this is not a goal of this research, as discussed in the methodology section in the previous 
chapter. It is important to note that because I am not looking at causal relationships but 
rather at the constitutive relationship between discourse and policy, the empirical chapters 
are in this sense not a test of a hypothesis but an ‘application of the theory’ (Hansen, 2006: 
11) and an examination of ‘a more complex web of facilitating conditions’ (Salter 2013: 
16) that make particular choices possible. 
 
Because of my interest in analysing constructions of energy as security and what security 
means and does to energy, I decided to focus the empirical analysis on the United States 
and China, as they are the top two energy consumers and oil importers globally, which 
makes them particularly vulnerable to energy (in)security issues. This follows Friedrichs 
and Kratochwil’s ‘most-important’ case design, which aims to help conceptual clarity 
(2009: 718). The analysis starts in 2004, as the year of ‘the global demand shock’ which 
saw an unexpected and unprecedented global increase in oil consumption
3
 (Yergin 2011b: 
193). The effect on global energy supply and markets placed energy at the top of national 
security agendas. Starting analysis in 2004 also enabled a contemporary focus, while 
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 The demand shock was caused partly by growing Chinese energy demands, though many countries – 
including the United States – saw increased consumption rates (Yergin 2011b: 193). 
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providing a long enough time period to study to show continuity in how energy security is 
constructed. Rather than focusing on particular events during these time periods, 
constructions of energy security were traced over time to create a typology, drawing out 
key themes in how energy security has been constructed. This also provided a clearer and 
more general picture of how energy security has been constructed in my cases to increase 
understanding of the concept of energy security more broadly. For practical reasons, the 
empirical material ends in 2012. Because of the relatively short time period under study 
and because of the thematic focus, the empirical chapters present the material analysed 
thematically rather than chronologically. This also avoided repetition, as constructions 
were surprisingly consistent over time. However, any deviations from this pattern are 
noted where relevant. Chapters four and five present state discourses, while chapter six 
presents both a discussion of these (relating them to the debate over the value of security 
introduced in chapter two) and an analysis and discussion of alternative discourses which 
contest dominant notions of energy security in both states. 
 
In terms of research design, choices also had to be made in terms of which discourses to 
analyse (Hansen 2006: 75). Some contextual and historical information was necessary to 
make sense of the discourse and policy, so this became the starting point. This included the 
history of energy consumption and production as well as of energy policy-making in both 
states. In terms of primary material, the starting focus was official discourse, as it has the 
most impact on policy choices. However, official discourse is produced in a number of 
venues. I focused on presidential and ministerial speeches and statements, bills and 
legislation as well as other texts produced by administrations where the primary focus was 
energy security. Analysis included key texts frequently quoted and referred to as these 
work to organise the debate, as well as the ‘larger body of more general material’ (Hansen 
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2006: 82). This was selected on three criteria: texts had to articulate policies (and in this 
case, the concept of energy security) clearly; they had to be ‘widely read’ and paid 
attention to; and ‘have the formal authority to define a political position’ (Hansen 2006: 
85). What is included and important in terms of general material varies between empirical 
contexts (Hansen 2006: 86) – for example, for the study of China I used some media 
sources as a form of official discourse because of censorship practices (which will be 
discussed in more detail under methods). A range of texts is central – while the US 
research entailed analysing a lot of presidential speeches on energy security, legislation, 
documents and statements from relevant departments complemented this. The academic 
literature analysed in the first chapter is also a form of primary data, being influenced by, 
and influencing, policy debate. Overall, energy security was found to be constructed and 
defined by elite actors working in various parts of the security establishment, with little or 
no input from non-elite, non-state actors, or even from other government departments 
working on related issues such as climate security. 
 
However, the normative agenda of this research also required going beyond official 
discourses to find competing, more positive notions of energy security that contest official 
constructions. Thus, while analysis began with official discourses, it then moved on to 
analyse marginalised, alternative and competing notions of energy security in the 
discursive space in both states. Broadening the scope from official discourse ‘to capture 
discourses that contest and challenge’ also helps assess ‘the hegemony of official 
discourse’ (Hansen 2006: 74) and open up space for change by disrupting ‘common sense’ 
understandings (Milliken 1999: 229). This also involved a consideration of power, 
understood not as narrow military capability or wider influence/hegemony, but as a 
relation manifest in practice. This involves looking at ‘the way in which power works to 
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constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions’ (Doty 1993: 299)4. 
Ultimately official discourse can limit discursive possibilities by silencing voices outside 
of the accepted discursive borders, and through the construction of ‘common sense’ 
understandings. In this way ‘international relations are inextricably bound up with 
discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as “truth”’ (Doty 
1996: 5). As such, there is a need to ‘examine how certain representations underlie the 
production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various 
courses of action possible’ (Doty 1996: 5). In the case of energy security this has involved 
a silencing of voices that question the dominant representations of energy security.  
 
Looking at power relations is vital here. In showing that ‘the present conjuncture, far from 
being the only natural or possible societal order, is the expression of a certain 
configuration of power relations’ these power relations ‘can be challenged’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001: xvi). In this way, the research moved between official and marginalised 
constructions to illustrate the contested nature of energy security, opening up the meaning 
and providing potential for change. Thus chapters four and five present official 
constructions in the United States and China respectively, while chapter six presents 
alternative, marginalised constructions, focusing on non-governmental groups articulating 
more positive notions of energy security. This involved actively looking for more positive 
constructions of energy security. The previous chapter outlined some of the criteria used as 
a starting point to judge what more positive constructions might look like, though the 
criteria were kept as open as possible to avoid limiting analysis. This search was also 
helped by the presence of some more positive elements in official discourses as discussed 
in chapters four and five. In practical terms, marginal discourses are harder to locate, and 
                                                          
4
 Most traditional understandings of energy security, in particular realist/strategic analyses, also place a 
heavy emphasis on power, but analyse power in a very different way. They analyse state power in the 
anarchic international system, whereas this thesis looks at representation as power and power as productive.  
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thus analysis was limited by what was available (Hansen 2006: 87). In identifying 
competing constructions within each state, this part of the research was in a sense 
comparative, comparing competing discourses to emphasise the contested nature of energy 
security.  
 
In terms of data selection, my case study analysis aims to maximise theoretical 
understanding instead of representativeness for purposes of generalisation (Arber 2001: 
59). Consequently I used ‘focused or judgemental sampling’ of representations of energy 
security in the US and China in the specified time period, allowing me to select cases to 
‘maximise understanding of social processes’ (Arber 2001: 61). However, to ensure all key 
dominant themes were captured in terms of official constructions of energy security, 
analysis was continued until no further themes were discovered. Key texts were identified 
by reading broader sources and general material, together with use of online search 
engines. Analysis also emphasised these. As covering an eight year period rather than 
specific events produced an unworkable level of data, selection was limited to explicit 
mentions of energy/energy security to make it manageable. Data selection and sources will 
be discussed in more detail in the research methods section. In terms of time limitations, 
this project had to be undertaken over three years with the empirical work undertaken 
largely over a twelve month period, with six months of fieldwork in the US and China, 
which also limited the amount of data covered. However, limiting both the cases and the 
time period covered allowed selection of ‘cases for theoretical and targeted purposes’ (De 
Vaus 2001: 239), making the research more focused. To corroborate results and ensure 
empirical richness (Salter 2013: 15), archival and documentary analysis was 
complemented by interviews with experts and officials in the US and China. In terms of 
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access relying primarily on grey literature
5
 is useful as it is usually publicly available and 
this also avoids ethical issues (ethical issues during interviews will be discussed in the 
methods section). Data was organised first by state (US/China) and then by actor 
(state/non-state), rather than by discourse or theme, to avoid imposing particular categories 
and to avoid predetermining the results and selection bias. This also opened for the 
possibility of being surprised by my findings rather than pre-empting the results (White 
2008: 6), which is also essential to interpretive research design. 
 
Taking a pragmatic approach involved using open concepts and allowing these to adjust 
throughout the research process (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 717) – particularly how 
the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ were understood in relation to energy security. This 
allowed the ‘conceptual framework, field of research, and empirical findings’ to adapt and 
adjust (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 717). Likewise, the research design evolved 
throughout as I discovered more detail about what kinds of records and documents were 
available for me to analyse (Hakim 2000: 48). This chapter also presents a reflexive 
discussion of ‘how the research was actually done, why, and with what effects for the 
resulting interpretation that is presented’ (Wilkinson 2013b: 30). Reflexive research 
necessitates ‘consideration of the researcher's positionality in relation to both the field and 
her research, in terms of the roles that she performed in her interactions with people in the 
field location and the influence of her positionings on the data generated’ (Wilkinson 
2013b: 30). Considering the role of the researcher and analyst is essential, and requires 
being open and clear about the choices that were made during the research process. As 
noted in the normative discussion in the previous chapter, all research involves normative 
choices, including in choosing what to study. Here, I am studying constructions of energy 
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 This term refers to ‘that which is produced on all levels of government, academics, business and industry 
in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial publishers’ (Rothstein and 
Hopewell 2009: 104). 
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security by state and non-state actors to highlight its contested nature and therefore the 
potential for moving towards more positive security practices that secure beyond the state.  
 
Lastly, a number of practical issues also affected my research design. Time limitations 
have already been noted. Another issue was language, in terms of analysing Chinese 
documents. While I speak and read Mandarin at an intermediate level, it is not good 
enough to conduct interviews on policy in Mandarin, so interviews were undertaken in 
English. The possibility of using a translator was rejected as this would be problematic in 
terms of carrying out discourse analysis on material which has already been interpreted 
through a translator, as this adds a further layer of meaning which it would be better to 
avoid. A lot of the documentary and archival material was available in official translations 
for a foreign audience, and this was used where possible, again to avoid adding another 
layer of interpretation in translation (for precedent, see Vuori 2008, 2011). Analysing 
official translations aimed at the international audience also helped to understand how 
China wants its constructions of energy security to be understood. However, I did translate 
documents where no official translation was available, which also avoided limiting 
analysis to documents ‘pre-approved’ (and, thus, selected for translation) by the Chinese 
government
6
. As noted, media censorship made some media sources reliable as official 
discourse too. Access issues will be discussed in more detail under data collection, but it is 
worth noting that when it comes to sensitive political issues – including anything under the 
heading of security – interviewee access is often difficult (Salter 2013: 22), particularly in 
China, so the decision to focus primarily on text analysis and archival research was made 
early in the research process with the aim of using interviews where possible to 
complement and triangulate my results.  
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 The emphasis on language in discourse analysis makes knowledge of the language used and its linguistic 
codes and connotations essential, particularly in authoritarian states where ‘official discursive codes have 
been vigorously enforced’ (Hansen 2006: 83-4). 
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Of course, the amount of data is often endless and thus the length of research or time in the 
field is limited by more practical concerns, such as research funding and length of degree 
program (Salter 2013: 16). This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council, but while the original funding decision was taken based on a research proposal 
after this point the research and its outputs are not controlled or regulated. However, 
funding is limited to three years, which has affected the research period. While initially the 
aim was to focus on energy security in foreign policy, it is difficult to separate 
constructions of energy security into domestic and international as there is a lot of overlap. 
When constructed in security terms, it tends to have foreign policy connotations, but is 
also used in domestic discussions and debates to justify/enable policy. Following this, the 
focus was broadened to energy security more generally. 
 
3.2 Research methods  
3.2.1 Data collection 
Developing a clear research design helped me to prepare for my data collection by 
outlining more specifically what discourses I needed to analyse to achieve my objectives. 
However, while providing clear guidelines and a starting point, a number of choices 
remained and were made during the data collection process.  This section first discusses 
choices made in terms of what sources to analyse, and how cultural differences and 
contexts in my two case studies affected data collection. It then outlines the process of data 
collection in virtual archives and interviews.  
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In terms of choosing sources, archival analysis was emphasised from the beginning, both 
for practical reasons and because of the role of discourse in this research, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. Presidential/ministerial speeches and documents, legislation and other 
written or spoken material on the subject of energy security produced by governments 
make up the discursive structure that outlines how the state in question represents energy 
security. By being widely read and having a formal authority it is these texts and 
utterances that discursively construct energy security. These, therefore, necessarily needed 
to have a central place in my analysis. Interviews were used to complement this data and to 
give more depth by focusing directly on the concept of energy security. This approach was 
also practically useful, as it was difficult to know beforehand how much access I would be 
able to gain to officials and experts in each state – though it was clear that it was likely to 
be difficult. Thinking about sources when researching China was particularly important, 
because of the lack of transparency in the policy process and less open access to 
documents.  
 
While both collecting documents and interviewing for my study of the United States was 
relatively straightforward, data collection for China was more complex. The difficulties of 
carrying out discourse analysis in an authoritarian regime have already been noted. Less 
data was available overall, and it was clearly affected by censorship. However, Vouri’s 
(2008, 2011) analysis of security discourse in China provided a very useful precedent (see 
also Wilkinson 2007; Holm 2004: for discussions about using securitisation and discourse 
analysis in non-Western cultures). Vouri raised some important questions, asking ‘how 
does security logic work in non-democratic systems? What is ‘special politics’ when there 
is no democratic process to move security issues away from? [and] What is the political 
function of security in non-democratic systems?’ (Vuori 2008: 66). While his focus on 
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securitisation is less relevant here, his discussion of security logics and actors is very 
useful. Vuori found that while the ‘real’ agent/s behind security constructions are difficult 
to identify, it is still possible to study how these constructions become legitimised by 
‘analysing official programmes, laws and statements’ (Vuori 2008: 71). Likewise, security 
constructions still have an audience, though this may not be the general public but rather 
the elite: ‘who has to be convinced of the necessity of security action changes with the 
cultural and political…[context]’ (Vuori 2008: 72). However, the growing number of 
political protests and unrest in China, particularly over environmental and energy issues 
(Duggan 2013) indicates that the general public is an increasingly important audience at 
least when it comes to energy and environmental security. While ‘the Communist Party 
has authoritative positions from which official security issues are phrased’, with leadership 
statements on security being key, leaders still ‘have had the need and urge to appeal to the 
masses for support’ (Vuori 2008: 70-71). Overall, the use and construction of security 
issues ‘can be utilized for a range of political purposes, from raising an issue on the agenda 
of decision-making to legitimating policies, deterring threats, and controlling 
subordinates’; it also helps to maintain the political system (Vuori 2008: 93). The use of 
security for maintaining the political system and political stability is key in China, where 
‘security’ has been used to mean stability, in contrast to chaos and disorder (Vuori 2008: 
93). 
 
However, while there is less openness in government, it is possible to use a broader range 
of speakers and documents. This includes speeches by diplomats and political actors, and 
some media outlets, as party line is much stricter, meaning any official statements released 
by government members will have been pre-approved by central government. Likewise 
central government and separate ministries often reproduce Xinhua (a popular news 
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source) and People’s Daily (the Chinese Communist Party’s official media outlet) articles 
on their official web pages
7
. Thus while my study on China relied on a lower number of 
sources, enough material was available to produce an interesting and reliable analysis. The 
problems of translating documents for discourse analysis have been discussed; Callahan 
provides one precedent with a study on Chinese national culture using discourse analysis 
and translating documents and imagery (2010). Vouri (2008, 2011) also provides a 
precedent here in using official translations where possible. It is also important to consider 
both text selection and interview strategies and I will now briefly discuss both of these in 
turn. 
 
3.2.1.1 Virtual archives 
Following Hansen’s model, data collection began with some historical material, including 
‘conceptual histories, key texts quoted in contemporary debates and republished works’ 
(Hansen 2006: 83). Following her criteria for selecting general material and key texts 
outlined in the research design, together with my knowledge of the academic literature on 
the subject, gave a clear idea of where to start. In the process I used a number of online 
search engines and virtual archives both through the respective governments and relevant 
ministerial departments’ webpages, and media archives of key speeches, statements and 
events. Policy and energy consumption/production data was uncovered using a similar 
approach, together with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy 
Information Administration’s (EIA) online archives and databases. Relying on a range of 
archives, databases and search engines to source material enabled me to cast as wide a net 
as possible to avoid missing important information. It is worth noting that internet 
censorship in China made it difficult to access a lot of sources while on fieldwork, 
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 See Tong for a discussion on media censorship and self-censorship in China (2009). 
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consequently most of this work was done before and after the interview stage. Validity was 
ensured by continuing to select and analyse texts until the discursive field was saturated – 
that is, once the data emerging did not provide any significant new findings different from 
what had already been discovered.  
 
The analysis of the United States used speeches on energy security made by Presidents’ 
Bush and Obama in the time period under study; while energy legislation and policy 
documents from the time period were found via a number of different sources, including 
the White House page, the While House energy web page
8
 as well as the webpages and 
archives of the Department of Energy and Department of State, and the Environmental 
Protection Administration. The Washington Post has an online archive of transcripts of key 
speeches by Obama with an energy section, which was also used. The analysis of China 
used two key white papers on energy and the five year plans produced by the Chinese 
government covering the period of study. In terms of online archives, it used the central 
government’s web portal9 and the archives of the Foreign Ministry, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the National Energy Administration
10
, and the 
Ministry of Commerce. These also contained documents released by the State Council, 
which fulfils the role the cabinet plays in Western systems. The main media sources used 
to complement this were Xinhua and the People’s Daily, as key outlets following 
government line. Searches were initially carried out in English to gather official 
translations of key documents. This was then complemented by searches in Mandarin, to 
avoid the possibility of a bias in selecting only documents available for a foreign audience.  
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 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy 
9
 See http://english.gov.cn/ 
10
 This also page has more specific information on energy policy governance in China 
(http://www.nea.gov.cn/) 
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3.2.1.2 Interviews 
Potential interviewees were contacted via email, stating clearly the purpose of the 
interview. The interviews themselves were undertaken in different locations to suit the 
interviewee – ranging from their own offices to nearby cafés and hotel lobbies in cases 
where this was more convenient
11
. A full list of interviewees is included in the appendix. 
They ranged from academic and policy experts on energy security to public officials from 
different government departments and bodies. Access to public officials was particularly 
difficult in China, where most of the interviewees were experts rather than officials, 
though some of these also worked with the government. Because of practical limitations, 
the interview sample was relatively small, with a total of 23 interviews undertaken. 
However, it became clear that further interviews would ‘yield little new knowledge’ 
(Kvale 2007: 44). Interviews were semi-structured with some open questions prepared 
beforehand but with deviations from this where relevant (see Kvale 2007: 10). Overall an 
exploratory approach was used, with interview directions determined by the degree and 
type of expertise of the interviewee (Kvale 2007: 38). This also involved a number of 
‘reply questions’ to explore how interviewees’ interpreted the concept of energy security 
and to clarify my interpretations of what they were saying (Kvale 2007: 11). Overall, I lead 
the discussion towards themes I was interested in while leaving space for interviewees to 
express their opinions about these themes and what they saw as important within the 
different themes (Kvale 2007: 12). To avoid affecting the results my own opinions and the 
normative aims of the research were kept deliberately vague, but explained in more detail 
if/when interviewees requested. If this had not come up before, it was discussed after the 
interview itself (Kvale 2007: 26). Some interviews were recorded by hand, with notes 
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 In many cases, interviewees worked in government buildings with strict access policies requiring longer-
term notice and paperwork to enter. In most of these cases undertaking interviews elsewhere avoided these 
practical issues.   
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taken during and after the interview. Others, where appropriate and when consent was 
given, were recorded on tape and later transcribed
12
. 
 
A number of practical issues were considered during the interview process. Interviewing 
foreign subjects requires an awareness of cultural differences (Kvale 2007: 68), which was 
obviously particularly important in China, but also in the United States. Consequently, 
much time was spent preparing for and researching the background of interviewees as well 
as speaking to colleagues who had conducted interviews in the United States and China to 
draw on their experiences
13
. Power asymmetry is a key concern when it comes to 
interviews. With elite interviews this is often reversed because of the position of the 
interviewee, who is likely used to the interview process and may wish to push their own 
agenda (Kvale 2007: 70). My own position and identity also affected the interview process 
from the very beginning. Both in terms of access to interviewees and during the interviews 
themselves as I was myself part of the process of knowledge creation – in research 
interviews knowledge is in a sense co-constructed ‘in the inter-action between the 
interviewer and interviewee’ (Kvale 2007: 1; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 18), which also 
affects the results. This made building a rapport with interviewees particularly important 
(Keats 2000: 23). My identity and position as a foreign academic, who is also young, white 
and female affected both access and the interviews themselves (see Wilkinson 2013a: 134; 
and Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 66-8). Interviewees may well have responded very 
differently to a journalist (in many cases being interviewed by an academic was considered 
less ‘risky’), or to someone who was an insider ethnically and culturally. In this sense, my 
                                                          
12
 As noted by Keats, certain people and certain cultural situations make tape-recording interviews 
problematic, which is why this wasn’t done in many cases (Keats 2000: 24). 
13
 One piece of advice (or warning!) from a colleague which was particularly helpful, was to be prepared for 
interviewees ‘testing’ my knowledge by asking me questions about the subject area to ascertain whether or 
not speaking to me was worth their time. Had I not been prepared for this, it could have led to interviews 
being cut short by inadequate responses on my behalf. With preparation, however, it helped to build rapport 
with my interviewees over common interests and subject-knowledge. 
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position was from the very beginning very much as an outsider or ‘other’. Cultural and 
ethnic differences were particularly evident in China, though my British accent likewise 
made it difficult to blend in in the United States
14
.  
 
The ‘outsider’ role often also worked in my advantage, as it made it possible to ask some 
questions that would otherwise have been difficult as they seemed obvious to interviewees. 
Likewise, for some interviewees it made speaking to me both more interesting and less 
controversial, as I was far removed from the regular policy circuit (see Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow 2012: 67). In the United States, many of my interviewees had undertaken PhD 
research themselves and were therefore sympathetic and interested in my research. 
Because the culture in China is more hierarchical, it was much more difficult not only to 
get interviews, but even to discover potential interviewees and their contact details – 
information which was widely available online for my research in the United States. This 
required extra preparation and reliance on contacts and snowballing, with word of mouth 
referral. Cross-cultural interviewing also requires some familiarity with the culture of 
interviewees, so the first few weeks in each country were spent on deskwork and talking to 
local academics to acclimatise and develop a fuller awareness of these differences (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2009: 144). All interviewees were asked at the end of their interview to 
recommend other potential interviewees; this was both useful in providing contacts and to 
provide access. Transcribing the interviews while on fieldwork also helped to refine my 
interview technique, as I could observe in a much more detached environment how the 
‘conversation’ aspect was going and see what I was doing well and not so well as an 
interviewer (for a good discussion on this, see Kvale and Brinkmann 2009: 180). This was 
incredibly helpful, as it is difficult to be reflexive during an interview as a new researcher 
                                                          
14
 In China, while no one stated it explicitly, it became clear that talking to a foreigner about sensitive 
political issues was particularly controversial. However, the people I did speak to made it clear that Chinese 
researchers would experience similar access problems, if for different reasons.  
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with little experience. Using interviews and documents together was particularly beneficial 
as it corroborated my analysis (Moran-Ellis et al. 2006: 47) as well as giving me a richer 
and more up-to-date data set, as interview data was collected immediately and unlike much 
policy material does not go through a process of reviews before being published. 
 
In terms of interview ethics, my research plans, including my research questions and 
research strategies, had to be pre-approved by the University of Birmingham research 
ethics committee before I left for my fieldwork. As I was not asking personal questions but 
interviewing research subjects in their professional capacity there were no ethical issues in 
terms of the interview questions themselves. Subjects were briefed on the purpose of the 
interview and project before the interview via email, but without too much detail to avoid 
leading subjects towards specific answers (Kvale 2007: 27). At the beginning of each 
interview, subjects were verbally asked for consent to be interviewed, and when 
appropriate for consent to record the interview. They were also informed of their right to 
withdraw from the study. They were informed that the interview data would be kept 
confidential and stored securely in password protected files together with the contact 
information of the interviewees (Kvale 2007: 27). They were also given the option of 
anonymity in all documents resulting from the research (Kvale 2007: 28) and informed 
that they could contact me at any point if they changed their mind regarding this. Only four 
interviewees wished to remain anonymous, and apart from one all consented to their name 
and details being listed in the appendix even in cases where they wished to remain 
anonymous in the text itself with no quotes attributed directly to them. However, because 
of the relatively small number of interviewees the decision was made to anonymise all 
quotes used in the text, as interviewees who wished to remain anonymous would otherwise 
be relatively easy to identify. An exception to this general rule has been made where 
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quotes are both provided by interviewees who did not wish to remain anonymous and 
where quotes provide useful factual background information rather than opinions on 
policy. Interviewees were also given the option of reviewing transcripts and, if requested, 
to review the interview questions beforehand. Because of lack of time interviews focused 
primarily on official discourse. 
 
3.2.2 Data analysis 
While using both interviews and document analysis, the overall focus was on common 
understandings, so the data collected from interviews was treated as instances of discourse. 
However, because the interview data presented co-created discourse rather than official 
discourse with a formal authority, the official discourse was used as the base for analysis 
with interviews presenting supplementary data and background information (Neumann 
2008: 73). The empirical chapters present a discussion of energy policy in both states; 
these were described following source information as detailed. Meanwhile, discursive 
constructions of energy security (texts and interviews) were collated in an NVivo database. 
NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software which is particularly useful for organising 
and coding large amounts of text (see Hassan 2013; Bazeley 2007). Texts were organised 
by state, date, and by ‘speaker’ or ‘voice’. Subsequently, relevant sections of each texts 
were coded manually on the basis of my research questions. During coding I used a 
combination of pre-decided categories based on my research questions and categories that 
emerged during the process as important themes relating to representations of energy 
security. Doing this using NVivo was particularly helpful, as it contains a number of 
functions for exploring the data as well as for coding it and then later for organising these 
codes into themes. I was able to search the whole database as well as specific texts for key 
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terms, and to track commonly recurring words and expressions to ensure no important 
themes were missed.  
 
Once my texts were coded and these codes were organised into themes, I carried out more 
extensive discourse analysis on the relevant sections of texts by theme. In practical terms, 
discourse analysis covers a group of research methods which analyse ‘empirical raw 
materials and information as discursive forms’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). In 
terms of this research, using a discourse analysis approach also means treating interview 
data as ‘texts’. The empirical data collected is regarded as ‘sets of signifying practices’ that 
make up a discourse, ‘providing the conditions which enable subjects to experience the 
world of objects, words and practices’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4). As suggested 
there are a number of different methods of discourse analysis, and I will be focusing here 
on discourse analysis as outlined by Doty (Doty 1993, 1996) and Milliken (1999). 
Thinking about representations of energy security in the US and China involves examining 
how energy security is discursively represented by actors, looking at ‘the ways in which 
regimes of “truth” and “knowledge” have been produced’ (Doty 1996: 2). Here, my focus 
was how energy security is constituted and the relationship between energy and security. 
To see how particular discourses enabled particular policy choices, I began by studying 
energy policy in the time period, before mapping what discourses made these policy 
choices possible (see Neumann 2008: 62). 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, discourses are here understood following Milliken, as 
‘structures of significations which construct social realities’ (1999: 229). A policy debate 
is bound together by a ‘smaller number of discourses’, in turn made up of individual texts 
which tend to present particular themes and constructions of which policy choices are 
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‘viable, desirable or necessary’ (Hansen, 2006: 51). Key texts work as ‘monuments’, in 
that they play a central place in the policy debate, have ‘broad reception’ and are often 
cited (Neumann 2008: 67). These played a central role in my analysis. According to Doty a 
discourse ‘produces interpretive possibilities by making it virtually impossible to think 
outside of it’, providing the ‘discursive spaces’ for making sense of the world (1993: 302). 
Analysis therefore contains two main parts. Firstly, examining the discursive practices in 
the texts which work to construct the reality, including identifying viable policy choices, 
and secondly, an investigation of ‘how, from this construction and positioning, various 
possibilities of practice emerge’ (Doty 1993: 304). In this way, the texts and statements 
that make up discourses work to make particular policy possible, creating ‘thinkable’ 
policy possibilities and excluding others by making them ‘unthinkable’. It is also 
important to note that interpretation is an essential part of discourse analysis, and as such I 
am here ‘providing an interpretation of what the discursive practices do, which does not 
necessarily coincide with individual motivations, perceptions, and intentions’ (Doty 1993: 
305). There are three central concepts or categories for analysis in the approach outlined 
by Doty; presupposition, predication and subject positioning (Doty 1993: 306).  
 
All statements have presuppositions in the form of ‘background knowledge that is taken to 
be true’ (Doty 1993: 306). Presupposition also helps discourses ‘naturalise’ understandings 
(Doty 1996: 10), making them appear common sense or ‘fact’. Analysing presupposition 
involves asking what a particular use of language implies ‘about the existence of subjects, 
objects and their relation to one another’ (Doty 1993: 306). Presupposition in statements 
‘creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in 
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which certain things are recognised as true’ (Doty 1993: 306)15. This was particularly 
interesting during my analysis, as many texts and statements discussed policies that were, 
or needed to be, undertaken in the name of energy security, while the term energy security 
itself was rarely defined or discussed. Likewise, the relationship between energy and 
national security was rarely explicitly addressed, but often implicitly assumed to be a 
neutral fact. The wider discursive context is vital, as statements, to be taken seriously as 
meaningful and important, ‘must make sense and fit with what the general public takes as 
“reality” (Doty 1993: 303). Similarly, intertextuality means that all texts ‘are intertwined 
with other texts’ (Doty 1993: 308). This can be explicit (quotes, references) or implicit 
(secondary sources, concepts, catchphrases) (Hansen 2006: 57). Again, this makes 
‘cultural competence’ and historical and contextual knowledge of the case studies essential 
(Neumann 2008: 63)
16
. By looking at some marginalised discourses on energy security I 
am also exploring texts which do not occupy a dominant status, including ‘social 
movements, illegal associations, academics, NGOs’ (Hansen 2006: 64). This is particularly 
important for this project as ‘keeping a space open for a possible inclusion of marginal 
actors and discourses becomes salient when analysing where resistance and future 
rearticulations might occur’, especially when the official discourse is hegemonic and does 
not allow for much questioning (Hansen 2006: 63).  
 
                                                          
15
 For example, a statement declaring that ‘energy security equals security of supply and stability of price’ is 
based on a number of presuppositions. Firstly, it takes as fact that energy security as a predetermined concept 
exists and therefore cannot be questioned and that security of supply and price are possible and desired; 
meanwhile security of supply assumes supply to something (state) and so it is assumed that energy security is 
necessarily about the security of states. Finally, the statement also assumes that these statements are facts 
which the author can establish as ‘reality’ or ‘truth’. 
16
 Consequently, Neumann suggests it is helpful to study places of some familiarity, including historical 
knowledge and language skills – though being too much at home risks ‘home-blindness’. This was less of a 
problem for me as I studied both the United States and China during my undergraduate and MA degrees, 
including spending time at Fudan University, Shanghai for an intensive Mandarin course. Adequate levels of 
cultural competence required for different studies are difficult to determine. Most importantly, the researcher 
must have enough knowledge to tell ‘intended readers something new’ (Neumann 2008: 64). 
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Predication is the practice of attaching labels to subjects (Doty 1993: 306). Within a 
discourse, ‘predications of a noun construct the thing(s) as a particular sort of thing, with 
particular features and capacities’ (Milliken 1999: 232). In this way ‘a predicate affirms a 
quality, attribute, or property of a person or thing’, which is important as ‘attributes 
attached to subjects are important for constructing identities for those subjects and for 
telling us what subjects can do’ (Doty 1993: 306). This is key for my analysis, as I am 
interested in the language used to explain, describe and justify energy security, energy 
security policy, and constructions of energy as security. It is worth also briefly noting the 
Copenhagen School’s understanding of security as a ‘speech-act’, arguing that under 
certain conditions
17
 utterances of security or the designation of an issue as ‘an existential 
threat requiring emergency actions...and the acceptance of that designation by a significant 
audience’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 27) securitises those issues, enabling emergency measures. 
Successful securitisation follows a specific rhetorical structure, which focuses on survival, 
urgency and ‘priority of action’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26), analysing these plays a central role 
in securitisation analyses, and they were also considered during my coding. 
 
Together, ‘presupposition and predication, in addition to constructing subjects and objects, 
establish various kinds of relationships between subjects and between subjects and 
objects… [w]e can think of this as subject positioning’ (Doty 1993: 306). This affects how 
subjects can act, and positions them against each other through ‘assigning them various 
degrees of agency’  (Doty 1993: 308). Deconstruction can allow us to identify some of 
these relationships by ‘identifying the oppositional structuring’ in texts whereby one term, 
the dominant, is privileged over an-Other, the subordinate, Other, deviant term (Doty 
1993: 306), these three mechanisms work together. Thus, texts were analysed with a focus 
                                                          
17
 These conditions are: the speech-act using a particular ‘grammar of security’; the speech-act coming from 
an actor or actors in a ‘position of authority’ to make audience acceptance of the move more likely; and the 
features of the supposed ‘threat/s’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 33). 
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on presuppositions and predications, and how these create subject positions which together 
work to make particular policy choices possible while excluding other options. In this way 
texts, as parts of larger discourses, ‘create a “world” in the sense that a particular “reality” 
must be accepted in order for the statements to make sense’ (Doty 1993: 308). Particular 
practices are made possible because particular texts construct a reality where those 
practices seem ‘reasonable and probably quite unremarkable’ (Doty 1993: 308). 
Questioning and problematising these processes is a central goal of this analysis. A final 
concept that is used in this analysis is that of articulation, as developed by Weldes. This is 
related to predications and subject-positioning, being the way in which ‘meaning is created 
and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different linguistic 
elements’ (Weldes 1996: 284). Through  
the process of articulation, then, particular phenomena…are represented in specific ways and given 
particular meanings on which action is then based. With their successful repeated articulation, these 
linguistic elements come to seem natural, to be an accurate description of reality (Weldes 1996: 
285).  
 
Vitally, articulations have to be reproduced to stay connected (in terms of the connotations 
which define articulations), and as a result ‘alternative representations of objects and social 
relations are always possible’ (Weldes 1996: 285). This emphasis on reproduction and the 
possibility for change differs from securitisation theory, which presents the meaning of 
security as largely fixed. Of course, while all meanings are fluid, some are more fixed than 
others (Neumann 2008: 73), but all have to be reproduced to retain meaning. A number of 
choices had to be made in terms of what data to include in the empirical chapters. Themes 
and discourses central to answering my research questions and understanding how energy 
security is constituted in both states were prioritised.  
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3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a research design and methods to help me answer my research 
questions. This could have been done in a number of different ways, and therefore this 
chapter has clarified the choices and decisions I have made. Like all research designs, it 
has a number of limitations. It emphasises official discourse over the wider policy debate. 
However, there is a surprising amount of agreement in the US over the meaning of energy 
security, though less so over the solutions. Meanwhile, in China, the wider policy debate 
would have been difficult, if not impossible, to study because of the political system. 
Marginal political discourses have instead been used to show contestation of dominant 
constructions of energy security. However, the analysis of marginalised discourses 
presents a starting point, illustrating contestation rather than the entirety of competing 
discourses. Energy also had to be separated from other security, economic and foreign 
policy issues, of which it is of course a part. However, as the focus is on what the 
constructions do rather than the intentions behind them this was less important. Overall, 
this research is concerned with how official constructions of energy security both 
legitimise and silence through particular constructions of common sense, making policy 
particular policy choices in the name of energy security, while delegitimising others. This 
is the focus of the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Energy security in the United States 
 
 
 
 
 
US energy security discourses and practices continue to largely rely on a traditional notion 
of security. Energy security is defined as national security, economic security, in ‘us’ vs 
‘them’ terms, and with an emphasis on energy independence – ultimately ensuring the 
American state has reliable energy supplies at stable/affordable prices. Overall, rather than 
producing security, policies undertaken in the name of energy security enable a continued 
focus on fossil fuels, causing human and environmental insecurity for individuals both 
within and outside the state. The argument here is not that it is in some way wrong for a 
state to be concerned about its energy needs, as energy supplies are clearly necessary for 
the continued functioning of human society as we know it. The problem, rather, is the 
focus on strategic autonomy, expressed in the need for energy independence to exclusively 
secure the American self against external threatening others, the solution for which is 
presented as vastly increased domestic production of fossil fuels, further enabled by 
legislation and a problematic policy-making process/set up.  
 
This chapter starts by looking briefly at energy security policy-making and the historical 
context of energy in the United States. It then looks in detail at energy security practices 
between 2004 and 2012, focusing on legislation and regulation, consumption and 
production, change and continuity in the policy-making process, and lastly energy foreign 
policy practices. The following section discusses official discursive constructions of 
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energy security in the time period under study, focusing on how energy security has been 
constructed in official speeches and documents. This section draws out four key themes in 
official discourses, looking at energy as a priority, national security and survival; energy as 
economic security and growth; energy security as ‘us’ vs ‘them’; and lastly energy 
independence. These are used to illustrate how particular dominant constructions of energy 
security enabled particular policy practices. It finishes by looking at some alternative, 
marginalised official constructions of energy security in the discursive space. 
 
4.1 Energy security policy-making in the United States 
Practices of energy security in the United States are heavily affected by institutional 
factors in the energy security policy-making process. This includes arrangements as to 
where energy security policy is made, and continuity or change in this, which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this section. The Department of Energy was created in 
1977, but deals largely with research and development (see interview with Delhotal 2012) 
rather than with defining energy security policy goals. This has particularly been the case 
under Obama, who appointed Nobel-prize winning physicist Steven Chu as his first 
Secretary of Energy. Chu’s 2013 successor Ernest Moniz is also a physicist (DoE 2013)1. 
At times of concern over energy prices or supply instability, analysts and policy-makers 
routinely lament the lack of an energy policy in the United States. However, each 
administration tends to have a stance on energy security, accompanied by particular goals 
and emphasis. This is decided primarily in the White House, where the President together 
with his administration set the agenda. Likewise, the ‘grand strategy’ of energy security for 
the United States has always been diversifying supply, diversity of suppliers, and 
                                                          
1
 Rather than setting policy, Moniz describes himself as tasked with ‘implementing critical Department of 
Energy missions in support of President Obama’s goals of growing the economy, enhancing security and 
protecting the environment’ (emphasis added, see reference above). 
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protection of markets (Interview 2012a), to ensure a stable economy. The focus here is on 
official constructions with an emphasis on presidents and administrations as playing a 
central role in articulating energy security and policy, it is worth noting that Congress is 
often more extreme in linking energy and national security, together with emphasising the 
need to increase domestic fossil energy production (see House Committee on Natural 
Resources 2013). 
 
While legislation has to pass through Congress, who may have differing goals and 
agendas, smaller changes are often implemented by presidents and their administrations 
through different government departments and bodies, from the Department of Energy, to 
the Departments of State, Defense
2
 and Transportation, as well as the Environmental 
Protection Agency, which works to protect human health and the environment and also has 
input in energy legislation and writes regulations to implement environmental laws (EPA 
2012a). This includes fuel efficiency standards and greenhouse gas emissions standards 
under the Clean Air Act after finding in 2009 that ‘six key well-mixed greenhouse gases 
constitute a threat to public health and welfare’ (EPA 2012b). Lastly, emergency energy 
security policy and decisions are made when considered necessary by the National 
Security Council, usually on an ad-hoc basis (Interview 2012c).  
 
In practical terms, energy security is not a policy in itself, but rather a label signifying a 
much broader policy goal encompassing a number of policy-areas, as repeatedly 
articulated in statements and speeches. However, for analytical purposes ‘energy security 
policy’ will be used here to describe policies that aim to achieve or improve energy 
security.  
                                                          
2
 The Pentagon plays a particularly interesting role in testing and implementing new energy technologies. 
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4.2 Historical context 
In the vast majority of the academic and policy literature on energy security in the United 
States, ‘the objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at 
reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives’ 
(Yergin 1988: 111). This definition remains dominant and largely unquestioned. 
Throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, the United States enjoyed abundant domestic 
supplies of coal, crude oil and natural gas, with coal as the leading source of energy even 
in the middle of the 20
th
 century (EIA 2011). Coal was first surpassed by crude oil and 
then natural gas, but since the mid-1980s crude oil production has been largely declining 
while coal remains central (EIA 2011). Meanwhile, estimated US consumption of 
petroleum and other liquids continued to rise, and as US production from the 1970s until 
2005 either ‘fell or remained relatively flat’, the country became more and more reliant on 
imports (EIA 2011). However, this was not considered a problem until the early 1970s 
when the US experienced the start of the oil crises (for an in-depth discussion of America's 
relationship with oil, see Rutledge 2006). Contemporary US understandings of energy 
security relate back to the oil crises of the 1970s, particularly the 1973 oil price shock. 
This occurred when OPEC (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and 
others issued an oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands for supporting 
Israel in the Yom Kippur war, causing massive price hikes and shortages in the United 
States. This was a major shock to a country which had enjoyed seemingly endless supplies 
of energy for over a century, and the effects of the oil crises lingered on throughout the 
1970s. In 1977, President Carter made a speech outlining the need to reduce reliance on 
imported energy, stating that ‘if we fail to act soon, we will face an economic, social and 
political crisis that will threaten our free institutions’ (Carter 2013). The importance of 
energy security to state survival is key here. The oil crises are the defining moment in US 
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energy security history, and are continually referred to in academic and policy writings on 
the subject (Bamberger 2003). They are also the main source of the dominance of ‘secure 
supplies’ and ‘stable prices’ as the defining characteristic and definition of energy security. 
It remains central to any discussion on energy security in the United States, even today: 
We've talked about this since Richard Nixon. Remember OPEC, '73, and oil -- lines at the gas 
station? And every President has said this is a national security issue, this is a crisis, we've got to do 
something about it. But we don't do anything about it (Obama 2010g) 
 
 
 
In practice, energy policy-making has fluctuated between more market-based approaches 
and more reliance on the federal government (Bamberger 2003). As discussed in the 
literature review, there have been two key approaches to solving energy insecurity, which 
both understand supply and price security as central - market-based/liberal, and 
strategic/realist approaches. For the strategic approach, the focus is on securing the state’s 
strategic autonomy, as ‘security necessitates reducing vulnerability to being subject to the 
power of others’ (Lee 2005: 289; see also Boekestein and Henderson 2005; Klare 2008). 
Thus, ‘a state is said to be insecure if it has to rely on external sources of strategic 
materials which contribute to its “war potential” or if the supply of the strategic materials 
is under threat’ (Lee 2005: 266). Following this approach, energy independence equals 
ultimate energy supply security for a state as they would no longer have to rely on external 
sources. Meanwhile, market-based approaches to energy security focus on ensuring US 
economic security and stability through stable international energy markets. For these 
authors, energy security ‘is not a zero-sum effort; if appropriate policies are instituted, the 
improvement of one country’s energy security need not be at the expense of other 
countries’ (Gault 2006: 9; also Bielecki 2002). These approaches are dominant in the 
academic literature, but, whether market or strategic, the mainstream energy security 
literature focuses on securing the state in energy terms; they only differ on whether the 
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state should be secured in strategic or economic terms and thus differ on policy 
proscriptions. In policy contexts, US official discourse and practice tends to pick and mix 
between market/liberal and strategic/realist energy security approaches depending on 
political convictions and the context, often pursuing various ‘hybrid strategies’ (Dueck 
2011) that combine them in different ways. 
 
Since the oil crises in the 1970s, energy security has remained an issue on US policy-
agendas. At times of supply insecurity or price hikes it has been considered key to national 
security, but in times of stability it has been somewhat less prioritised. The period under 
study in this research begins with the second Bush administration, though key events 
during the first administration will also be considered where they set the course for later 
policy. As part of this, it is important to note that Bush first came into power during an 
unexpected rise in oil prices during Spring 1999 (all the more shocking as it followed 
historically low prices in 1998). Prices kept increasing well into 2000, and as late as 2003 
‘oil prices were reaching into the mid-$30's, and appeared poised to possibly go higher as a 
result of events in Venezuela and possible disruptions in oil supply from the Middle East’ 
(Bamberger 2003: 1). This period of extended supply and price instability was ‘the fourth 
significant episode since 1973 to jog American awareness of the extent to which the U.S. 
economy and lifestyle depends on inexpensive and plentiful energy’ (Bamberger 2003: 1). 
Bush repeatedly referred to the ‘energy crisis’ in speeches and documents on energy 
security (see for example National Energy Policy 2001), and in response to the crisis he 
established a National Energy Policy Development Group under Vice President Cheney to 
develop a plan to deal with ‘the most serious energy shortage since the oil embargoes of 
the 1970s’ (National Energy Policy 2001: viii). Between World War II and 2005, there 
have been five major energy price-hikes in the US, starting in the 70s, with the most recent 
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starting January 2004, doubling oil prices in twenty months
3
 (Jordan 2005: 3). Since 2004, 
oil prices have remained higher - with a spike in 2007-8, and a dip in 2009 during the 
height of the global financial crisis, followed by another peak in 2011 during the Libyan 
revolution. This marks the starting point of the empirical work in this thesis. 2004 was ‘the 
year of the global demand shock, when world oil consumption grew in a single year by 
what normally would have been the growth over two and a half years’, partly because of a 
surge in Chinese consumption (Yergin 2011b: 193). This changed thinking on energy 
security, and placed it at the top of the national security agenda.  
 
There has been much debate over the role of government in energy policy-making, 
particularly at times of peak concern over energy security – with widespread fear and 
claims that the US does not have an energy policy. This section relies heavily on Robert 
Bamberger’s Congressional report, which states that ‘not only does the nation have an 
energy policy, it has adopted several distinct policy approaches over the years’  
(Bamberger 2003: 1). The key energy policy variation since the 1970s has been between 
market-based approaches and periods of more reliance on federal government (Bamberger 
2003: 2). Until the mid-1970s there were price-controls to fix the price of domestic 
production below market levels, which stabilised prices somewhat but discouraged 
domestic production, leading to increased imports (Bamberger 2003: 2). Gradual 
deregulation of oil prices from 1975 made prices more responsive to market changes, 
which in turn hoped to encourage domestic production (Bamberger 2003: 2). As Reagan 
took office in 1981, government control of prices was greatly reduced and energy policy 
more broadly became more market orientated  (Bamberger 2003: 2). After Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990-1991 oil prices spiked again, until the US and allies began air strikes 
                                                          
3
 These kinds of price hikes are difficult to deal with in policy-terms, as ‘every episode of instability has had 
its own set of contributing factors – and these may be geopolitical, based in energy infrastructure, or 
triggered by extremes of heat or cold beyond anyone’s control’  (Bamberger 2003: 12) 
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against Iraq in early 1991 (Bamberger 2003: 3). During the 1980s and 90s the emphasis 
was largely on market-based approaches, but even during these periods policy-makers 
increasingly viewed energy as a national security issue justifying intervention by federal 
government. Reliance on energy imports largely became issue in the 1970s, and George 
W. Bush’s first term aimed to deal with this through increased domestic production via tax 
breaks for oil and gas companies, together with increased investment in ‘clean coal’ 
technologies and nuclear technology. Overall, ‘the energy debate has been the most 
vigorous over the balance to be struck between increasing supply and encouraging 
conservation’ (Bamberger 2003: 4), and this debate remains unresolved today. During the 
oil price fluctuations in the 1970s and 80s, a focus on conservation, efficiency and 
development of alternative sources of energy emerged, spurring spending on alternative 
sources and efficiency technology, together with government regulations to improve 
efficiency in appliances and buildings; however, ‘largely because of the generally lower 
prices over time for fossil fuels…these energy programs have shown mixed results’ 
(Bamberger 2003: 3). This remains the case today, though Obama’s efforts on efficiency 
and clean energy have been somewhat more successful than past attempts.  
 
There are a number of approaches to dealing with energy security understood as supply 
and price stability, which can be largely split into supply/demand based approaches. 
Supply-focused approaches aim to increase energy supplies to stabilise both prices and 
supply – this has involved increased fossil fuel production as well as focus on renewables 
(particularly biofuels like ethanol under Bush). Demand-side measures aim to reduce or 
manage demand for energy, through efficiency and conservation improvements. A number 
of measures can and have been undertaken   on both supply and demand sides by both 
Bush and Obama, including removing regulations to allow increased coal production, 
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opening up of new areas for drilling and exploration for oil and gas, continued subsidies to 
increase domestic energy production and improvement on efficiency regulations. All of 
these approaches aim to secure stable energy supplies at reasonable prices for the United 
States. 
 
4.3 US energy security policy 2004-2012
4
 
This section will start by looking at energy legislation and regulation made in the name of 
energy security. It then considers sources of energy, focusing on consumption and 
production and change and continuity under Bush and Obama. After this, it discusses 
continuity and change in the policy-making process, before briefly considering the role of 
energy in foreign policy. 
 
4.3.1 Legislation and regulation 
A key part of practicing energy security is producing legislation and regulations on energy. 
Legislation on energy can be driven either by the administration in power or by groups in 
Congress. Energy legislation and regulations are heavily related to energy consumption 
and energy choices, promoting and enabling particular energy sources over others. While 
the energy industry in the United States is market-based rather than state-run, legislation 
and regulations allow the state to direct national energy consumption and/or production in 
line with its energy security priorities.  
 
                                                          
4
 As discussed in the previous chapter, my understanding of the relationship between discourse and policy 
draws on Hansen (2006). Viewing these as ‘mutually constitutive and discursively linked’ (2006: 28), they 
are nevertheless separated in this chapter for practical reasons, starting by looking at the policy practices 
before looking at how these were enabled through particular discourses. 
CHAPTER 4 
148 
 
As noted, Bush first came into power during an energy ‘crisis’, and his administration 
faced another price hike in 2004. While he took a largely market-based approach, 
legislation was used to provide tax cuts for domestic energy production to increase 
supplies and reduce demand. In August 2005, Bush signed into law the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 which had passed both the House and Senate with overwhelming support. The text 
defined it as an act ‘to ensure jobs for our future with secure, affordable, and reliable 
energy’ (Energy Policy Act 2005: section 1). The Act provided tax incentives, subsidies 
and loan guarantees for various types of domestic energy production, including oil, gas, 
coal, nuclear and renewables. It also aimed at energy self-sufficiency (independence) 
within North America, these provisions were headed under a subtitle shortened to the 
‘SAFE Act’, or ‘Set America Free Act of 2005’ (Energy Policy Act 2005: title 14, subtitle 
B). The Act also reduced taxes on fossil fuels and nuclear energy, increased coal 
production and provided more investment into clean coal (Energy Policy Act 2005). 
Meanwhile, it exempted the oil and gas industries’ use of fluids in fracking from clean air 
and water legislation (Energy Policy Act 2005). Washington Post called it a ‘piñata of 
perks for energy industries’ (Grunwald and Eilperin 2005). It made no serious efforts to 
tackle consumption levels or greenhouse gases. 
 
In his 2006 State of the Union Bush launched his ‘advanced energy initiative’, increasing 
funding for clean energy research at the Department of Energy (White House National 
Economic Council 2006). In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act was 
introduced by Democrats in Congress. It focused on achieving energy independence and 
security through efficiency savings, mandating use of biofuels and fuel economy (Energy 
Independence and Security Act 2007). The act originally aimed to also cut petroleum 
subsidies, but this did not pass in the Senate. Moreover, the environmental benefits of 
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corn-based ethanol, in practice the key biofuel focused on in the Act, have been 
increasingly questioned (Gies 2010). However, overall Bush’s two terms saw a focus on 
‘American-made’ energy, with increased domestic production of ‘traditional’ fuels, 
particularly oil and gas, but also continued investment in coal and nuclear power (White 
House 2008). The administration also aimed to improve efficiency and use of alternative 
fuels, though the targets and achievements in these areas were much less ambitious. 
 
Obama has taken more of a regulatory approach compared with the Bush administration’s 
market-focus. As part of this he has increased incentives to encourage domestic production 
of oil and gas, as well as stronger fuel-economy and a number of programs to increase 
efficiency in buildings, transportation and elsewhere (White House 2012). Incentives and 
investments also doubled use of renewables from 2008-2012 (White House 2012). These 
investments and incentives were partly introduced through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, which enabled a huge increase in investment in clean energy 
and federal subsidies for clean energy firms and technology and green jobs. While Obama 
attempted to put in place cap and trade legislation to cap carbon emissions this failed to 
pass through the Senate in 2010, so the administration has instead relied on the 
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Likewise, Obama 
attempted to cut fossil fuel subsidies in early 2012, but this also failed to pass Congress. 
The Obama administration has continued the Bush administration’s focus on reducing 
dependence on foreign oil so it has in some ways pursued a similar approach with 
increased domestic fossil fuel production, though with stronger emphasis on clean energy 
and efficiency. Overall, the focus on energy independence has enabled legislation to 
increase domestic production of energy, with a heavy emphasis on fossil fuels.  
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4.3.2 Consumption and Production 
Practicing energy security also involves sources of energy consumption and production, 
and choices made in terms of which fuels to promote via subsidies, regulation, federal 
grants and other measures. Political administrations tend to have clear priorities in what 
sources of energy they see as key to US energy security. 
 
The focus under both Bush and Obama has been on energy security as security of supplies 
at stable prices, including diversifying both energy sources and suppliers, and also 
increasing domestic production of all energy types to reduce dependence on external 
sources. This section looks at change and continuity in consumption and production 
patterns in the United States, using data and charts from the Energy Information 
Administration (see EIA 2012a). In terms of consumption, Obama places more emphasis 
on clean energy and energy efficiency than Bush. However, in practice changes in 
consumption have been minimal, as can be seen in Figure 4.1, showing US primary energy 
consumption by source from 1990-2011, divided into fossil fuels, renewables and nuclear 
electric power.  
 
CHAPTER 4 
151 
 
(Figure 4.1: EIA 2012a)
5
 
 
This shows that despite Obama’s best efforts to promote renewables as a key part of 
energy security, fossil fuel use remains near 2001 levels
6
, though there was a dip in fossil 
fuel and total energy consumption at the height of the financial recession, as can be seen 
on the chart. Likewise, it should be noted that fossil fuel consumption did increase during 
the Bush administration, though by 2008 consumption had reduced almost back to 2001 
levels (again, partly due to the financial recession). Furthermore, a study by the 
Environmental Law Institute into energy subsidies in the period 2002-2008 found that ‘the 
vast majority of federal subsidies for fossil fuels and renewable energy supported energy 
                                                          
5
 Most recent available data from EIA. It notes that ‘most energy consumed in the United States comes from 
fossil fuels, with petroleum accounting for 36 percent of primary energy consumption in 2011, natural gas 
for 26 percent, and coal for 20 percent. Nuclear electric power accounted for 8 percent and renewable energy 
accounted for 9 percent’ (EIA 2012a). 
6
 It is worth noting that it may take longer to see the full impact of Obama’s clean energy agenda.  
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sources that emit high levels of greenhouse gases when used as fuel’. In the period studied, 
the federal government ‘provided substantially larger subsidies to fossil fuels than to 
renewables’, with fossil fuel subsidies totalling £72 billion over the study period, and 
renewables only £29 billion, more than half of which was towards corn-based ethanol 
which may decrease US dependence on oil imports but ‘raises considerable questions 
about effects on climate’ (Environmental Law Institute 2009a). Meanwhile, ‘the largest 
subsidies to fossil fuels were written into the US Tax Code as permanent provisions’, 
while most subsidies for renewables had expiration dates which make them less useful for 
the renewables industry (Environmental Law Institute 2009a). Overall, ‘energy subsidies 
highly favoured energy sources that emit high levels of greenhouse gases over sources that 
would decrease our climate footprint’ (Environmental Law Institute 2009b). The impact of 
the recession on energy consumption makes it difficult to judge how far Obama’s 
measures to promote renewables and efficiency have translated into a more lasting 
reduction in fossil fuel consumption - while it is clear that renewable energy use has 
increased, in terms of overall use fossil fuels remain central to US energy security, 
showing continued conflict between the goals of energy security and climate security. 
 
In terms of production, both Bush and Obama have promoted increased domestic 
production of fossil fuels through a range of measures, including continued subsidies. 
Historically, most of the domestically produced energy in the United States has come from 
fossil fuels, in the form of coal, natural gas and crude oil (EIA 2012a). At first the leading 
energy source, coal was surpassed by crude oil and then natural gas in the mid-20th 
century, but became the leading energy source produced again by the mid-1980s, and 
crude oil production declined (EIA 2011). In 2010, ‘natural gas production exceeded coal 
production for the first time since 1981’ (EIA 2011), see Figure 4.2 below. 
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(Figure 4.2: EIA 2012a) 
 
Bush’s National Energy Plan (NEP) focused on increasing supply in the face of an energy 
‘crisis’, consisting of shortages (National Energy Policy 2001). To increase supply, there 
was a removal of regulations to allow increased exploration and drilling, expanding coal 
use and allowing increased pollution (NRDC 2001). Efficiency standards were weakened, 
and there were no improvements on pollution standards and several attempts to weaken 
existing clean air legislation to allow more coal plants to be built (Barringer 2008). 
Increased domestic production of fossil fuels was emphasised throughout his terms, and in 
2007 he signed the Gulf of Mexico Act, which aimed to ‘increase domestic oil and gas 
production by allowing access to key portions of America's outer continental shelf’, 
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allowing access to new areas of potential resources of both oil and gas (Bush 2007a). In 
the forming of the NEP, ‘Bush administration officials sought extensive advice from utility 
companies and the oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy industries, and incorporated their 
recommendations, often word for word, into the energy plan’ (NRDC 2002). Vice 
President Cheney went as far as outlining the administration’s stance on energy/climate by 
arguing that the administration viewed conservation as a ‘sign of personal virtue’, but ‘not 
a sufficient basis for a sound, comprehensive energy policy’ (Cheney, in NRDC 2001). 
 
Under Obama, the focus on increased domestic production of energy continued, though 
including more focus on renewables and clean energy alongside fossil fuels, the effect of 
which can be seen near the bottom of Figure 4.2, illustrating an increase in production of 
‘other renewable energy’ sources (geothermal, solar and wind power). While spending the 
first few years of his administration promoting clean energy in most speeches, in 2012 
Obama announced that his strategy to energy security was to take an ‘all-out, all of the 
above’ approach to energy (Obama 2012a). This had involved a massive expansion of oil 
and gas exploration, drilling, and pipelines, and was undertaken in the name of energy 
independence: 
Last year, American oil production reached its highest level since 2003. Let me repeat that: Our oil 
production reached its highest level in seven years. Oil production from federal waters in the Gulf 
of Mexico reached an all-time high. For the first time in more than a decade, imports accounted for 
less than half of what we consumed (Obama 2011b) 
 
There was a refocus on oil and gas as central to US energy security, and an emphasis on 
the ‘need to make continued investments in clean coal’7 (Obama 2010b); the effects of 
these measures can also be seen on the second graph, showing increased production of 
                                                          
7
 While ‘clean coal’ sounds good in theory, in practice measures largely enable continued investment in the 
most polluting source of energy available, as carbon capture and storage (CCS, or ‘clean coal’) technologies 
are still underdeveloped. In practice ‘substantial economic and technological hurdles remain’ in developing 
functional ‘clean coal’ technology (EIA 2012b). 
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coal, natural gas and crude oil. Increases in conventional and unconventional oil and gas 
production under Obama are particularly striking, and ‘U.S. crude oil output has risen by 
18% since 2008’ (Yergin 2011a). Obama and Energy Secretary Chu’s approach put 
‘everything on the table’, which enabled a refocus on fossil fuels and represented a change 
from previous Democratic administrations which tended to focus more on renewables and 
efficiency (Interview with Delhotal 2012). Likewise, for a Democratic administration they 
made a much more unequivocal commitment to nuclear energy (Interview 2012a). 
 
4.3.3 The policy-making process: change and continuity 
Under Bush, the National Energy Policy was made through consulting industry, 
particularly fossil fuel corporations, via the National Energy Policy Development Group 
which was set up aside from other institutions, headed by vice President Cheney and senior 
Cabinet members, who were tasked with developing an energy policy to enhance national 
energy security (National Energy Policy 2001). Under Obama, energy security policy-
making changed somewhat, with increasing priorities on climate change. He has used the 
EPA to write regulation using existing laws to improve the environment without involving 
Congress who are broadly resistant to climate legislation. When taking office in 2009, he 
created a White House Office on Energy and Climate Change, though funding for this was 
cut in 2011. He also created a Bureau of Energy Resources in the State Department in 
2011 to integrate energy security more comprehensively into US foreign policy. US energy 
policy-making is a complicated process taking place in a wide variety of institutional 
locations. It is important to note here a continuing division of labour between staff working 
on climate and staff working on energy. This is the case both within departments and to an 
extent between departments and institutions (Interview 2012a). This tension left ‘some 
significant hard policy choices where those two [energy and climate priorities] were in 
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tension’ (Interview 2012a). Even during the brief existence of the White House Office on 
Energy and Climate Change, it ‘primarily did climate change, they didn’t do international 
energy or energy security at all’ (Interview 2012a). Meanwhile, the Environmental 
Protection Agency is an entirely separate entity dealing with climate regulation as best it 
can within institutional limitations, rather than an integral part of the energy security 
policy making process. It is also worth noting that there is more action on climate change 
and renewables on the state level. 
 
4.3.4 Energy security and foreign policy 
While both Bush and Obama have focused on the problems and ‘threat’ of dependence on 
foreign oil, they also prioritised energy as a key part of foreign policy. For Bush, ‘energy 
security must be a priority of U.S. trade and foreign policy’, and while reliance on external 
supplies is bad it is the reality; as a result there is a need to ‘look beyond our borders and 
restore America’s credibility with overseas suppliers’ and to ‘build strong relationships 
with energy-producing nations in our own hemisphere, improving the outlook for trade, 
investment, and reliable supplies’ (National Energy Policy 2001). Likewise, Obama has 
encouraged shale gas development and global oil production to increase ‘reliable supplies’ 
as part of foreign policy, also a focus on ‘building strategic relationships with oil 
producers’ (White House 2011). He also created the Bureau of Energy Resources in the 
State Department to ‘ensure that all our diplomatic relationships advance our interests in 
having access to secure, reliable, and ever-cleaner sources of energy’ (State Department 
2012). The creation of Bureau illustrates the growing importance and role of energy in US 
foreign policy.  
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4.4 Energy security in official discourse 2004-2012  
US understandings of energy security remain shaped by the oil crises in the 1970s, which 
has led to a continuing focus on security of supplies at stable prices as underpinning 
energy security. US energy security policy rarely explicitly defines energy security. 
Neither the key energy policy acts nor key officials define the terms clearly. Imprecise 
terminology around energy security is a problem, and it is often exploited by political 
actors to promote particular policy options (Littlefield 2013). However, the way in which 
energy security is addressed in official discourse – whether this be policy documents, 
legislation, official speeches or statements by ministries or the President – suggests 
understandings of energy security in the US still relate back to these two key components – 
‘assured access to energy, at an affordable price’ (Interview 2012b)8. These two 
components relate to national and economic security, as states need reliable access to 
energy supplies at reasonable prices for economic growth and stability, and when this fails 
it becomes an issue of national security. One interviewee argued that the meaning of 
energy security varies in different countries – in the US the economic impacts of high 
levels of volatility in oil prices is ‘what has potential to make us insecure’ (Interview 
2012a). However, whatever the country, the common thread is that energy security is ‘the 
ability of a country to access the energy it needs to maintain national power’ (Interview 
2012a). This clearly illustrates the connection between economic and national security in 
how energy security is understood. In national security terms, energy security remains 
underanalysed conceptually by practitioners, in practice leading to a more ‘ad-hoc’ 
response, at least when there is a direct possibility of energy insecurity; however, the 
priorities and issues addressed under the heading of energy security still hints at an 
adherence to security of supplies at reasonable prices, with price instability or supply 
                                                          
8
 This overwhelmingly came out in interviews with policy-makers undertaken for this research. 
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disruptions considered as key threats to national security (Interview 2012c)
9
. Because of 
the continued link between energy and national security/power, it continues to take 
precedence over environmental or human security. 
 
In terms of their approach to energy, the differences between Bush and Obama are not as 
large as perceived (Interview 2012a). Bush took more of a market-driven approach, but in 
terms of their approach to oil and gas markets the Obama administration has actually been 
quite similar in its protection of markets and promotion of diversity of supply, but with an 
added focus on regulation, particularly in terms of efficiency standards (Interview 2012a). 
So there are some differences, but as a practical matter both administrations opened certain 
lands for offshore development [of oil and gas], and both of them sustained a relatively 
low tax-climate which supports investment in renewables (Interview 2012a). Likewise, 
both of them promoted domestic supply, as did the Clinton administration (Interview 
2012a). Consequently, the rest of this section presents four key themes in US constructions 
of energy security, most of which the Bush and Obama administrations share, though the 
emphasis differs somewhat in a few areas. Overall there are enough similarities
10
 to both 
suggest an institutionalised understanding of energy security and therefore to justify a 
thematic approach for the purposes of this discussion. The themes discussed here continue 
through both Bush and Obama’s administrations, and contain a number of subthemes and 
nuances. Differences in emphasis, change and continuity between administrations are 
noted where present.  
 
                                                          
9
 For this reason, the United States also maintains a large Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to supplement 
supplies when disruptions occur. 
10
 This was also the general consensus in interviews undertaken. 
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4.4.1 Energy as a priority, national security and survival 
Energy security is continually defined as an important issue in both US domestic and 
foreign policies. Speeches and documents on energy security continually emphasise 
survival and urgency, and national security is continually linked with energy supply and 
price security (see Obama 2011b). When George W. Bush took office in 2001, energy was 
established as a priority from the start – America was going through was he called an 
energy ‘crisis’ (National Energy Policy 2001), consisting of shortages (particularly in 
California) and so he established a National Energy Policy Taskforce led by Vice President 
Cheney, showing energy was considered a key priority. In the report itself, the key focus 
was ‘to diversify and increase the supply of energy’, and oil and gas were central to this 
(Bush 2001b)
11
. There was said to be a serious energy supply crisis which would affect 
America over the coming decades, and failure to deal with it would ‘threaten our nation's 
economic prosperity, compromise our national security, and literally alter the way we live 
our lives’ (Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham in March 2001, DoE 2001). At a 
meeting before the release of the report, Bush stated that ‘what people need to hear, loud 
and clear, is that we're running out of energy in America. And it is so important for this 
nation to improve its infrastructure so we can not only deliver supplies, but we need to go 
find new supply’ (Bush 2001a). Meanwhile, the importance of energy makes reliance on 
other states a vulnerability, which is also an urgent security issue: ‘our dependence [on 
foreign oil and gas] is growing…I believe that creates a national security issue and an 
economic security issue for the United States’ (Bush 2005a). This discourse continued 
throughout both Bush administrations, though the initial focus on energy decreased 
somewhat after 9/11. Throughout, Bush emphasised increasing domestic supplies of 
                                                          
11
 It later emerged that oil, gas, coal and nuclear industries had key input into the National Energy Policy 
Plan produced, with their suggestion sometimes incorporated verbatim (see NRDC, 2002). 
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energy rather than reducing demand, enabling investment in infrastructure to allow more 
domestic production (National Energy Policy 2001: xi).  
 
Likewise, Obama has continually stated that ‘American energy security’ is ‘an issue that 
has been a priority for my administration since the day I took office’ (Obama 2010b). The 
importance and urgency of energy security is clearly emphasised in statements like: 
These are extraordinary times, and it calls for swift and extraordinary action. At a time of such great 
challenge for America, no single issue is as fundamental to our future as energy (Obama 2009a) 
 
He has also referred to the possibility of a future ‘crisis in terms of oil supplies’ and the 
possible effect on the economy and national security (Obama 2010f), referencing Nixon’s 
desire for energy independence and following it with ‘every President has said this is a 
national security issue, this is a crisis, we've got to do something about it’ (Obama 2010g). 
So energy is represented as important, it is a crisis, because both national security and the 
economy depend on energy security. The ‘threat’ usually referenced is ‘dependence’, or 
supply insecurity (see Obama 2011b), and it is the American state which is under threat, 
even when the focus is stabilising global oil markets. The focus on energy as an urgent, 
important, ‘national security’ issue enables a separation between energy and environmental 
concerns, particularly under the Bush administration, allowing continued focus on 
traditional fuels in the name of economic and national security, as well as a focus on 
domestic production as the resources are too important to rely on other states which may 
be ‘unstable’ or even ‘hostile’. 
 
4.4.2 Energy security as central to economic security and growth 
Another key feature of US energy security discourses is an emphasis on energy as essential 
for economic security and growth. This relates both to stable prices, which are needed to 
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keep the economy stable, and to continued supplies, which are also needed for growth. 
Under Bush, this involved a focus on increased drilling and calls for ‘new drilling options’, 
said to be necessary ‘to accomplish our economic goals’ (Bush 2008b). Likewise ‘keeping 
our economy growing requires an affordable, reliable, and secure supply of energy’ (White 
House 2005). He repeatedly called for expansion of ‘domestic oil and natural gas 
production’ including increased  access for offshore drilling to increase oil supplies in 
order ‘to reduce pressure on prices’ (Bush 2008a). The focus on domestic sources and 
production is key here, as supply security, and thus economic stability, cannot be left to 
untrustworthy foreign states: ‘for the sake of our economic and national security, we must 
reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy’ (Bush in White House National 
Economic Council 2006). Under Obama, this focus on energy as ‘absolutely critical to our 
economic future’ (Obama 2009b) continued, though clean energy also becomes considered 
key for growth, which will be discussed in more detail later. The focus on ‘domestic’ 
sources of energy continues, and is a key part of the energy strategy Obama announced in 
2011, titled ‘a blueprint for a secure energy future’. This pointed to a need to  
develop and secure America’s energy supplies: we need to deploy American assets, innovation, and 
technology so that we can safely and responsibly develop more energy here at home and be a leader 
in the global energy economy (White House 2011). 
 
 
However, while there was increased focus on clean energy under Obama, ‘America’s oil 
and natural gas supplies’ were still considered ‘critical components’ necessary to enhance 
‘our energy security and fuel[sic] our Nation’s economy’ (White House 2011). Likewise, 
increased domestic production of fossil fuels is necessary ‘given our energy needs, in order 
to sustain economic growth, produce jobs, and keep our businesses competitive’ (Obama 
2010b). This is continually emphasised – while clean energy is represented as good, as 
long as it’s domestically produced, increased domestic production of fossil fuels is 
CHAPTER 4 
162 
 
necessary so economic growth does not have to be ‘sacrificed’ along the way  (Obama 
2010c). Meanwhile, when discussing clean energy, it is presented largely as a means for 
economic growth and jobs creation. Throughout the idea of domestic/foreign sources of 
energy is emphasised, the former identified as good, while the latter is identified as bad 
and leaving America ‘vulnerable’ – in the past ‘the economy was weakened by ever-
growing dependence on foreign oil’ (Obama 2009j). America’s position as ‘the world's 
leading importer of oil’ is equated with ‘sending our money and our wealth away’ (Obama 
2009g). Dependence on foreign oil and imports is linked to the financial recession, and the 
solution is ‘moving forward seriously on an energy policy that frees us from dependence 
on foreign oil and makes sure that our economy is not vulnerable’ (Obama 2010h). This 
construction of energy security and domestic energy in particular as essential for economic 
security and growth is linked together with the elevation of energy as one of the most 
important issues facing America, creating a need for action: ‘This is the time that 
Americans must come together on behalf of our common prosperity and security’ (Obama 
2009a). Linking energy strongly with economic security and growth allows added 
imperative for action, prioritising it in the policy-making process and enabling legislation 
and regulations to increase domestic production. The link to jobs creation is particularly 
important here and is continually evoked, particularly by Obama during the financial 
recession. 
 
4.4.3 Strategy and power politics 
Another key feature of American representations of energy security is the idea of strategy 
and power politics, which also relates back to national security, and distinguishing 
‘America’, or ‘us’, from external ‘others’, who may be hostile and not have America’s best 
interests at heart. While more pronounced under Bush, this continues through to Obama’s 
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first years in power. It also draws on the idea of ‘dependence’ on these ‘others’ as a threat 
to American energy security, and therefore also to American economic and national 
security: 
America's dependence leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists – who could 
cause huge disruptions of oil shipments, raise the price of oil, and do great harm to our economy 
(Bush 2007a) 
 
Likewise,  
Addiction to oil is a matter of national security concerns. After all, today we get about 60 percent of 
our oil from foreign countries…Now, part of the problem is, is that some of the nations we rely on 
for oil have unstable governments, or agendas that are hostile to the United States. These countries 
know we need their oil, and that reduces our influence, our ability to keep the peace in some areas. 
And so energy supply is a matter of national security. It's also a matter of economic security (Bush 
2006) 
 
 
Obama focuses particularly on the need for ‘homegrown’ or ‘American-made’ energy and 
cutting oil imports to ‘end the tyranny of foreign oil’ (Obama 2009d); for Obama, ‘that's 
what's going to help us secure our energy future’ (Obama 2011e). ‘Homegrown’ sources of 
energy, whether fossil fuel or ‘alternative’, will ‘make us more secure and less dependent 
on foreign oil’ (Obama 2012b). US representations of energy security consistently set up a 
distinction between ‘us’, who are to be protected, and ‘them’, who may be hostile or not 
have US interests at heart. Overall, ‘this is an American issue, making sure that we've got 
energy security and energy independence’ (Obama 2011d). This also makes competition a 
key part of energy foreign policy, and other countries, particularly China, are considered 
‘aggressive’ and so the US needs to prioritise energy even more to be able to compete 
(Obama 2010a). Thus under Bush, energy security was a necessary ‘priority of U.S. trade 
and foreign policy’ (National Energy Policy 2001), which meant strengthening 
relationships with key producer nations, something continued under Obama (Obama 
2011b). Promoting diversity of supply globally is a key priority for ensuring US energy 
security – which includes ‘using diplomacy to protect global supply to ensure that there is 
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a good diversity of suppliers’ and ‘to reduce the ability of…producers to use oil as a 
weapon’ (Interview 2012a). Both presidents highlight the role and nature of America as 
different, emphasising America’s innovation capabilities compared with other states as 
central to solving the energy security challenge. America is continually referred to as a 
‘leader’, and that leadership and the need for it to continue on energy is key. In terms of 
policy, constructions of America in opposition to ‘others’ has a clear impact on energy 
foreign policy, encouraging competition and impacting how the US relates to other states. 
Energy-producing states are considered more valuable as strategic partners, while other 
energy consumers, particularly China, are considered competitors, and often ‘aggressive’. 
It also enables continued focus on traditional fuel sources, particularly oil and gas, as these 
are more strategically important and central to the notion of supply security.  
 
4.4.4 Energy independence 
A key feature of energy security under both Bush and Obama is the idea of energy 
independence. This links back to national security and a construction of America as ‘us’, 
who must be independent in energy terms to secure us from hostile ‘others’. Energy 
independence represents ultimate supply and price security, with full control over both. 
Control is a key feature of the energy independence discourse, with statements like ‘an 
economy built to last is also one where we control our energy needs. We don't let foreign 
countries control our energy supplies’ (Obama 2012c). This was also featured in Obama’s 
2012 State on the Union where he spoke out in favour of ‘a future where we’re in control 
of our own energy, and our security and prosperity aren’t so tied to unstable parts of the 
world’ (Obama 2012a). Likewise, Bush argued that ‘energy independence is an important 
part of our nation's future’ (Bush 2007b). There’s continual contrast between ‘us’ 
Americans, and ‘foreign’ others, who cannot be relied on:  
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Here in America, we have become too dependent -- too dependent -- on the increasingly 
limited supply of foreign oil for our own energy needs…Our dependence on foreign oil is 
like a foreign tax on the American Dream (Bush 2005b) 
 
The solution to this threat of dependence? Energy independence, through increased 
efficiency measures and increased exploration and drilling, as well as investment in 
biofuels and ‘clean coal’ (Bush 2005b). Overall, ‘our dependence on foreign oil endangers 
our security and our economy’ (Obama 2010d). The idea of energy independence as 
ultimate energy security is a key part of US representations of energy security, and has 
been promoted by every president since Nixon. Likewise, Mitt Romney made energy 
independence by 2020 a key part of his platform for the election (Youngman 2012). The 
threat constructed through the ideal of energy independence is dependence, particularly on 
‘foreign oil’. Accepting dependence on other countries means having to ‘risk the peril’ of 
dependence, while aiming for energy independence ‘makes our economy stronger and our 
nation more secure’ (Obama 2009a). Ultimately, ‘because we know we can't power 
America's future on energy that's controlled by foreign dictators’ (Obama 2009c). Energy 
independence works to construct a zero-sum, competitive, ‘America-vs-the world’ 
understanding of energy security. Constructions of energy independence as ‘common 
sense’ have enabled legislation like the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and increased 
production of domestic fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas. Even by 2008, Bush still 
wanted increased domestic production to make energy independence possible – he pointed 
to increasing demand for ‘traditional fuels’ and complained about continuing ‘old and 
outdated restrictions on increasing our domestic supplies of oil and gasoline’ (White 
House 2008). Meanwhile, energy independence is unlikely to make energy prices more 
stable, because whether or not domestically produced or imported oil is still traded openly 
on the world market.  
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Because of the focus on energy independence and prioritising of energy as a national and 
economic security issue, there has been a continued focus on fossil fuels and subsidies for 
fossil fuels in the United States. Thus, ‘in terms of the political debate [energy security is] 
often referred to in a sense of producing more domestically’ (Interview 2012e). Under 
Bush, this involved focus on increased drilling for oil and gas as well as continued 
investment in coal nuclear energy and ‘clean coal’ technologies (White House National 
Economic Council 2006). Under Obama, it led to the development of the ‘all-out, all of the 
above’ approach to energy. While this was the strategy from the start, it became a key 
slogan in his 2012 State of the Union, when he announced that ‘this country needs an all-
out, all-of-the-above strategy that develops every available source of American energy’ 
(Obama 2012a). In practice, this involved a refocus on traditional sources of energy, 
increased drilling for oil and gas, and more ‘clean’ coal and nuclear, while continuing 
focus on efficiency/clean energy. It has also had a problematic effect on energy foreign 
policy, encouraging isolationism.  
 
4.4.5 Alternative constructions of energy security  
There are some alternative constructions of energy security present in US official 
discourse which are also worthy of note as they diverge from the themes presented above. 
Under Bush, there is some focus on human security primarily in discussions on energy 
prices, which are considered problematic for families who need gasoline in particular in 
their daily lives. This focus is more evident under Obama, however, particularly in 
discussions on clean energy. Like Bush, he also notes the impact of high energy prices on 
human security: ‘gas prices affect everybody, from farmers and truck drivers, to restaurant 
owners and workers, as well as consumers…Families see the pinch every time they fill up 
the tank’ (Obama 2011b). Green jobs are considered necessary for ‘protecting the 
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environment and improving public health, all the same time’ (Obama 2009c). Likewise 
there is some mention of sustainability and the security of the planet: ‘The energy we use 
can sustain our planet or destroy it’ (Obama 2009k). Security is occasionally viewed in a 
more international way, 
We know that, even as we seek solutions to our energy problems at home, the solution to global 
climate change requires American leadership abroad. That's why I've appointed a global climate 
envoy to help lead our re-engagement with the international community, as we find sustainable 
ways to transition to a global low- carbon economy (Obama 2009h) 
 
 
Likewise the developed world is seen as having a responsibility, ‘it's critical for us to lead 
by example by becoming more energy efficient, and we also have to harness technology 
and shared scientific breakthroughs in order to find more sustainable energy patterns’  
(Obama 2009f). However, even where human and environmental security are discussed 
they tend to come last in long lists of benefits cleaner energy or green jobs will bring, after 
national and economy security, and the main focus remains on securing the state in energy 
terms. For example, 
right now, some of the most promising innovation is happening in the area of clean energy 
technology -- technology that is creating jobs, reducing our dependence on foreign oil, and -- 
something that every young person here cares about -- making sure our planet is a healthier place to 
live that we can pass on to future generations (Obama 2011a) 
 
Under Obama, tension remains between energy and climate priorities. During the first two 
years of his first administration, there was more focus on climate change, but after the 
failure of the cap and trade bill, the dissolution of the Office of Energy and Climate 
Change at the White House, and the Libyan revolution and the spiking of oil prices that 
followed, causing a drop in GDP, ‘the administration discovered the oil market’ (Interview 
2012a). But ‘it's not much of an organised approach’ (Interview 2012a). Another 
interviewee noted that in practice, climate change is off the energy security agenda. It is 
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assumed that ‘it will happen or get dealt with along the way to new energy technologies’12, 
and has become a political issue, partly because Congress is divided on the issue. Dealing 
with energy security, ‘you're not allowed to say climate change anymore’ (Interview 
2012d). But it is not completely the case that climate change is not a priority, but rather an 
assumption that it will happen along the way. Even when he unveiled a new climate 
strategy in June 2013, the plan ‘remains fatally compromised by Obama's unflinching 
commitment to the maximum possible exploitation of fossil fuels’ (Ahmed 2013). 
 
Overall energy security is constructed in a problematic way that reinforces links to national 
security, enabling continuing emphasis on fossil fuels. However, the presence of some 
alternative constructions of security including environmental and human security does 
begin to provide some space and potential for change. These can be used as a basis for 
conceptualising a more positive energy security in practice, which will be discussed further 
in chapter six. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
US energy policy-making is a complicated process taking place in a wide variety of 
institutional locations. However, each administration tends to have a stance on energy 
security, accompanied by particular goals and emphasis. This is decided primarily in the 
White House, where the President together with his administration set the agenda. While 
energy security is rarely explicitly defined, policy choices and discourses clearly illustrate 
the centrality of supply and price stability. Overall, dominant themes in US energy security 
discourses between 2004 and 2012 all relate back to an understanding of energy security as 
                                                          
12
 This interviewee went on to note that ‘we never talk about coal, we talk about clean coal, and that 
includes, you know, carbon capture, utilisation and storage, CO2. So it’s in there, it's just kind of, assumes 
that it will happen along the way to new energy technologies’.  
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security of supplies at stable prices to the American state. While energy is rarely fully 
securitised, securitising moves are common, with clear links between energy and national 
security, as well as statements outlining energy as a key priority, emphasising urgency and 
survival, as well as the need for extraordinary action. These discourses work to enable 
particular policy practices, valuing the supply security of the state above environmental 
and human security. Ultimately, current US energy security discourses and policy practices 
take a narrow interpretation of security, whereby security equals reliable energy supplies at 
affordable prices, with no consideration of the consequences for environmental and human 
security.  
 
US energy security discourses and practices continue to rely on a traditional understanding 
of security
13
. Energy security is defined as national security, economic security, us/them, 
independence, ultimately ensuring that the American state has reliable energy supplies at 
stable/affordable prices. Overall, rather than producing security, policies undertaken in the 
name of energy security enable a continued focus on fossil fuels, particularly on increasing 
domestic production of these, causing human and environmental insecurity for individuals 
both within and outside the state. However, the existence of some alternative notions of 
energy security even in official discourse does suggest there is some space for change. 
This is discussed further in chapter six. Interestingly, one interviewee noted that we are in 
a period where understandings of energy security are changing – before, the definition of 
energy security was a sentence: ‘now it’s a sentence with a lot of commas’ (Interview 
2012e). 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 If US domestic fossil fuel production continues to increase, it is set to become a major energy exporter in 
the future. It will be interesting to see how much impact this will have on notions of energy security, though 
it has had very little impact so far. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Energy security in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at how China conceptualises and practices energy security. The focus 
here is on official discourses, and analysis is centred on speeches by leaders, policy 
documents, and government-approved news sources. For a discussion on the wider debate 
on energy security within China, see Kennedy (2010) who illustrates the multitude of 
voices weighing in on the energy security debate (Downs 2004: also provides a good 
discussion on this). Even within official discourses, like in the US, there are a number of 
voices, approaches and emphases on what energy security involves, and the focus here is 
on the dominant strands. 
 
It is argued here that China’s conceptualisation and practice of energy remains too 
narrowly focused on national security and economic goals; particularly continued 
economic growth. While there has been some change to include more focus on 
sustainability, security of supplies as stable prices for the Chinese state remains the key 
focus. In terms of the bigger picture, China’s understanding of energy security is similar to 
the US: identifying dependence on foreign states for supplies as bad and therefore 
continuing focus on increased domestic production of fossil fuels to achieve continued 
self-sufficiency in energy. However, when it comes to details and emphasis in key themes 
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they do differ somewhat, as can be seen throughout this chapter
1
. The chapter starts with a 
brief look at the energy policy-making process and the historical context of energy in 
China. It then turns to look at Chinese energy security policy practices in the period 2004-
2012, focusing on legislation and regulation, production and consumption, the policy-
making process, and the role of energy security in foreign policy. After this, it presents an 
analysis of the relevant energy security discourses, drawing out four key themes, before 
looking at some alternative official energy security discourses. 
 
5.1 Energy policy making in China 
Energy policy-making in China is a complex process with input from a number of agencies 
and government departments, as well as industry stakeholders. The top leadership set out 
the overall agenda and define energy security, setting targets for each five year period in 
terms of energy production and consumption by energy type, as well as efficiency and 
emissions. Politicians articulate and implement national energy policies, and in the process 
try to satisfy a wide range of interests (Zha 2013 forthcoming: 1). Policy debates in China 
differ from those in the United States, in that debates ‘are often hidden and the participants 
frequently do not acknowledge that differences of opinion exist’ (Downs 2004: 29). In 
practice, this means that rather than acknowledging differences of opinion openly, officials 
often ‘talk past’ each other (Downs 2004: 29) – as can be seen in the number of ‘key’ 
priorities identified by officials in this chapter. 
 
Problematically, China has not had an energy ministry since 1993, the same year as it 
turned from a net oil exporter to a net importer. Meanwhile, ‘debate over the necessity for 
                                                          
1
 To avoid over-emphasising the similarities between the two the discourse analysis and coding was 
undertaken using a separate NVivo database to allow codes to emerge from the data, while bearing in mind 
key areas of interest. 
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having a ministerial-level bureaucracy to govern the various components of the country’s 
energy industry has been ongoing and inconclusive…’ (Zha 2013 forthcoming: 1). Energy 
administration, policy and planning duties are now officially in the hands of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a government department responsible for 
national economic and social development. Within the NDRC, the National Energy 
Administration (NEA) is a sub-department in charge of energy policy since 2008, when it 
replaced the Energy Bureau (PRC NDRC 2012). The NEA has a broad mandate, including 
‘managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating 
with international energy agencies, and approving foreign energy investments’, but ‘lacks 
the authority, autonomy, manpower, and tools to deal with the country’s energy 
challenges’ (Downs 2008). 
 
On top of this, in 2010 a National Energy Commission was established, with the Prime 
Minister as its head ‘to step up strategic policy-making and coordination’(Xinhua 2010a). 
The Commission is responsible for ‘drafting national energy development plans, reviewing 
energy security and major energy issues and coordinating domestic energy development 
and international cooperation’, according to the State Office Information Council, and it is 
‘composed of 21 members from various government agencies’ (Xinhua 2010a). In 
practice, the Commission coordinates different departments work on energy, while the 
National Energy Administration in the NDRC carries out its daily duties (PRC NDRC 
2012). So far, ‘the commission has functioned on a crisis-driven basis ‘ (Zha 2013 
forthcoming: 1). 
 
Besides the NDRC’s National Energy Administration, a number of government 
departments play some role in energy policy, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
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Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection. Problematically for Chinese energy policy-making, the NDRC 
is a weak ministry (Downs 2008), and China has had difficulties in ‘finding an appropriate 
mechanism for governing its energy industry’ (Zha 2006a: 186). The lack of an energy 
ministry since 1993 ‘greatly reduces the value of strategic plans the central government 
wishes to implement’2 (Zha 2006a: 186). The main energy companies also play a role in 
forming energy policy. These include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
Sinopec, and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). They are partially 
independent and partially state-owned with some state financing. They are also ‘routinely 
consulted by the government on policy matters’ (Downs 2004: 25). Top staff ‘belong to 
the pool of high- ranking cadres’, but most of the companies are also publicly listed to 
various degrees, and thus also need to deliver profits to share-holders (Zha 2013 
forthcoming: 7). The relationship between these companies and the state is often debated 
and still evolving – they do not simply follow government dictates, but work quite 
independently – sometimes leading and pushing policy and occasionally even flouting 
government advice to ‘advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones’ (Downs 
2008). 
 
In terms of actual policy energy is still a relatively recent priority, and the first white paper 
on energy did not appear until 2007. Lots of agencies, bodies and officials were involved 
in the drafting of it, including ‘a team of experts and officials from the National People's 
Congress (NPC), the top legislature, and the State Council’ together with the National 
Energy Commission under the Prime Minister (PRC Central Government 2005a). The 
                                                          
2
 Problems in energy policy-administration are long-standing. As noted by Zha, ‘the Ministry of Fuel 
Industries was abolished in 1955, when separate ministries for coal, electricity and oil were established. In 
1970, a new Ministry of Fuel and Chemical Industries combined the functions of those three ministries, but it 
had to be dissolved five years later. In 1988, a Ministry of Energy was launched to oversee coal, oil, nuclear 
and hydroelectric development, but it was again dissolved in 1993’ (Zha 2006: 186). 
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2007 white paper pointed to the need to strengthen energy legislation ‘to provide a legal 
guarantee for increasing the energy supply, standardizing the energy market, optimizing 
the energy structure and maintaining energy security’ (PRC NDRC 2007a). Likewise 
marketisation of the energy industry is considered a priority, but alongside ‘national 
energy management’, which remains key to ensuring energy security (PRC NDRC 2007b). 
The same areas were noted in the 2012 white paper on energy, noting that markets 
‘playing an increasingly important role in resource allocation’. It emphasised the need for 
continuing work on legal reform to regulate the energy market alongside marketization of 
the energy industry, together with the need to improve energy administration and 
management (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I and VIII). End-use energy prices 
are still regulated by the government (Zha 2013 forthcoming: 3), though the pricing system 
differs depending on the energy type (Li 2011: 13). 
 
Overall, there is a lack of clear administration, though energy security and policy 
objectives are increasingly set out in white papers by central government and the National 
Energy Commission with input from the NEA as well as other government departments, 
bodies and institutions. There is no one meaning of energy security, rather this is made up 
of a number of policy priorities which will be discussed in more detail later.  
 
5.2 Historical context: energy in China 
China was relatively late to industrialise, and as a result energy security only really became 
an area of attention in 1993, when it went from being a net oil exporter to being a net oil 
importer (Lee 2005: 265). While China was self-sufficient in energy from the 1950s until 
the early 1970s, ‘Soviet-supplied oil and technological assistance for developing the 
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Chinese oil industry’ was essential for both achieving and maintaining self-sufficiency 
(Zha 2006a: 179). However, 
By the mid-1970s, the economy was on the verge of collapse. China had energy self-sufficiency but 
not energy security. Improvements in China’s international relations in the early 1970s led to an 
expansion of the Chinese economy. China lost self-sufficiency in energy but gained improvement in 
energy security (Zha 2006a: 179) 
 
Moreover, oil and coal played ‘a valuable strategic purpose for Beijing, helping renew 
links with the world’s industrialised economies’  as it exported oil in Asia  (Zha 2006a: 
180). With industrialisation and opening up from the late 1980s energy demand increased, 
and China became increasingly reliant on imports of crude and processed fuels (Zha 
2006a: 180). Interestingly, ‘for much of its contemporary history, China treated fossil fuels 
as just another set of ordinary commodities…[u]ntil the 1990s, oil, coal, minerals, grain, 
and other raw materials made up more than half of the total value of exports’ (Zha 2013 
forthcoming: 4). As a result, energy was long characterised as a ‘domestic economic 
development issue’ rather than an issue of national security, with a few exceptions 
including pipeline locations or border disputes where energy resources play a part (Zhang 
2011).  
 
There was another big change in 2004 when China experienced an energy demand shock 
which changed thinking on energy security. From focusing solely on growing oil imports 
in energy security discussions 10-15 years ago, there was a recognition of the need to 
change consumption patterns and look at other sources of energy to ensure continued 
economic growth, so in a sense the demand shock broadened the energy security debate in 
China (Interview 2012f)
3
. Because of this change there was a break between the 10th 
(2001-2005) and the 11th (2006-2010) Five Year Plans - by the 11th there was a new focus 
                                                          
3
 There is some debate over this – others interviewed for this research suggest the Chinese leadership is still 
very strongly focused on security of oil supplies in energy security debates. 
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on changing energy consumption patterns and reducing energy intensity. The 12th Five 
Year Plan (2011-2015) can be seen as a continuation of this but with actual quantitative 
targets (Interview 2012f). China, like the US, has seen competing discourses promoting 
market/liberal or strategic/realist approaches to energy security with their accompanying 
policy suggestions (Downs 2004: 22), but in terms of policy practice China has pursued a 
similar approach to the US, combining the two in a hybrid strategy, sometimes referred to 
as ‘hedging’ (Tunsjo 2010). Overall, ‘Chinese understanding and practices of energy 
security are evolutionary…[t]here has not been and will likely be no straightforward path 
of energy policies, in either domestic or overseas realms’ (Zha 2013 forthcoming: 1). 
However, it is clear that energy security is increasingly important to China, and it 
underpins not just economic and national security, but also the political survival of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) (Leung 2011). Ultimately, ‘a reliable and adequate 
supply of oil at reasonable prices is crucial to national values and objectives and underpins, 
in part, the party’s governance’ (Leung 2011: 1332). 
 
Statistics on China’s energy consumption and production vary, and often rely on different 
measures. There are also often accusations of government tampering with statistics, but 
reliability has improved in recent years.  
For a long time China has been relying largely on domestic energy resources to develop its 
economy. The rate of self-sufficiency has been above 90%, much higher than that in most 
developed countries. China became the world's largest energy producer during the 11th Five-Year 
period [2005-2010] with a strong foundation for energy production and supply (Li 2011: 9).  
 
This period saw huge increases in domestic production of coal, doubled gas production, 
and some increase in oil production, and a big growth in renewable energy (Li 2011: 9-12). 
According to one source, China’s primary energy consumption increased from 0.57 to 3.25 
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billion ton coal equivalents between 1978 and 2010 (Fan and Xia 2012: 23)
4
. China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics put 2011 total primary energy consumption at ‘3.48 billion 
tonnes of standard coal equivalent (btsce) in 2011, a 7 percent increase from the previous 
year. Domestic production stood at 3.18 btsce. This means that roughly 9 percent of total 
energy consumption came from imports’ (Zha 2013 forthcoming: 2). While coal is 
domestically produced, more than half of oil consumption relies on imports (IEA 2012: 4). 
As a result, oil is often at the centre of Chinese energy security discussions (Leung 2011: 
1330). ‘Energy security’ has been a ‘buzzword’ in China since 2000, when oil imports 
doubled (Leung 2011: 1331).  
 
5.3 Chinese energy security policy 2004-2012 
This section focuses on legislation and regulation, consumption and production, change 
and continuity in the policy-making process, and the role of energy in foreign policy. 
 
5.3.1 Legislation and regulation 
This section will focus on the two white papers on energy that have been released by the 
central government, before briefly looking at other relevant legislation. The white papers 
on energy set out the broad aims and course for energy policy, including guidelines and 
regulations for energy industries, and tend to follow after five year plans, with the first 
appearing in 2007 and the second in 2012. The white papers have provided a more 
coordinated direction for China’s energy policy, though calls for reform in the energy 
policy-making process continue.  
 
                                                          
4
 IEA measures this using TOE (tons of oil equivalent), to a consumption increase from 420 million toe (tons 
of oil equivalent) in 1980 to 2,150 million toe in 2009 (IEA 2012). 
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Appearing in 2007, the first white paper on energy was titled ‘China’s energy conditions 
and policies’, and it set out the overall strategy and goals of energy development; 
emphasising conservation, increasing supply capacity, improving energy technologies, 
coordinating energy and environmental development, deepening energy system reform and 
strengthening international cooperation on energy (PRC NDRC 2007a). There was a focus 
on demand reduction and efficiency, reducing reliance on foreign oil and reducing 
dependence on coal. Overall, it avoided quantitative goals, focusing on more generic aims, 
such as, ‘by 2010 the energy supply will basically meet the demands of national economic 
and social development; and obvious progress will have been made in energy 
conservation’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: 13). The main exceptions to this are reiterations of the 
goals already outlined in other plans, specifying a reduction in per-unit GDP consumption 
of energy of 20% from 2005 to 2010, and a 10% reduction in total amount of major 
pollutants discharged (PRC NDRC 2007a: 13); as well as reiterating the goal of 10% 
increase in renewable energy consumption by 2010 and 15% by 2020 (PRC NDRC 2007a: 
23). 
 
The 2012 white paper on energy was titled ‘China’s energy policy 2012’. It contains 
similar key sections to the 2007 white paper, including continued focus on conservation 
and improving energy technology and strengthening international energy cooperation. It 
also has the following additions: ‘vigorously developing new and renewable energy, 
promoting clean development of fossil energy; improving universal energy service…[and] 
deepening institutional reform in the energy sector’ (PRC Central Government 2012b). 
Like the 2007 white paper, it also contains reiterations of goals set out in the preceding 
(12
th)
 Five Year Plan (2011-2015), though this time these goals are more specific, targeting 
consumption patterns in terms of energy type: ‘by 2015 non-fossil energy will rise to 11.4 
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percent in the national total primary energy consumption, energy consumption per unit of 
GDP will drop by 16 percent from 2010, and CO2 emission per unit of GDP will decrease 
by 17 percent from 2010’. Likewise, ‘by 2020 non-fossil energy will account for 15 
percent of its total primary energy consumption, and CO2 emission per unit of GDP will 
be 40-45 percent lower than in 2005’ (both PRC Central Government 2012b: section II). It 
also contains more specific goals for each energy industry. It specifically addresses the 
problem of energy regulation in China, mentioning ongoing work on an energy law, 
improvements to the ‘energy-related legal regime to regulate the energy market’ and the 
need to ‘strengthen administration’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section X). 
 
Other relevant legislation includes the Renewable Energy Law finalised in 2006, which set 
targets giving ‘first priority to the exploitation of renewable energy and promotes the 
establishment and expansion of the market for renewable energy by setting objectives for 
the total volumes of the renewable energy to be exploited and taking appropriate measures’ 
(PRC National People's Congress 2007). It ‘comprises the legal framework for China’s 
renewable energy policies…[covering] all relevant regulations, sectoral targets, 
development plans, fiscal and subsidy policies, and national standards’ (Li 2011: 25). 
Likewise, China’s Energy Conservation Law was redrafted in 2007, coming into effect 
2008. This set out changes to administration of energy conservation, and stipulations by 
sector for improving conservation and efficiency (PRC National People's Congress 2009). 
It also referred to conservation of resources as ‘a fundamental State policy’ (article 4, PRC 
National People's Congress 2009). National targets feature clearly in these laws, showing a 
new and clear commitment to renewable energy and conservation. 
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5.3.2 Production and consumption 
In terms of energy production, China still relies largely (around 90%) on domestically 
produced energy, with a heavy focus on coal (PRC NDRC 2007a: 12). Figure 5.1 below 
shows IEA estimates of energy production changes since 1971. Production and 
consumption patterns depend largely on domestic resources, with the government playing 
a key role in setting targets for all the relevant energy industries, as well as providing fiscal 
and tax incentives to keep production and consumption in line with national targets. 
 
China is facing large increases in energy demand with increasing economic growth, though 
efforts have been made to limit consumption increases through improved efficiency and 
conservation. It also aims to increase domestic production to meet growing demand. Oil 
production has declined as a percentage of total production, with increasing reliance on 
imported oil (Fan and Xia 2012). China is also on schedule to meet renewable energy 
targets set out in the Renewable Energy Law, and aims to increase shale gas exploration 
and production.  
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(Figure 5.1: IEA 2013a) 
 
 
In terms of consumption, China continues to rely heavily on coal, and its central place in 
China’s energy mixture ‘will remain unchanged for a long time to come’ (PRC NDRC 
2007a), though environmental considerations increasingly call this into question. In terms 
of the overall mixture of sources of energy supply, it has remained relatively unchanged in 
the period studied here, though total primary consumption has increased heavily, as 
discussed in the previous section – Figure 5.2 below shows International Energy Agency 
(IEA) estimates of China’s total primary energy supply. 
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(Figure 5.2: IEA 2013c)
5
 
 
 
Growing energy demand is an increasing problem for China, and there is recognition that 
‘energy consumption has grown too quickly in recent years, increasing the strain on energy 
supply…[f]ossil energy resources have been exploited on a large scale, causing a certain 
amount of damage to the eco-environment’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface). As 
a result, there have been some calls for controls on energy consumption – in 2011, a senior 
NEA official said the government will ‘boost energy production and control consumption’, 
though no consumption control target was specified (Xinhua 2011a). This was reiterated at 
the National Party Congress in November 2012, where outgoing President Hu stated: ‘[w]e 
should launch a revolution in energy production and consumption, impose a ceiling on 
total energy consumption, save energy and reduce its consumption’ (Hu 2012). However, 
it is worth noting that the focus on conservation and efficiency has made some impact – 
                                                          
5
 Figures exclude electricity trade. 
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between 1978 and 2005 ‘China's primary energy consumption rose by 5.16 percent on 
average each year, while GDP grew by 9.6 percent’ (Yang 2007).  
 
In terms of changing patterns of consumption, there are also more recent calls to increase 
natural gas consumption in China in order to reduce reliance on coal, from the current 4% 
to 8% during the  12th Five-Year Period (2011-2015), according to Wu Yin, deputy head 
of the NEA (Xinhua 2010b). While China remains largely self-sufficient in energy, 
meeting around 90% of its consumption through domestic production, imports of oil are 
becoming increasingly important.  
 
5.3.3 Policy-making process  
There are increasing calls for strengthening China’s energy policy-making process, 
including legal reform to improve regulation of the market, and energy administration and 
management (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I and VIII). Institutional change 
and continuity has been largely covered in the earlier part of this chapter, but it is worth 
noting that the energy planning and policy-making process is continually evolving, with 
increasing importance placed on energy governance. The 2012 white paper on energy in 
particular made this a clear priority, emphasising the need to ‘strengthen top design and 
overall planning’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section VIII). This can also be seen in 
the 2010 creation of the National Energy Commission, headed by the Prime Minister and 
including key staff in the NDRC, the NEA, as well as other government departments 
(Xinhua 2010a). It’s members also include the minister for state security and the head of 
the People’s Liberation Army (Bradsher 2010). The creation of the new Commission to 
oversee and coordinate energy policy above ministerial-level shows just how important 
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energy has become. However, the NEC has so far worked largely on a crisis-driven basis 
(Zha 2013 forthcoming: 1).  
 
Like in the US there is some division between staff working on energy security and staff 
working on environmental issues, particularly before the 11
th
 Five Year Plan, which began 
in 2006 (Interview 2012e). From 2007 onwards, there was more coordination between the 
NDRC and the Ministry of Environmental Protection as their objectives under the Plan 
coincided (Interview 2012e). 
 
5.3.4 Energy security and foreign policy 
Energy security is a major part of Chinese foreign policy, playing a key part both in 
China’s bilateral relations with other states and in its international engagement. It is 
mentioned as a key issue in most international speeches by Chinese officials, ranging from 
diplomats and ambassadors to PM Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao at G8 meetings, 
BRICS summits, the United Nations, and so on. China also has a number of bilateral 
strategic partnerships where energy plays a major role, both with energy exporters and 
others, including the US and the EU (PRC NDRC 2006). This is discussed further in under 
theme number three, below – the need for a stable international environment and energy 
cooperation. In this sense, maintaining political stability in oil rich areas is also constructed 
as key for ensuring energy security (Xinhua 2006a). 
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5.4 Energy security in official discourse 2004-2012
6
 
Chinese official discourse contains a number of themes relevant to understanding how 
energy security is viewed in China. As early as 2005, the head of the Energy Bureau in the 
NDRC, Xu Dingming, pointed to the need for a new energy law ‘to ensure our energy 
security’ (PRC Central Government 2005a). He went on to suggest that the focus of the 
law, which is still forthcoming at the time of writing, would likely ‘include principles of 
energy saving, cleaner utilization and security’, all emphasised by top leadership  (PRC 
Central Government 2005a). While China’s self-sufficiency in energy is often emphasised, 
the stability of international energy markets is increasingly highlighted as a central concern 
for Chinese energy security (PRC NDRC 2005). Following this, Chinese energy security 
strategy includes a combination of ‘co-ordinating domestic development and external 
cooperation’ (PRC NDRC 2005). In 2006, Hu Jintao summarised China’s energy strategy 
as follows: ‘Give high priority to conservation, rely mainly on domestic supply, develop 
diverse energy resources, protect the environment, step up international cooperation of 
mutual benefit and ensure the stable supply of economical and clean energies’ (PRC 
Foreign Ministry 2006). It is clear that while China is largely self-sufficient in energy, 
security of oil supplies and the stability of the oil market are both increasing priorities – 
alongside retaining self-sufficiency. 
 
This section draws out four key themes in Chinese energy security discourses, each of 
which has a number of sub-themes: firstly supply security and price security; the 
                                                          
6 Chinese discourses also continually repeat a focus on science and technology as key to ensuring energy 
security. This is a common trope in Marxist discourse, however, so isn’t dealt with a separate theme here. It 
includes a focus on energy research and development (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). The 2007 white paper 
notes China’s ‘conspicuous scientific and technological achievements relating to energy’, particularly oil, 
gas, and coal exploration and development, enabled by China’s ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ (PRC 
NDRC 2007a: section I). It contains statements like the following: ‘science and technology is the primary 
productive force and the main motive force of energy development’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: section V). The 
2012 white paper similarly reiterated China’s commitment to the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development as its 
guiding principle’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface). 
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importance of energy to national security and economic growth; the need for a stable 
international environment; and lastly energy self-sufficiency. After this, it briefly discusses 
alternative official constructions of energy security, focusing on economic and social 
development, world energy security, sustainability and energy and the environment. The 
empirical focus is primarily on China’s two energy white papers, but also covers a number 
of official speeches on energy by key actors, including President Hu Jintao and Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao. 
 
5.4.1 Supply security and price security 
Supply and price security play a key part in China’s energy security discourses, 
particularly with increasing dependence on oil imports and international markets, so it has 
become more and more important over time (Interview with Gao 2012). Supply, 
particularly of oil, is a key concern, and largely takes priority over price stability. 
Ultimately, ‘China has a closer relationship with the global energy market now…so in that 
sense it is quite similar to the US, secure supplies at stable prices are important’ (Interview 
with Gao 2012)
7
.  
 
China’s energy supply story is one of increasing tension between supply and demand. The 
period between 2004 and 2012 has seen growing marketisation of the domestic energy 
industry, together with increasing interaction with the international energy market. Rapid 
development has led to huge growth in consumption, putting heavy pressure on supply 
capacity (PRC NDRC 2005) as well as increasing environmental pressure due to China’s 
heavy reliance on coal. Reliance on domestic sources forms the core of China’s energy 
supply strategy, and is articulated repeatedly in the vast majority of statements - this will 
                                                          
7
 Downs (2004: 31) also makes the case that Chinese analysts and policy-makers consider oil price volatility 
and physical supply disruptions to be 'the main threats to energy security'. 
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be discussed in more detail under self-sufficiency. While the focus remains on domestic 
supply and China is said to be ‘striving to ensure a stable supply of energy with a steady 
increase in domestic energy production’ according to the 2007 white paper (PRC NDRC 
2007a: 11), increasing imports has led to growing attention on global energy supply 
markets. One of the earlier reports on energy security, produced by Vice Premier Zeng in 
2005
8, summarised China’s energy issues accordingly: ‘the demand for energy has 
outstripped supply…[and] changes in the international energy market are having more 
impact on China's domestic energy market’ (PRC Central Government 2005b). Clearly, 
supply security is becoming increasingly important. Zeng suggested that ‘domestic energy 
supply should be improved to ensure energy security’ (PRC Central Government 2005b). 
He also pointed to continued development of the coal industry in China as necessary to 
ensure security of supplies, as China’s domestic oil and gas resources are relatively poor, 
and increasing reliance on oil imports means energy supply is affected by changes in 
international oil supply (NDRC 2005). Thus, because coal is domestically available, China 
should take full advantage of domestic coal resources to reduce dependence on foreign oil 
imports (NDRC 2005). Because of increasing reliance on imported oil and concerns over 
energy supplies, China also began building up strategic oil reserves in 2004, in case of 
emergency supply disruptions (Yang 2008). This dual attention to domestic and 
international supply security is evident throughout the period under study, despite China’s 
high rate of energy self-sufficiency. 
 
The 2007 white paper on energy likewise presented improving and increasing supply 
capacity as a central goal of energy policy, in the process of which China will continue to 
‘rely mainly on domestic energy resources’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: 20). To achieve increased 
                                                          
8
 Zeng Peiyan was Vice Premier of the State Council 2003-2008. 
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supply the white paper proposes increasing coal supply while reducing pollution (2007a: 
21), ‘expediting development of oil and gas’ (2007a: 22), and ‘vigorously developing 
renewable energy’, said to be a ‘strategic choice’ to reduce tension between supply and 
demand and to achieved sustainable development (2007a: 23). Meanwhile, diversification 
remains a key part of supply security, both in terms of different types of domestic sources 
and in the case of imports, both to different types of energy sources and in terms of 
locations and transportation channels (IEA 2010; Xinhua 2008). The focus on supply 
continued, and in 2011 the deputy director of the NEA stated that the government would 
‘boost energy production and control consumption’ ‘to ensure energy supplies in 2011’ 
(Xinhua 2011a). Later in the year the head of the NEA suggested controls on consumption 
were necessary as ‘energy security is our permanent concern as our country's natural 
resources are inadequate’ (Xinhua 2011b). In early 2012 he outlined plans for ‘boosting 
reserves of oil, natural gas and coal in 2012’, all in the name of ensuring ‘a stable energy 
supply’ (Xinhua 2012). The 2012 white paper pointed to increasing strain on energy 
supplies caused by growing consumption (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface). It 
also mentions ‘grave challenges to energy security’, listing China’s increasing dependence 
on ‘foreign energy sources’ in recent years, particularly oil (PRC Central Government 
2012b: section I). It continues the focus on domestic supplies, suggesting that ‘as a large 
developing country with a population of over 1.3 billion, China must rely on itself to 
increase the energy supply steadily to satisfy such demands’ (PRC Central Government 
2012b: section V). However, a later section links back to the international, stating that 
‘energy security is a global issue. Few countries can secure their energy supply without 
international cooperation’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section IX).  
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Overall, the key threats to domestic supply security that are discussed are growing 
domestic demand, low efficiency and lack of resources, as well as environmental pressure. 
In terms of international supply security, the threat referenced is increasing dependence on 
foreign oil and gas, and unstable international markets, as well as potential political 
instability in energy-exporting regions (PRC NDRC 2005, 2007a).  
 
The other side of this theme is price security. Concerns over price stability largely relate to 
imports and therefore primarily oil, as China’s domestic energy prices remain partly state-
regulated though there is increasing marketization of prices. International energy prices 
have remained a concern throughout the period under study. At an APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation) summit in 2005, President Hu stated that ‘[s]ince 2004, the surge 
of oil prices in the international market has affected the economic growth of the whole 
world, developing countries in particular’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2005). This is a clear 
concern for China, and the following year Hu reiterated similar feelings at a G8 meeting, 
pointing to rising prices as hurting ‘the interests of both oil producers and consumers…the 
international community needs to…take a comprehensive approach to address the 
problem’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). The international dimension is clear here, as 
increasing marketisation within China as well as increasing reliance on imported oil have 
made China more vulnerable to volatile international energy markets. China’s 2012 
position paper to the UN similarly pointed to the need for cooperation to stabilise prices:  
Joint efforts must be made to stabilize the prices of energy and other commodities and prevent 
excessive speculation and market hype, so as to meet the energy demands of all countries, 
particularly the developing countries, and maintain order in the energy market (PRC Central 
Government 2012a) 
 
The impact of international energy prices on domestic supply are considered increasingly 
serious, with the 2012 white paper suggesting that ‘price fluctuations in the international 
energy market make it more difficult to guarantee domestic energy supply…[i]t will not be 
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easy for China to maintain its energy security since its energy [read oil] reserves are small 
and its emergency response capability is weak’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section 
I). Furthermore, China’s white papers highlight the need to marketise China’s domestic 
energy system, including price reforms (PRC Central Government 2012b; see also 
Kennedy 2010). However, the focus of discourses on prices remains on the international 
level, with pledges for China to work with other countries ‘to maintain stability of the 
international energy market and energy prices’ (PRC Central Government 2012b).  
 
The key threat identified here is rising prices which damage economic growth. Soaring 
international oil prices are said to threaten supply (Xinhua 2006b). Meanwhile, because of 
the volatility of the international market there are calls for continued or even increased 
reliance on domestic coal, as it is cheaper than importing oil or gas and not subject to 
volatile international prices (NDRC 2005). Ultimately, the focus on supply and price 
security enables a continued focus on domestic production and consumption of fossil fuels. 
 
5.4.2 Importance of energy: national security and economic growth 
Energy is essential for maintaining both economic security and national security (PRC 
NDRC 2005), though the two are hard to separate. Like in the US, energy security as a 
term is commonly used. This section looks at how energy is constructed as important, as 
essential for national security and economic growth, in which the role of energy in 
development plays an important part. 
 
A 2003 report from China’s Energy Strategy and Policy Research Group noted that 
‘energy security, especially oil security, is increasingly important’ (Chen et al. 2003). 
Likewise, the 2007 white paper states that ‘energy is an essential material basis for human 
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survival and development’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: preface). In a 2011 white paper on China’s 
development, energy is listed as a ‘common security issue’ that states need to cooperate 
on, alongside other common security challenges including terrorism, financial crisis, and 
climate change. These are listed as common security threats ‘to the world’, and ‘have a 
major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social development’ (PRC 
Central Government 2011: section IV). In a speech to the EU in 2012, China’s (then) 
Prime Minister in-waiting Li Keqiang noted that ‘China attaches great importance to 
energy supply and security, as energy provides the basic conditions for economic and 
social development’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2012a). This idea has been reiterated in a 
number of venues, including at the UN (PRC Central Government 2012a). Energy appears 
to be rising in importance in China, and in the 2012 white paper it was said to be ‘the vital 
material base for China to modernize and build a moderately prosperous society’ (PRC 
Central Government 2012b: conclusion).  
 
Energy is also increasingly linked with national security, and often referred to directly as a 
security issue, both in domestic statements and international speeches – at the UN in 2005 
President Hu listed energy security as a non-traditional security issue posing a ‘severe 
challenge’ to development (Hu 2005a). There have been repeated calls for a law to ensure 
energy security (PRC Central Government 2005a). Energy security is now considered a 
key issue for the policy agenda, and as required to maintain both ‘economic security and 
national security’ (PRC NDRC 2006). Even energy efficiency is considered a strategic 
issue (PRC Central Government 2006b). Energy is consistently listed as a new or ‘non-
traditional’ security threat by officials. The 2012 white paper reiterates this, calling energy 
‘a major strategic issue for China’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface), noting 
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China’s growing ‘dependence on foreign energy sources’, with a special emphasis on 
imported petroleum (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I).  
 
The role energy plays in economic growth and economic and social development is 
continually highlighted in these discourses. Economic growth as emphasised here is often 
national, but sometimes also global, with statements like the following: 
We should step up worldwide energy dialogue and cooperation, jointly maintain energy security and 
energy market stability, and ensure a well-supplied, secure, cost-effective and clean energy 
environment conducive to global economic growth (Hu 2005b) 
 
At an APEC summit the same year, Hu noted the need to address ‘the growing constraint 
of energy, resources and environment on economic development’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 
2005). Likewise, he pointed to energy as a ‘global issue’, ‘indispensably linked with world 
economic development’, and said that the international community needs to handle the 
energy issue well ‘to achieve balanced and orderly growth in the world economy’  (PRC 
Foreign Ministry 2005). Energy is noted as a key issue when it comes to ensuring 
continued economic growth, with energy conservation and cutting pollution noted as 
important while making ‘arduous effort to ensure that China's economy keeps steady and 
fairly fast growth’ (Hu at APEC, PRC Foreign Ministry 2007). As part of this, Xi Jinping 
(then President in-waiting) said in 2008 that ‘China will try to meet the demands for 
economic growth and the improvement of people's life by increasing domestic energy 
supply’ (Xinhua 2008). As part of this, China will continue to rely on coal to fuel 
economic growth, though in a ‘greener fashion’ (Xinhua 2010c). 
 
As a part of the link between energy and economic growth, energy is also said to be linked 
with economic development (PRC Foreign Ministry 2005). The 2007 white paper on 
energy sets out ‘developing its economy and eliminating poverty’ as the main task for the 
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Chinese government  (PRC NDRC 2007a: preface). China’s pursuit of a ‘stable, 
economical, clean and safe energy supply system’ is done to ‘support the sustained 
economic and social development’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: section II). Economic and social 
development remains key to China’s energy industry targets (PRC NDRC 2007a: section 
II). The link between energy and development is central to justifications for increasing 
energy consumption, and is a key theme in the discourses surveyed. In 2012, Li Keqiang 
noted, 
As one of the major economies and the biggest developing country in the world, China attaches 
great importance to energy supply and security, as energy provides the basic conditions for 
economic and social development (PRC Foreign Ministry 2012a) 
 
Likewise, the 2012 white paper retained this focus on development, noting that energy is 
‘an indispensable basic condition for the development of modern society’ (PRC Central 
Government 2012b: preface). This is often also linked back to the international level, with 
statements like, ‘China's energy development not only guarantees domestic economic and 
social development, but also makes significant contributions to global energy security’ 
(PRC Central Government 2012b: section I).  
 
Chinese discourses on energy continually represent energy as important, as an issue of 
human survival, as well as necessary for national security and for economic growth, which 
is often linked with development. It is becoming increasingly important due to growing 
consumption. The focus on economic growth enables continuing focus on production and 
consumption of fossil fuels in the name of economic growth and development. The key 
threat evident in this theme is lack of economic growth, which would have a serious 
impact on political legitimacy and national security. Occasionally, growing consumption is 
also noted as a threat. Interestingly, while the state remains the focus as referent object to 
be secured in energy terms, two other referent objects are also present in these discourses – 
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global energy security is frequently promoted, and energy is also occasionally linked with 
human survival.  
 
5.4.3 The importance of a stable international environment  
The need for a stable international environment and cooperation to ensure energy security 
is another key theme in Chinese energy security discourses. It is closely linked with the 
growing emphasis on stable international markets to avoid price volatility for imported oil. 
An important sub-theme in this area is the idea of global, or ‘common’, energy security, 
which will be discussed at the end. 
 
Cooperation on energy is particularly emphasised by leaders in speeches with an 
international audience. The global nature of energy security is emphasised, particularly 
with both increasing marketisation of energy within China and with increasing reliance on 
imports, as China becomes more vulnerable to unstable international energy markets. A 
number of aspects for cooperation are noted, including ‘protection, conservation of energy 
as well as the development of new energy’ (Wen 2004). Overall, ‘China is ready to 
strengthen energy dialogue and cooperation with all countries, to jointly maintain energy 
security and stability of the world’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2005). Energy director Zhou 
called ensuring ‘world supply capacity through sufficient investment in energy production’ 
one of China’s key objectives in international energy cooperation (PRC Central 
Government 2006a). Energy was emphasised in a number of bilateral meetings with both 
energy producers and consumers, including Japan and South Korea, India, the US, the EU, 
and Saudi Arabia.  
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It is often noted that China needs to get more involved in international energy 
organisations, including the IEA, of which China is still not a member (PRC NDRC 2006). 
The 2007 white paper points to ‘strengthening international cooperation in the field of 
energy’ as a key priority (PRC NDRC 2007a: section VIII). It also suggests that, 
The international community should work collaboratively to maintain stability in oil producing and 
exporting countries, especially those in the Middle East, to ensure the security of international 
energy transport routes and avoid geopolitical conflicts that affect the world’s energy supply (PRC 
NDRC 2007a) 
 
The emphasis on cooperation is tied in with a desire to not be considered a threat, as can be 
seen in a number of statements, including an NDRC official pointing to the white paper as 
increasing transparency which should aid cooperation and show that China is not a threat, 
as when ‘it comes to international energy cooperation, China's development is inseparable 
from the world’ (PRC NDRC 2007b). There is continued emphasis on China’s desire to 
‘enhance energy dialogue and cooperation with other nations’, (Xinhua 2010e). Areas 
where cooperation is continually emphasised include policy coordination to ensure supply 
and stable international markets, as well as dealing with energy emergencies (Xinhua 
2006c; see also Hu 2011a). Joint efforts to stabilise energy supply to meet all countries’ 
energy demands is also key (PRC Central Government 2012a). 
 
The emphasis on cooperation remains key in the 2012 white paper (PRC Central 
Government 2012b: section II), which notes that ‘China did not, does not and will not pose 
any threat to the world's energy security’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: conclusion). It 
also states that China  
will further strengthen its cooperation with other energy producing and consuming countries as well as 
international energy organizations, and work together with them to promote a sustainable energy 
development around the world. It will strive to maintain stability of the international energy market and 
energy prices, secure the international energy transportation routes, and make due contributions to 
safeguarding international energy security and addressing global climate change (PRC Central 
Government 2012b: conclusion). 
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However, while some discourses emphasise cooperation and reliance on international 
markets, there is also a perception that while there is scope for cooperation between China 
and the United States on energy, their bargaining power is asymmetric, and therefore 
‘there is a need to rely on international organisations to achieve China's national interests’ 
in order to avoid disadvantage (PRC NDRC 2006). Likewise, it is widely accepted that 
‘energy is clearly also a geopolitical issue’ (Interview 2012i). In this sense, the state and 
national security remains at the centre of Chinese notions of energy security. More 
recently, China appears not only interested in expanded cooperation, but also in pursuing 
increased global energy governance. In 2012, Wen Jiabao suggested that in order to 
‘stabilize the oil and natural gas markets, we may consider establishing, under the G20 
framework, a global energy market governance mechanism…under the principle of mutual 
benefit’ (Wen 2012). 
 
Lastly, the emphasis on cooperation and a stable international environment links with a 
focus on the idea of global, or shared, energy security. This is particularly common in 
speeches by leaders abroad. Calls for more dialogue are a key feature of this, and though 
global energy security becomes slightly less of a focus after 2010 the emphasis on 
cooperation and dialogue remains (for example, see Hu 2011c). At a G8 meeting, 
President Hu Jintao stated that ‘to ensure global energy security, we need to develop and 
implement a new energy security concept that calls for mutually beneficial 
cooperation…global energy security is crucial to ensuring the economic growth and 
people's livelihood of all countries and to maintaining peace and stability and promoting 
common development’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). The need to maintain global energy 
security is often linked to high oil prices and the need for dialogue to stabilise the markets 
(PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). It involves both increased dialogue between consumers and 
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producers, and increased oil and gas exploitation to increase global supply to meet global 
demand at reasonable prices (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). The 2012 white paper likewise 
mentions the need for ‘working together to maintain energy security’ including managing 
energy to ensure a stable global market and working together to avoid disruptions to 
supply (PRC Central Government 2012b: Section IX).  
 
Interestingly, this theme shows a number of referent objects for energy security, 
particularly evident in statements such as ‘[Prime Minister] Wen pointed out that energy 
security is of great significance to the national economy and the people's livelihood as well 
as to ensuring a full recovery and long-term development of the world economy’ (PRC 
Foreign Ministry 2012b). It is heavily related to market and price security, as well as 
strategic supply security, as a stable international environment and international 
cooperation over energy underpins all of these.  
 
5.4.4 Energy self-sufficiency and the importance of domestic supply
9
 
Continued reliance on domestic supply is another key feature in Chinese energy security 
discourses. It also links in with the desire for China to not be considered a threat 
internationally, due to widespread international concern that China may buy up energy 
sources abroad thus taking them out of the international market. This section will discuss 
three subthemes, starting with the emphasis on self-sufficiency in energy. It then discusses 
the continuing focus on traditional sources of energy, before pointing to recent emphasis 
on new or ‘alternative’ energy.  
 
                                                          
9
 This theme is very similar to US energy independence discourses. The title chosen here is different as the 
term ‘energy independence’ is not commonly used in China. 
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The role of the ‘domestic’ and self-sufficiency is key throughout the time period studied. 
Because of the problems of relying on the international market (price volatility and 
potential for supply disruption) self-sufficiency remains central to any discussion about 
China’s energy security. At APEC in 2005, Hu Jintao declared that, 
 
Since the 1990s, China has always met over 90% of its overall energy needs on its own. As a 
country with coal dominating its energy structure, China still has a huge potential for domestic 
energy supply (PRC Foreign Ministry 2005).  
 
In the same year, Vice Premier Zeng also suggested that China needs ‘security of supply 
based on domestic production’ (PRC NDRC 2005). The focus on the domestic as secure is 
key, with assistant foreign minister Cui stating that ‘the government aimed to meet its 
energy demands with domestic supplies, and would tap more resources and economize on 
consumption’ (Xinhua 2006a). China’s reliance on domestic sources is also often cited to 
explain why China is not a threat to global energy security (Ma 2007; PRC NDRC 2007b). 
The 2007 white paper also cites China’s reliance on ‘domestic energy resources’, repeating 
again China’s 90% self-sufficiency (PRC NDRC 2007a: section IV), a statistic cited in 
most speeches and documents discussing China’s supplies and energy security. In a speech 
in 2008, Xi Jinping (then Vice President) also emphasised the need to increase domestic 
supply, stating that ‘China will try to meet the demands for economic growth and the 
improvement of people's life by increasing domestic energy supply’ (Xinhua 2008). 
Boosting domestic production of coal, as well as importing more coal, and increased 
domestic oil and gas exploration are seen as essential to ensure energy supplies due to 
growing demand (Xinhua 2011a). The 2012 white paper reiterated that ‘as the world's 
largest energy producer, China mainly relies on its own strength to develop energy, and its 
rate of self-sufficiency has reached around 90 percent’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: 
section I). This is later reinforced as a key part of China’s energy strategy: 
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The country relies on domestic resource advantages…makes special efforts to enhance its energy 
supply capability and security, improves its emergency energy reserve and emergency response 
systems, and controls its dependence on foreign energy sources (PRC Central Government 2012b: 
section II) 
 
Here the idea of secure domestic supplies is clearly juxtaposed with ‘dependence’ on 
foreign energy sources, which needs to be controlled. 
 
Traditional sources of energy still play a key role in China’s energy security strategy, 
though conservation and efficiency is often emphasised (PRC Foreign Ministry 2005). 
However, because of the fear of increasing reliance on imported energy, coal remains 
central. Because of ‘chronic oil shortage’ and growing reliance on imports which can 
affect domestic supply, China needs to ‘vigorously develop coal’ as a petroleum substitute 
(NDRC 2005). Likewise, after the 11
th
 Five Year Plan a senior government energy 
researcher suggested that while China will continue international cooperation to achieve 
energy security, ‘2006 to 2010, China will try to meet its energy demand mainly with 
domestic supply, and will take coal as the main source of energy’ (PRC Central 
Government 2006a). Hu in 2006 pointed to China’s ‘great potential for expanding energy 
supply from domestic sources’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). The 2007 white paper stated 
that ‘China boasts fairly rich fossil energy resources, dominated by coal…China has built 
an energy supply framework with coal as the main energy resource and electricity as the 
focus, featuring an overall development of oil, gas and renewable resources’ (PRC NDRC 
2007a: section I). Plans to increase natural gas production and develop greener coal 
technologies are often suggested, and in 2011 an NEA official said that China would see 
continued increased coal production and imports to fulfil demand, as well as a ‘focus on 
offshore oil and gas exploitation during the 12th Five-year Plan (2011-2015) period’ 
(Xinhua 2011a, 2012). The 2012 white paper also states that ‘worldwide, fossil energy, 
including coal and oil, will continue to play a dominant role in energy supply for a long 
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time to come. China is no exception. Therefore, China will continue to plan fossil 
exploitation and utilization, with environmental protection taken into account’ (PRC 
Central Government 2012b: section V). 
 
Increased reliance on imported oil is discussed as being a key problem, and there is a clear 
link between China’s increasing desire for cooperation over energy and its growing need 
for, and concern over, imported oil. To some, this means that ‘when you’re talking about 
energy security in China, you’re really talking about oil security’ (Interview 2012g). 
Security of transport has also become key to Chinese notions of energy security, both in 
terms of domestic resources and imports (Interview with Gao 2012). Inside China, 
resources are unevenly distributed meaning ‘large-scale transportation over long distances 
of coal and oil from the north to the south, and transmission of natural gas and electricity 
from the west to the east’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: section I). The 2012 white paper notes 
increasing dependence on foreign energy sources as a ‘grave challenge’ to energy security, 
particularly the rise in imported petroleum to 57% of total consumption, as well as the 
‘ever-greater security risks’ to ‘marine transportation of petroleum and cross-border 
pipeline transmission of oil and gas’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I). 
Increased domestic supply of fossil fuels is usually cited as the solution to deal with these 
potential threats. 
 
Lastly, new or ‘alternative’ energy is an increasingly popular frame, playing a major part 
after the 12
th
 Five Year Plan, with quantitative targets for renewables (15% by 2020), 
energy intensity, efficiency and conservation, as well as emissions targets (Xinhua 2010c). 
There has been increasing recognition of the need for improvements in clean energy 
technology (PRC NDRC 2005), with new energy considered a ‘must’ for China according 
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to the head of the NEA (Xinhua 2009). The 2012 white paper notes ‘rapid development in 
non-fossil energy. China has made energetic efforts in developing new and renewable 
energy resources’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section I). It also reiterates key targets 
from the 12
th
 Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social development for increasing 
non-fossil energy, reducing consumption per unit of GDP and emission reductions (PRC 
Central Government 2012b: section II). 
 
The role of the domestic as secure and the need for self-sufficiency, contrasted with 
foreign energy sources constructed as insecure and volatile, plays a key role in justifying 
increased fossil fuel production in China. However, though the focus remains on fossil 
fuels, the same reasons are increasingly used to also justify new or alternative energies.  
 
5.4.5 Alternative constructions of energy security 
Chinese official energy security discourses do use some alternative constructions of energy 
security which are rarely recognised in the academic literature. There are some indications 
of a broadening understanding of energy security to include sustainability and human well-
being, particularly more recently. 
 
There is an increasing variety in referent objects of energy security in Chinese discourses. 
World energy security, or common energy security, as a concept promoted by the Chinese 
government globally, has already been noted. The second theme also showed some 
indications of occasional emphasis on human survival. While the emphasis on national, or 
domestic, security remains, the inclusion of multiple referents of energy security is 
particularly interesting for this research. At the G8 meeting in 2006, Hu pointed to the 
need for increased cooperation on clean energy as ‘as part of the overall effort to ensure 
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sustainable development of human society’  (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). He also noted 
the need for global energy security to ensure ‘people's livelihood’. The 2007 white paper 
points to the need to strengthen cooperation to protect global energy security ‘to safeguard 
the stability and security of energy supplies in the world, strive to achieve mutual benefit, 
win-win and common development, and protect this home human beings share’ (PRC 
NDRC 2007a: conclusion). Xi Jinping also justified increased domestic energy supply to 
meet demands for economic growth and improve people’s lives (Xinhua 2008). The 2011 
white paper on development mentioned energy security among global security issues that 
have ‘major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social development’ 
(PRC Central Government 2011). The role energy plays in economic and social 
development is continually emphasised, which was also noted under the economic growth 
theme discussed earlier. 
 
Sustainability, efficiency and conservation to improve the environment are also 
increasingly common topics in discussions on energy security. A 2003 report noted the 
importance of ‘minimising the impact of energy production and consumption on the 
environment and health’ (Chen et al. 2003). At APEC in 2007, Hu Jintao said that ensuring 
‘stable energy supply is a major factor contributing to building a sustainable future. 
Sufficient, secure, economical, clean and predictable energy supply is essential to 
sustaining the steady growth of the world economy’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2007). It is 
increasingly recognised that ‘the development and use of energy, is one of the main causes 
of ecological destruction and environmental pollution’ (PRC NDRC 2007b). Developing 
clean energy is seen as a new growth point in the economy, to ‘adjust our energy structure, 
cope with global climate change, and ensure energy security’ (Xinhua 2010d). The head of 
the NEA pointed to energy security as a ‘permanent concern’: ‘China's population, natural 
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resources, environment and the need for sustainable development do not allow wanton 
consumption of energy resources’ (Xinhua 2011b). The 2012 white paper also concluded 
that ‘the Chinese government will strive to address the energy problem properly by 
following the sustainable road of energy development’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: 
conclusion). At the 18
th
 Party Congress in November 2012, Hu advocated the need for 
major progress on ‘building a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly 
society…[e]nergy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP as well as 
the discharge of major pollutants should decrease sharply’ (Hu 2012). 
 
Alternative discourses will be discussed further in the next chapter, but it is important to 
note that changes so far are minimal, with continued emphasis on coal as essential to 
ensure Chinese supplies. There is still a heavy focus on national security and securing 
enough resources of any kind to continue rapid economic growth. Continued heavy 
reliance on domestic coal supplies as justified in national security terms is particularly 
problematic. Official constructions of energy security still focus on securing supplies for 
continued national economic growth, and China remains the  
most prolific emitter of greenhouse gases in recent years. Generally speaking, this development, and 
the threat of climate change more generally, has not been a driving force behind new thinking about 
energy security in China (Kennedy 2010: 145). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
To sum up, ‘energy security in China is an evolving notion’ (Interview 2012h). China is 
still going through a learning curve and there is ‘no unified definition or approach to 
energy security’, but meeting growing demand is central (Interview 2012h). Overall, 
Chinese notions of energy security emphasise the need for secure supplies at stable prices. 
Oil security is a priority as the key imported source of energy, while self-sufficiency 
remains a goal. In part because of fears over increasing reliance on imported energy, coal 
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remains central to Chinese energy supply. While the energy white papers and legislation 
emphasise conservation and sustainability, growing energy demand and consumption 
makes the effect negligible so far. When it comes to energy security, increasing domestic 
production of coal, oil and gas to ensure stable supplies and prices by keeping China self-
sufficient in energy takes precedence over human and environmental security.  
 
Official discourses place continued emphasis on fossil fuels, which enables continued 
production and consumption. Thus, because coal is domestically available, China should 
take full advantage of domestic coal resources to reduce dependence on foreign oil imports 
(NDRC 2005). In the name of ensuring ‘a stable energy supply’, continuing increases in 
oil, gas and coal production are sought through various energy exploration programs 
(Xinhua 2012). Likewise, the policy-making process places energy security, understood in 
national security terms, as the top priority. Ultimately, ‘security tops the environment in 
China’s energy plan’, and the priority remains on secure (domestic) sources of energy to 
fuel continued economic growth (Bradsher 2010). The ‘domestic’ and the need to secure it, 
is continually contrasted with the threat of dependence on ‘foreign’ sources of energy. 
Thus ‘China must rely on itself to increase the energy supply steadily to satisfy such 
[growing energy] demands’ (PRC Central Government 2012b: section V). Even calls for 
international cooperation and a stable international environment largely relate back to 
desire for continued oil supplies to ensure continued domestic economic growth.  
 
In this sense, the state and national security remains at the centre of Chinese notions of 
energy security. Of course, economic development necessitates a rise in energy 
consumption, but it does not necessitate prioritising fossil fuels in the name of self-
sufficiency. There are some indications of a broadening understanding of energy security 
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to include sustainability and human well-being, particularly more recently, and policy is 
changing to reflect this, but it will take time before it has any real impact on production 
and consumption patterns. Likewise, the variety in referent objects in Chinese official 
discourses is an interesting development, with discussions of global/common energy 
security as well as the impact on individual well-being and the environment. There is also 
now a recognition that ‘the development and use of energy, is one of the main cause of 
ecological destruction and environmental pollution’ (PRC NDRC 2007b). 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
206 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Towards a positive energy security  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last two chapters have presented empirical analysis of state, or official, energy security 
constructions in the United States and China between 2004 and 2012. They have discussed 
both the policy choices that have been made and the discourses which enabled them, 
drawing out key themes in these discourses to understand how energy security has been 
constructed. This chapter begins by looking at these constructions through the lens of the 
emerging debate over the value of security, which was introduced in chapter two. As 
discussed in previous chapters, this thesis makes a normative commitment, arguing that the 
purpose of security policy should be to provide security for human beings, which cannot 
be separated from the environment on which they depend. Consequently, drawing on 
existing literature, ‘negative security’1 is here understood as notions of security which 
centre around securing a national ‘us’ against a threatening and excluded ‘other’, and 
security practices which rely on processes or result in consequences which are negative in 
character – most notably narrowing democratic debate and participation, and militarised 
threat-defence responses. Negative security constructions do not secure human beings. In 
contrast, a ‘positive security’ approach is understood here as one employing a conception 
of security which does not rely on exclusion, securing human beings rather than citizens, 
                                                          
1
 As noted in chapter two, this use of the term negative security differs somewhat from some of the previous 
uses, which draw on Berlin, Galtung or Wolfers to understand it as the absence of threat, rather than as 
something which is negative in character and consequences. 
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and which uses security practices that involve and include open political debate and 
participation. This is used to analyse existing energy security constructions to develop an 
understanding of what more positive and more negative energy security can look like, in 
an empirical context
2
. 
 
Thus, the chapter opens with a discussion of state constructions of energy security in 
connection with this debate. It illustrates that state constructions are largely negative, 
presenting the state as the object to the secured through continuous supplies of fossil fuels, 
while marginalising alternative notions of energy security. However, the very existence of 
some alternative notions of energy security even in official discourses serves to illustrate 
that energy security is contested. The chapter then moves on to look more directly at 
alternative notions of energy security which are considered to be more positive. It looks 
both at marginalised state energy security constructions, and constructions produced by 
non-state actors, focusing on non-governmental organisations advocating for a change in 
energy policy. This is used to illustrate that ‘energy security’ does not have to be negative, 
which opens up potential for change. In this regard, this chapter follows the pragmatic, 
contextual approach outlined in chapter two, starting by looking at cases where energy is 
constructed more positively and using this to develop a more detailed understanding of 
what a positive energy security looks like. Following ‘a broader approach to the 
construction of security’ (McDonald 2008: 565) that goes beyond securitisation and elite 
voices, this chapter is a vital part of answering the question of how energy security is 
constructed in the United States and China. Importantly, it also works to denaturalise 
dominant ‘common sense’ understandings of energy security by highlighting contestation 
over energy security, which in turn opens up the potential for change. 
                                                          
2
 The emphasis this thesis places on empirical practice and context makes the definitions of negative and 
positive security a guide rather than a taxonomy of absolutes, to be used to locate alternative notions of 
energy security that rely on a more positive notion of security. 
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6.1 What do dominant state energy security constructions do?  
As stated in chapter two in the discussion on the value of security, security has been 
labelled negative by a number of critical authors (including the Copenhagen School), 
making desecuritisation preferable. Other authors – notably those coming from a Welsh 
School approach – have argued that security is not inherently negative but can, and some 
have argued should, be about positive, enabling values. Problematically, this debate is 
rather clouded by a lack of distinction between the term ‘security’ and ‘securitisation’ in 
much of the critical literature. In contrast, it is argued here that securitisation represents 
only one particular type of security construction. Security is constructed in varied and 
often unpredictable ways. It is constructed by a wide range of actors, in different ways in 
different contexts – sometimes more negatively, and sometimes more positively. While the 
emerging literature on positive and negative security partially recognises this, producing 
some useful guidelines for understanding when security is positive and when it is negative 
(Roe 2008, 2012; Floyd 2007, 2011; Hoogensen Gjørv 2012), the discussion remains 
largely at an abstract, theoretical level and remains closely tied to discussions on 
securitisation.  
 
In contrast, this thesis argues that security has no inherent meaning, and therefore cannot 
be intrinsically positive or negative. We can only analyse the meaning and value of 
security in empirical contexts, where the value ranges from more negative to more 
positive. Thus, while securitisation theory dismisses security as a concept with negative 
associations and consequences, I argue that the concept of security is often positive. 
Moreover, locating more positive constructions of security in practice begins to disrupt 
traditional, more negative notions of security, and as such can open up space to move 
towards more positive constructions of security. It is also important to note that as they are 
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understood here, positive and negative security are not binary opposites. In practice, most 
security constructions likely fall somewhere between the two – being rather ‘more 
positive’ or ‘more negative’, or somewhere in between, than either/or. In this sense, the 
value of security is better understood as a continuum or spectrum rather than a clear-cut 
binary. Even in official discourses, though these are characterised here as largely negative, 
there is contestation, both between strategic/realist and liberal/economic notions of energy 
security and between more negative and more positive notions. The more positive 
constructions of energy security in state discourses are a more recent development, which 
suggests that more positive notions of energy security are possible. Thinking explicitly 
about alternatives is an essential part of advocating change and involves a discussion about 
what kinds of definitions of (energy) security create potential for more ethical practice: 
which are better and which are worse when it comes to actually providing security. 
 
Constructions were analysed to understand what security does to energy. The methods 
used for this have been outlined in chapter three, which discussed the way in which 
particular constructions create a reality, or a ‘common sense’, which makes particular 
policy choices thinkable and possible, while simultaneously making other policy choices 
less likely. In this way, texts construct a reality where particular practices seem ‘reasonable 
and probably quite unremarkable’ (Doty 1993: 308). Questioning and problematising these 
processes is a central goal of this analysis. Texts were analysed with a focus on 
presuppositions and predications, and how these create subject positions which together 
work to make particular policy choices possible while excluding other options.  
 
The two previous chapters have outlined and analysed dominant state energy security 
constructions in the United States and China. They have illustrated the centrality of 
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‘security of supplies at stable prices’ to understandings of energy security in both states. 
Overall, there is a link between energy security and a very particular understanding of 
national security, which has three core features. Firstly, the state is reaffirmed as both the 
sole actor and speaker of ‘security’, and as the primary object to be secured. National 
security is understood to entail autonomy in energy terms, phrased as ‘energy 
independence’ in the US, and ‘self-sufficiency’ in China. Secondly, traditional geo-
political security boundaries and identities are reproduced, with an ‘inside’ to be protected 
against external ‘others’. The geographically-delimited state, and its independence in 
energy terms, is distinguished as that which needs to be protected or secured, against 
external ‘foreign’ others, who may be ‘hostile’ and may cause ‘harm’. These ‘others’ do 
not need protection or security but are instead a threat, causing ‘dependence’ and 
‘vulnerability’. Thirdly, linking energy with national security both elevates it above other 
issues in importance, and can enable extraordinary measures. Energy is constructed as key 
for maintaining ‘national power’ and independence, even state survival. In 
liberal/economic discourses the focus on national economic growth and competitiveness 
plays a similar role. Dependence on others is constructed as a threat, and energy 
independence or self-sufficiency as the main goal, rather than, say, sustainability. Some 
liberal discourses emphasise the preservation of open and stable markets, but again, in the 
official discourses analysed here this is largely related to the need for continuous supplies 
of fossil fuels for national economic growth. In policy terms, this separates and elevates 
energy supply above the security of human beings and a secure and stable climate and 
environment.  
 
Overall, this research is concerned with how official constructions of energy security both 
legitimise and marginalise through particular constructions of common sense, enabling 
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particular policy choices in the name of energy security, while delegitimising others. The 
link between energy security and a very particular understanding of national security 
justifies, underpins and reproduces a negative construction of security. These negative 
energy security constructions emphasise the need to secure ‘us’ against ‘them’, which has 
negative consequences, producing insecurity and enabling state-centred responses. They 
also work to narrow democratic debate and participation, disempowering non-state actors 
and closing down the meaning of energy security through particular constructions of 
‘common sense’. This results in an energy security paradox, whereby state pursuit of 
energy security makes states, individuals and the environment less secure. In many ways, 
the link between energy and national security in these dominant constructions mirrors how 
security is understood by the Copenhagen School. While energy is rarely fully securitised, 
it is subjected to repeated securitising moves in both states – with elite ‘speech-acts’ 
following the ‘grammar of security’ emphasising priority, urgency and survival (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 33). Likewise, the consequences are similar to the consequences of securitisation, 
with ‘threat, defence, and often state-centred solutions’ (Wæver 1995: 65). However, while 
energy is repeatedly subjected to securitising moves, emergency measures are rarely 
possible (for an exception, see Nyman 2014). Consequently, they are here understood as 
‘negative’ energy security constructions.  
 
6.1.1 Securing state supplies of fossil fuels: reproducing insecurity 
These negative energy security constructions emphasise the need to secure ‘us’ against 
‘them’, which has negative consequences, producing insecurity and enabling state-centred 
responses. Interestingly, the meaning of energy security is rarely openly discussed or 
defined in official discourses, even in legislation on energy. This constructs the meaning of 
energy security as common sense, suggesting that it does not need to be discussed, making 
CHAPTER 6 
212 
 
policy choices appear obvious and difficult to question. Meanwhile, in reality the way in 
which policy-makers use the terms ‘energy’ and ‘energy’ security are often vague 
(Littlefield 2013). Policies and actions are undertaken in the name of energy security, or 
justified in its name, without defining or discussing what energy security means. However, 
the dominant themes noted in the previous two chapters show the continuing focus on 
ensuring secure supplies at stable prices. 
 
Throughout, energy is constructed as important, as national security and economic growth. 
Both of these priorities construct the state as the object to be secured – whether in strategic 
or economic terms. They delineate a boundary between a national inside, or ‘us’, to be 
protected, against external threats in the form of threatening ‘others’. The ‘outside’ is 
constructed as unstable and insecure, with a focus on the possibility for supply disruptions 
and market volatility. The state is to be secured as autonomous in energy terms, which 
enables a focus on maximising ‘security’ through strategic or economic competition 
against threatening others
3
. This enables a zero-sum view of energy security, where each 
state needs to maximise its own supplies to ensure national strategic/economic power or 
growth. Following this, both US and Chinese discourses construct ‘dependence’ on others 
as a threat, as these ‘others’ may be ‘hostile’. The aim of energy security politics is to 
secure the state’s own supplies at the best prices possible, against dependence or reliance 
on ‘others’, making energy independence the key goal. On a fundamental level, they rely 
on a distinction between the state, the ‘us’, to be protected – against external enemy 
‘others’ – what Walker terms a system of ‘spatial exclusion’ (1988: 121). Rather than 
                                                          
3
 The link between security and exclusionary friend/foe thinking has also been discussed by the Copenhagen 
School, who view these as inevitable features of security politics. However, this understanding of security is 
heavily influenced by Schmitt, who understood the ‘political’ as characterised by antagonism and friend-
enemy distinctions (Williams 2003: 516). This is particularly useful for understanding how these negative 
energy security discourses and practices work. For a more in-depth discussion on the influence of Schmitt on 
the Copenhagen School’s concept of security, see Williams (2003) and Huysmans (1998b). 
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securing people, therefore, the emphasis remains on securing ‘our’ citizens against external 
‘others’. Even where liberal discourses in both states emphasise marketisation, and the 
need for stable international energy markets as a source of security, it is often related back 
to the need to maximise US/Chinese national economic growth vis-à-vis other states. 
 
By constructing the state as the object to be secured, dominant state energy security 
constructions produce insecurity, through the reproduction of friend/foe, threat-defence 
thinking, and by prioritising the security of the state above the security of human beings 
and the environment they depend on to survive. Firstly, this works to cause insecurity for 
the states themselves. Focusing on securing ‘us’ against ‘them’ in energy terms encourages 
competition over limited and finite resources, reproducing energy security dilemmas and 
encouraging continued and often increased exploitation of finite and unsustainable 
(domestic) energy resources in the name of autonomy, national security and continued 
economic growth. By continuing to reproduce a competitive exclusionary logic, they 
encourage competition to maximise their own supplies of finite unsustainable resources 
rather than cooperation to develop more sustainable energy resources that could provide 
longer-term energy, environmental and human security, as well as further inter-state 
stability. Current discourses construct cooperation with other states as either unnecessary 
or directly harmful
4
 – as in the discourse on energy independence; or at best difficult, as 
‘foreign’ states are continually constructed as potentially hostile and different. This has 
also led to increasing fears of resource wars (see Klare 2002, 2008). Thus, the argument 
that security needs to move away from traditional geopolitical premises is not simply a 
case of ethical preferences, but of ‘strategic necessities’ (Burke 2013: 21). The 
reproduction of the state as the referent of energy security limits practices to securing the 
                                                          
4
 Cooperation over fossil fuels is rare, though it is becoming more common in renewable technologies and 
unconventional technologies – including shale gas.  
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state, or rather, the continued existence of the particular political order, and allows 
continued rejection of the security of other referent objects even where current practices 
directly make other referent objects insecure. This enables policy choices which secure the 
state and its citizens’ fossil fuel supplies at the expense of international cooperation and 
climate stability, endangering the future of the planet and ultimately failing to secure 
human beings – while also making states less secure. 
 
The focus on national security prioritises the security of the state above other referent 
objects. Dominant state discourses construct the need to secure states by ensuring 
continuous supplies of fossil fuels as common sense. As noted in chapter one, the very 
notion of security of supplies is linked to fossil fuels, as the only energy resources which 
are geographically bound to territory and therefore need to be physically supplied from one 
state to another. Likewise, the notion of secure and stable prices implicitly puts the 
emphasis on security of oil supplies and oil markets, as the main energy resource which is 
traded on a global market. Moreover, the focus on state autonomy in energy terms is 
emphasised throughout in both states, and the answer to the energy security dilemma as 
presented in these discourses is continued and increased exploitation of domestic fossil 
fuels, both in the US and China. This includes continued and increased exploitation of, and 
consumption of, conventional and unconventional oil and gas (including shale), and coal. 
These practices are a continuing cause of insecurity for human beings and the environment 
in which they live. These sources of energy are major causes of climate change and 
threaten the survival of the global ecosystem.  
 
Both states prioritise investment in fossil fuels, particularly in unconventional oil and gas 
technologies, as well as ‘clean coal’ technologies and nuclear power, as these energy 
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sources are domestically available and therefore seen as more ‘secure’. Likewise, there is a 
separation between ‘energy’ and ‘climate’ issues in both states, with energy continually 
prioritised as a national security issue. However, internationally, ‘the burning of fossil 
fuels to produce energy is by far the main source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions’ (International Energy Agency 2007: 28), which contribute to climate change. 
Meanwhile, a recent study into solutions to global warming, air pollution and energy 
security which took the three as linked, found that clean coal technologies and nuclear 
investments provided ‘less benefit with greater negative impacts’ (Jacobson 2009: 170). If 
climate change and air pollution are also considered, fossil fuels ultimately no longer 
provide security. It concluded that ‘because sufficient clean natural resources (e.g. , wind, 
sunlight, hot water, ocean energy, gravitational energy) exists to power all energy for the 
world…the diversion of attention to the less efficient or non-efficient options represents an 
opportunity cost that delays solutions to climate and air pollution health problems’ 
(Jacobson 2009: 170). Problematically, much of US investment in ‘cleaner’ energy is 
devoted to clean coal technology research and the development of biofuels, particularly 
ethanol. However, ‘no large [coal] power plant currently captures CO2’ (Jacobson 2009: 
152). Likewise, ethanol ‘does not improve US energy security; is uneconomical; is not a 
renewable energy source; and increases environmental degradation’ (Pimentel 1991). 
Climate change in turn, is also linked with sea-level rises caused by melting polar regions, 
droughts and famine associated with increased temperature levels and more extreme 
weather overall, as well as increased frequency of natural disasters including cyclones and 
hurricanes, among other things. These all contribute to increasing cross-border human 
insecurity. Climate change has also been attributed to increases in disease, including 
malaria, diarrhoea and dengue fever (World Health Organisation 2002).  
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Likewise, the burning of these fossil fuels contributes to air pollution which is a major 
cause of health insecurity. It has been associated with ‘a broad spectrum of acute and 
chronic health effects’, including ‘lung cancer and other cardiopulmonary mortality’ and 
as causing 800.000 deaths annually (World Health Organisation 2002). Air pollution is 
also a cause of acid rain, which contaminates food supplies and damages ecosystems. The 
impact of air pollution in China is increasingly well-documented and to a large extent 
attributable to its heavy reliance on coal: 
In 2007…the World Bank estimated that outdoor air pollution in China was causing between 
350,000 and 400,000 premature deaths each year, more than Chinese historians estimate their 
country suffered in the Korean War. Sensitive to the outrage such figures could produce, the 
Chinese government insisted that the World Bank not publish the figures, citing threats to “social 
stability” (Kennedy 2010: 145).  
 
The effects of air pollution on public health in the United States is also well documented 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2013). Not only do these sources of energy threaten the 
environment and the health of millions of people – particularly bearing in mind that air 
pollution does not stop at national borders, moreover, fears of economically 
disadvantaging fossil fuel energy industries continue to limit action. 
 
Beyond these global insecurity costs there are also local environmental and human 
insecurities produced as a result of these energy security policies. These relate largely to 
the production processes for oil, gas and coal for energy. Among these are coal mining 
deaths, which are prevalent in China, where 75,572 people died in coal mining accidents in 
2011 (Areddy 2012) . This category also includes oil and gas exploration accidents causing 
major pollution, including the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and in the same year, a major oil spill in Dalian in Northeast China, and the 2011 
Bohai Bay oil spill, also in Northeast China. These all damaged ecosystems and local 
livelihoods. The recent rush for shale gas in both the US and China has also caused 
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environmental concerns, particularly regarding air and water pollution resulting from 
hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’, processes.   
 
The argument here is not that it is in some way wrong for a state to be concerned about its 
energy needs, as energy supplies are clearly necessary for the continued functioning of 
human society as we know it. The problem, rather, is the focus on strategic autonomy, 
expressed in the need for energy independence to exclusively secure the national self 
against external threatening others, the solution for which is presented as vastly increased 
domestic production of fossil fuels, further enabled by legislation and a problematic 
policy-making process/set up where energy and climate remain considered largely in 
isolation from each other. Ultimately, current dominant state energy security constructions 
continue to focus on securing state fossil fuel supplies. In the process, they make states, 
human beings and the environment less secure. 
 
6.1.2 Narrowing democratic debate and participation  
Dominant state constructions of energy security also work to narrow democratic debate 
and participation, disempowering non-state actors and closing down the meaning of energy 
security through particular constructions of ‘common sense’.  
 
These dominant constructions also disempower by reinforcing the role of the state as the 
national security provider – as the sole actor and speaker of security. Likewise, this works 
to marginalise other voices and limit contestation. The reproduction of the state as the 
single actor means that only the state is authorised to legitimately speak or define energy 
security. Energy security is constructed and defined by a small number of situated, elite 
actors working in various parts of the security establishment, with little or no input from 
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non-elite, non-state actors, or even from other government departments working on related 
issues such as climate security. Energy and climate remain separated in policy-making 
processes, and generally ‘you don't find the same people in both circles’ (Interview 
2012e). Only the state understanding of energy security is really recognised, and it sets 
policy priorities even when the domestic system is market based, through legislation and 
regulation guiding subsidies, tax cuts and exploration for new resources. The state not only 
defines what energy security is, but how it should be dealt with, or rather, how energy 
insecurity is to be eliminated or reduced. Consequently, the need for energy security ends 
where the physical state ends – only continued supplies for the actor-state are to be 
secured. Thus the national security state defines and provides energy security for itself on 
its own terms. The reproduction of the state as the single speaker and actor limits practices 
to securing the state, or rather, the continued existence of the particular political order, and 
allows continued rejection of the security of other referent objects even where current 
practices directly produce insecurity.  
 
As the later sections in this chapter illustrate, dominant understandings of energy security 
are presented as common sense, but are in reality both limited and narrow, attempting only 
to secure the continued existence of the state. Meanwhile, other actors and voices are 
attempting to challenge this understanding, but are marginalised. The isolation or 
‘elevation’ of security issues away from regular debate is deeply problematic, 
marginalising and disempowering. In many ways, this reflects the concerns that the 
Copenhagen School have with the politics of security. However, these characteristics are 
not inevitable features of ‘security’ – as the discussion on ‘contesting energy security’ in 
this chapter shows. Official constructions of energy security both legitimise and 
marginalise through particular constructions of common sense, enabling particular policy 
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choices in the name of energy security, while delegitimising others. It is essential to 
consider the role of power in these processes, and ‘the way in which power works to 
constitute particular modes of subjectivity and interpretive dispositions’ (Doty 1993: 299). 
Disempowering energy security practices limit contestation and participation in debates 
over the meaning and practice of energy security to state actors reproducing a particular, 
traditional notion of (national) security. This is neither democratic nor does it produce 
security beyond protecting the continued existence of the state. In many ways, it actually 
produces insecurity. 
 
Even where the state constructions of energy security are more positive, as noted in 
previous chapters, these discursive constructions rarely filter into policy and remain 
marginalised. This separation between discourse and practice is interesting, and suggests 
these more positive notions of energy security are not established enough to have an effect 
on policy. However, their very existence in state discourses shows that alternative 
constructions of energy security are possible. Nevertheless, negative constructions remain 
dominant. The lack of voices and interests represented in debates leaves a limited 
understanding of energy security, which ultimately leaves power where it is. Thus, while 
securitisation theory argues that such a narrowing of debate is inevitable in security 
politics, I argue here that it is attached to a particular national security politics, suggesting 
that more democratic and positive notions of security politics are possible.  
 
Walker’s study of critical social movements emphasised the need for ‘greater democratic 
participation in security issues…[as] security issues cannot be left to elites capable of 
insisting on the necessary convergence of their interests with those of the nation’ (1988: 
125). Ultimately, elite actors have a vested interest in securing the continued existence of 
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the existing order. Allowing more contestation over energy security, meanwhile, allows 
more voices with different interests to articulate alternative notions of energy security. 
Overall, ‘the opening up of dialogic space enabling multiple voices to “speak” security’ is 
an essential part of making possible progressive change in dominant energy security 
discourses (see McDonald 2012: 4). In many ways, this draws on Habermas’ notion of 
communicative ethics (1979, 1981). Naomi Head has developed this to argue that 
communicative ethics can be used to ‘interrogate the intersubjective validity of claims to 
legitimacy raised by actors in particular contexts’ (2012: 198). This in turn both ‘reveals 
the operation of relations of power and domination in communicative practice’ and ‘opens 
up possibilities for the inclusion of those actors and discourses which are typically 
marginalised and lack recognition in international politics’ (2012: 198-9). She suggests 
there is a relationship between communicative processes and legitimacy, which is relevant 
here. Ultimately, there is a need for ‘fair and reflective procedures’ that include a larger 
number of actors and discourses to develop legitimate policy (Head 2012: 197). 
Hoogensen Gjørv has also made the case for the inclusion of a wider range of actors in 
security processes, arguing that positive security needs to be ‘multi-actor’ (2012).  
 
Dominant state constructions of energy security are negative in character and consequence: 
they reproduce insecurity for states, human beings and the environment, and narrow 
democratic debate and participation, disempowering non-state actors and closing down the 
meaning of energy security through particular constructions of ‘common sense’. However, 
these meanings are not fixed but constructed, and can therefore be contested. The rest of 
this chapter will look at alternative, more positive notions of energy security in the United 
States and China, highlighting the contested nature of the concept. 
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6.2 Contesting energy security  
As noted in the introduction, ‘positive security’ is understood here as notions of security 
which do not rely on exclusion, securing human beings rather than citizens, and which use 
security practices that involve and include open political debate and participation. This 
section uses this to analyse existing alternative energy security constructions to develop an 
understanding of what more positive energy security can look like in an empirical context. 
In this sense it contributes to the empirical examination of the concept of energy security 
in the United States and China put forward in chapter four and five. By illustrating how 
energy security is constructed in both official and non-official spaces, it hopes to show that 
energy security both can, and is, being concieved differently – though these alternative 
constructions remain marginalised. In this process, it also looks outside dominant 
discourses in an active search for alternative, more positive constructions of energy 
security in the United States and China. It thus looks both at marginalised state energy 
security discourses, and discourses produced by non-state actors, focusing on non-
governmental organisations advocating for a change in energy policy. In this way, the 
research moved between official and marginalised constructions to illustrate the contested 
nature of energy security, opening up the meaning and illustrating that energy security 
does not have to be negative, providing potential for change.  
 
Consequently, this chapter follows the pragmatic, contextual approach outlined in chapter 
two, starting by looking at cases where energy is constructed more positively and using 
this to develop a more detailed understanding of what a positive energy security looks like. 
Following ‘a broader approach to the construction of security’ (McDonald 2008: 565) that 
goes beyond securitisation and elite voices, this chapter plays a vital part in answering the 
core research question of this thesis, which asks how energy security is constructed in the 
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United States and China. A process of ‘identifying how marginalised actors or subjugated 
voices have articulated...[the key concepts, is used] as a basis for exploring what 
alternative discourses might look like’ (McDonald 2007). Here, I define marginalised 
voices as alternative representations of energy security which are ignored in the dominant 
constructions of energy security. It is important to note that these remain marginalised – 
even when they exist in state discourses. 
 
The examination of these streams of resistance to negative constructions of energy security 
involves a normative commitment to not just  ‘leaving power “where it is” in security 
terms’ (McDonald 2008: 4). It also recognises the need to demonstrate the ‘complexity of 
security’ rather than close off the debate (Hoogensen and Rottem 2004: 169). There has 
been a limited number of empirical analyses of contestations of security outside of the 
official sphere, with the exception of Hoogensen (2012) and McDonald (2012). The 
approach taken here brings together a number of different approaches to the construction 
of security, with a focus on positive security and resistance and a normative commitment. 
It departs from securitisation theory, which cannot envisage change within ‘security’ but 
only through desecuritisation. Likewise, it departs from Booth’s notion of emancipation, 
by suggesting that more positive or emancipatory understandings of security cannot be 
imposed but rather have to be located in existing practices. Here, it draws instead on Wyn 
Jones and McDonald’s alternative understanding of emancipation, based on locating 
alternative progressive notions of security in practice as a basis for change (Wyn Jones 
1999; 2005; McDonald 2012). Rather than imposing an abstract notion of emancipation, 
therefore, the emphasis here is on resistance and contestation – alternative practices – and 
giving marginalised voices the power to speak security, without ignoring traditional 
voices. This also departs from the existing debate on positive and negative security, 
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suggesting that once the meaning of energy security is opened up, starting analysis with an 
empirical focus to analyse how it is articulated in practice rather than imposing abstract 
theoretical definitions, it becomes increasingly clear that security can be more positive or 
more negative when attached to energy, depending on how security is constructed. 
 
This analysis of marginalised discourses presents only a starting point, illustrating 
contestation rather than the entirety of competing discourses. Only a limited number of 
groups have been looked at. Likewise, it is important to emphasise that it is not as simple 
as state discourses always being negative and non-state discourses being consistently 
positive. Many non-state writers and speakers take the same categories of analysis 
(national security, autonomy) as the dominant discourses, even when they dispute the 
official solutions to the ‘problem’ – ensuring maximised supply, offering alternative 
solutions within the same categories of analysis. There is not enough space here to fully 
engage with non-state discourses which support dominant discourses, though the literature 
review has covered academic work which supports it. Suffice to say that there are 
numerous groups which reiterate similar positions to dominant discourses
5
.  
 
                                                          
5
 There are also a number of pro-market groups who believe the market will solve future climate/security 
issues (see, for example McFarlane and Olah 2013), and groups like the United States Energy Security 
Council, emphasising the need for more competitive energy markets (USESC 2013). Likewise, groups like 
SAFE follow dominant discourses closely, advocating securitisation of energy: ‘too often, the energy 
security debate ignore traditional security matters. While energy policy and technological innovation must 
play an integral role in improving the nation’s energy security, all aspects of national power, including the 
military, diplomatic and intelligence services, need to be mobilised’ (SAFE 2013). Both of these groups were 
referenced in President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union. There are many links between these groups, think-
tanks and the policy world, so they often follow similar themes to official discourses, which is why less 
space is devoted to them here. Likewise, it has meant looking beyond these communities for more positive 
alternative discourses of energy security. 
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6.2.1 State discourses: 
Chapters four and five briefly introduced alternative notions of energy security present in 
dominant discourses, these will now be discussed in more detail here as they remain 
marginalised in practice.  
 
6.2.1.1 United States 
While state constructions of energy security in the United States centre around national 
security and construct security largely in a negative way, there are some elements of more 
positive notions of energy security, as noted in chapter four. This section sets some of 
these alternatives up against the first section in this chapter, to illustrate the ways in which 
they differ from the more negative representations. The focus is largely on the later part of 
the time period under study, as there have been more positive notions of energy security in 
state discourses under Obama. 
 
Firstly, there are some occasions where these discourses recognise multiple actors, both 
within and beyond the state. Many voices are represented in Congress when it comes to 
constructing energy security, but they rarely differ in terms of referent (national security), 
which in turn often trumps sustainability. President Obama occasionally presents a more 
positive notion of energy security with a clear emphasis on cooperation over competition 
with other states. He notes the importance of ‘international cooperation’ to deal with 
energy where possible, and the possibility of  pooling ‘our scientific and technical 
knowledge’ to improve global energy situation (Obama 2009e: at G20). Clean energy 
cooperation is also mentioned as key for the future in numerous speeches abroad, 
including in Columbia, Chile, India, China and Brazil. This has also led to the creation of 
the Clean Energy Ministerial advancing cooperation on ‘climate friendly technologies’ 
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(White House 2012: 11). It is interesting to note that Obama presents a more positive 
notion of energy security in speeches with an international audience. While the key actor 
here will always remain the American state, the emphasis on cooperation and 
interdependence over autonomy and independence is important, though marginalised. It 
does suggest some openness to alternative actors and voices, which is essential for change. 
Likewise, increasing openness to multilateralism is also key. 
 
Beyond recognising the need for cooperation and a role for other actors in providing 
energy security, there are also some elements of non-exclusive referents, with attempts to 
secure beyond the state in less exclusive terms. Rather than securing the US against 
outside threats, the need to act together with other states is emphasised. At the Copenhagen 
climate summit, Obama noted the need for a clean energy economy, stating that ‘we will 
all be stronger, all be safer, all be more secure if we act together’ (Obama 2009l). In these 
constructions there is emphasis on sharing ‘new technologies with countries around the 
world’ and a recognition of the need to ‘address this threat in a cooperative effort with the 
entire world’ (Obama 2009k: at United Nations). They also involve recognition of climate 
security and the need to ‘preserve our planet’ – ‘[t]ogether, we must work to transform the 
energy that powers our economies, and support others as they move down that path…[t]hat 
is what our commitment to the next generation demands’ (Obama 2011g). Even 
domestically, in a speech on energy independence, Obama has noted the need to ‘meet the 
challenge at this crossroad of history by choosing a future that is safer for our country, 
prosperous for our planet, and sustainable’ (Obama 2009a). In these constructions, 
sustainability is equally important as economic security and ‘there is no contradiction 
between environmentally sustainable growth and robust economic growth’ (Obama 2009i). 
The recognition of climate change is key, as impacting wider security - ‘climate change 
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poses a threat to our way of life…We're not going to be able to sustain this kind of fossil 
fuel use. This planet can't sustain it’ (Obama 2010d). Referents here are often global, 
recognising interdependence and the need to work together to secure energy supplies more 
sustainably.  
 
Lastly, these discourses tend to emphasise the need to safeguard human well-being and 
promote more sustainable energy supplies to preserve the planet for future generations.  
They emphasise sustainability and the need to move to clean energy as essential to avoid 
‘putting our children and our grandchildren at risk’ (Obama 2011f). At times, pollution is 
referenced as a threat, requiring action as they ‘threaten our health and the health of our 
planet’ (Obama 2009h). Problematically, even the clean energy economy is a ‘race’ for the 
21
st
 century against ‘competitors’ (Obama 2009h). The need to reduce reliance on oil is 
linked to human well-being, noting that ‘in an economy that relies so heavily on oil, rising 
prices at the pump affect everybody – workers, farmers, truck drivers, restaurant owners, 
students who are lucky enough to have a car’ (Obama 2011c). Multiple referents are also 
key here; these discourses do not focus solely on securing the American state: ‘our 
continued dependence on fossil fuels will jeopardize our national security. It will smother 
our planet. And it will continue to put our economy and our environment at risk’ (Obama 
2010e). This in turns evokes calls for working together ‘to address this threat in a 
cooperative effort with the entire world’ (Obama 2009k).  
 
Unfortunately, state discourses usually retain a focus on energy independence, 
emphasising clean energy largely as a way to reduce dependence on others, and more 
positive contractions of energy security remain marginalised, rarely filtering through to 
policy in any significant way. Overall, sustainability remains in the background, rarely 
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featuring in energy security discussions in any significant way. When used, the notion of 
sustainability suggests a broader, longer-term vision of security for the future of the 
‘planet’ rather than just the autonomy of the United States. While there is little recognition 
of non-state actors, the emphasis on cooperation and the need for multilateral action does 
open up the discussion and referent of energy security. These more positive notions have 
had some policy impacts too – particularly through bilateral and multilateral energy 
technology-sharing and cooperation initiatives involving the Department of Energy, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the State Department, though discussions of these 
are often divorced from discussions of energy security. Interestingly, there is more action 
within the United States, with an increasing number of states introducing stronger 
environmental regulation.  
 
 
6.2.1.2 China 
Chinese state discourses on energy security often have a heavy emphasis on the need for 
multilateralism, but there is little openness to alternative discourses in state understandings 
of energy security. However, the overall energy system in China is heavily influenced by 
key partially state-owned energy companies, which in practice have a quite a lot of 
independence in their operations. While there are many voices discussing energy security, 
censorship plays a key role limiting critique of the official line with most media sources 
largely reifying the official line.  
 
Interestingly, while the state remains the focus as referent object to be secured in energy 
terms, two other referent objects are also present in these discourses – global energy 
security is frequently promoted, and energy is also occasionally linked with human 
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survival. Energy is also presented as closely linked with social and economic development 
and with environmental stability. As noted in chapter five, Chinese state discourses 
increasingly rely on notions of global or common energy security, with President Hu 
suggesting a need to ‘step up worldwide energy dialogue and cooperation, jointly maintain 
energy security and energy market stability’ in a speech at the United Nations (Hu 2005b). 
Hu has also noted the need for ‘global energy security’ to ensure ‘the economic growth 
and people's livelihood of all countries and to maintaining peace and stability and 
promoting common development’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). Prime minister Wen 
Jiabao has also emphasised the role of energy security in ‘the national economy and the 
people's livelihood’, suggesting a need for ‘new concept of mutually beneficial 
cooperation, diversified forms of development and common energy security through 
coordination’ (PRC Foreign Ministry 2012b)6. Likewise, a 2011 white paper on 
development lists energy as a ‘common security issue’ that states need to cooperate on, as 
it has ‘a major impact on human survival and sustainable economic and social 
development’ (PRC Central Government 2011: section IV). The global nature of energy 
security is particularly emphasised with both increasing marketisation of energy within 
China and with increasing reliance on imports, as China becomes more vulnerable to 
unstable international energy markets. 
 
The importance of energy for social and economic development is emphasised continually, 
(PRC Foreign Ministry 2012a) – but often used to justify continued environmental 
destruction. Likewise, China’s energy development is said to be a positive contribution to 
meeting development needs both within and outside of China (PRC NDRC 2007b). The 
emphasis on social and economic development tends to precede any environmental 
                                                          
6
 It is worth noting also a counter discourse suggesting that China contributes to world energy security by 
being self-sufficient (Ma 2007). 
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concerns, however, with claims that targets set in the 11
th
 Five Year Plan (2006-2010) 
would result in the achievement of ‘coordinated development…between energy 
production, the economy, the society and the environment’ (PRC NDRC 2007a: 13). 
Discourses on ecology are seeping into the official stance, with increasing recognition of 
the environmental costs of rising energy demand: ‘China’s coal-dominated energy 
structure is not conducive to environmental protection’ (Zeng, in PRC NDRC 2005). 
Likewise, at the United Nations China has emphasised efforts made to speed up ‘the 
building of a resources-conserving and environment-friendly society’, announcing binding 
targets both for increasing non-fossil fuels as a part of total consumption and decreasing 
CO2 emissions (PRC Central Government 2012a). It also announced a willingness ‘to 
establish a long-term energy cooperation mechanism and make its due contribution to 
ensuring global energy security and tackling climate change’ (PRC Central Government 
2012a). Emphasis on sustainable development continued in China’s 2012 white paper on 
energy (PRC Central Government 2012b: preface).  
 
With increasing recognition of multiple referents and the need for sustainable 
development, there is increasing hope for more positive outcomes. The environmental 
discourse has evolved a lot, most likely because of the growing number of public protests 
over environmental issues threatening to undermine political stability. Clear targets on 
efficiency, consumption and emissions are a small step on the way. A key official 
suggested the need to ‘seek an energy-efficient and environmentally-friendly path for 
economic growth was a "pressing" task for the country, and also imposed a tougher 
requirement for the energy sector’ (Xinhua 2010c). Overall, China is becoming more open 
to cooperation over clean energy ‘as part of the overall effort to ensure sustainable 
development of human society’  (PRC Foreign Ministry 2006). However, sustainability is 
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often used as a catch-phrase to describe China’s current energy development, which is 
clearly not sustainable in practice, so it is difficult to see how far this represents any actual 
change. Nevertheless, open recognition that ‘that climate change is interrelated with 
energy and should be addressed in integrated manner’ represents a clear change in 
discourse, if not necessarily reflected in policy (FMPRC 2008; see also PRC NDRC 
2007a). This is becoming increasingly frequent, with the NDRC noting that ‘the 
development and use of energy, is one of the main causes of ecological destruction and 
environmental pollution’ (PRC NDRC 2007b), and developing clean energy seen as 
essential to ‘adjust our energy structure, cope with global climate change, and ensure 
energy security’ (Xinhua 2010d). Likewise, the 2012 white paper notes the need for energy 
reform for China to move towards ‘a comprehensive, balanced and sustainable 
development of its energy, economy, society and eco-environment’ (PRC Central 
Government 2012b: part I). This is a key feature in the 2012 white paper, with 
sustainability noted as an ‘important strategic task’, including reducing consumption and 
pollution to provide ‘economical, clean and secure development’ (PRC Central 
Government 2012b: part II)
7
.  
 
These changes have had some policy impact, with increasing investment in renewable 
technologies and more openness to energy cooperation and dialogue with other states. This 
has included the development of a solar-powered town in Turpan basin, and low-carbon 
emission pilot towns (Xinhua 2010d). In terms of cooperation, China has announced 
infrastructural projects ‘in clean energy and environmental protection in other developing 
countries’ (Hu 2011b). It has enhanced cooperation and participation in multilateral and 
                                                          
7
 The 2012 white paper goes as far as saying that the state encourages fostering the concept of environment-
friendly and low-carbon development, coordinates the development and use of energy resources with the 
protection of the eco-environment while paying equal attention to both, and actively fosters an energy 
development pattern that meets the requirements of ecological civilization’ (PRC Central Government 
2012b: part II). 
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bilateral dialogues to help ‘to improve international framework of energy security’ (PRC 
Central Government 2006a), though cooperation often focuses on stabilising prices or 
ensuring continued fossil fuel supplies. Cooperation with the US, meanwhile, has 
expanded immensely through a number of bilateral initiatives, particularly on clean energy 
technologies
8
. Overall, it is clear that cooperation is more prevalent on issues less likely to 
be constructed as national security – particularly clean energy technology, efficiency, and 
also climate change. In discussions on energy cooperation, energy security tends to be 
phrased largely in these terms.  
 
Overall, while the voices and actors constructing energy security in both states remain 
limited, there is some reliance on less exclusive referents framing energy as a global or 
common security issue, as well as emphasis on human survival, development and 
environmental protection. There is also more openness to cooperation, particularly over 
issues framed in environmental or climate terms rather than as national security. However, 
there is more emphasis on cooperation in international speeches. While sustainability is 
often emphasised, it has so far had little policy impact, but there does seem to be a move 
towards more positive notions of energy security at least in rhetoric. This is largely a more 
recent development in both states, gradually emerging from 2007-8 onwards. However, the 
energy system remains fairly closed, with little openness for non-state actors to influence 
policy.  
 
6.2.2 Non-state discourses 
This section looks at what individuals and communities are saying and doing in the name 
of energy security in the United States and China. The focus here is largely on non-
                                                          
8
 This has included the establishment of a joint ‘clean energy research center and joint ventures in wind 
power, smart grids and cleaner coal’ (Obama and Hu 2011). 
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governmental organisations (NGOs) and pressure groups working to influence policy on 
energy and the environment. The discussion here can only cover a limited number of 
groups and voices, but is largely used to illustrate the existence of alternative, non-state 
positive notions of energy security in the discursive space which have been ignored in 
previous analyses of energy security.  
 
6.2.2.1 United States 
In the US, the most active non-state voices articulating alternative notions of energy 
security are environmental pressure groups
9
. This is likely because their starting point is 
environmental or climate security, which, compared with energy, is not as closely linked 
with national security (Trombetta 2008)
10. There’s a wide range of groups advocating for a 
more positive energy policy, from the more well-known like Greenpeace USA and Friends 
of the Earth, to smaller, lesser known organisations such as Restoring Eden, a Christian 
Group advocating environmental stewardship. This section starts by looking at how some 
of these groups use the language of security, including how they draw on legitimating 
language. It then looks at the range of actors, both in terms of the multiplicity of voices 
and of actors involved. It illustrates a reliance on inclusive or multiple referents in need of 
protection, and an emphasis on the possibility for positive change in energy policy based 
on a broader understanding of security. Lastly, it discusses the values promoted in these 
representations. 
 
                                                          
9
 It’s more difficult to identify non-state discourses in authoritarian regimes. In this sense, the United States 
is a particularly good case study as it has a very active civil society, though it may make generalisations more 
difficult. 
10
 It is important to note that environmental security is also contested (for a fuller discussion, see Floyd 2007: 
340-2; Floyd and Matthew 2013). Here, I occasionally use the term environmental security as shorthand to 
refer to the need for a stable and secure climate and environment, needed for human survival and well-being. 
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Many of these groups draw on the language of security, using similar security references to 
the official discourse. In particular, there is often an emphasis on urgency and the need for 
action, but in these cases, the threats are to inclusive referents. For example, Greenpeace 
USA have produced an alternative policy agenda for US energy security, titled ‘the energy 
[r]evolution’. The first edition was produced in 2007, and claimed that 
time is running out…the global climate is changing and that this change is caused in large part by 
human activities; if left unchecked, it will have disastrous consequences for Earth’s ecosystems and 
societies (Greenpeace USA 2007) 
 
It asked for ‘a national plan to address global warming’, which would have broader 
security implications, as it would ‘create jobs, improve the security of America’s energy 
supply, and protect Americans from volatile energy prices’ (Greenpeace USA 2007). 
Meanwhile, current energy policy and accompanying course towards global warming is 
said to mean ‘catastrophic consequences for the natural environment, the global economy, 
and human society as a whole…[w]e have the opportunity now to change that course, but 
the window is narrow and closing quickly’ (Greenpeace USA 2007). This is a time for 
action and a case of survival: ‘we cannot survive without an energy revolution’ 
(Greenpeace USA 2010b). Likewise, for Friends of the Earth, ‘the climate crisis is the 
definitive challenge of our time, and our reliance on fossil fuels is driving it’ (2013b). 
Occasionally, these groups do fall back on negative security representations, using 
legitimating language to call for action. The mission statement of ACORE, for example, 
states that it is ‘dedicated to building a secure and prosperous America with clean, 
renewable energy’ (ACORE 2013).  
 
The range of actors, both in terms of voices calling for action (securitising actors, using the 
Copenhagen School terminology), as well as agents (securers), involved in reproducing 
positive energy security in itself allows for a reorientation of power. The number of voices 
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involved in calling for action is staggering, with the biggest climate demonstration ever 
taking place in Washington DC on February 17
th
 2013. Around 50,000 people 
demonstrated calling for a change in energy policy to stop global warming, including 
members of 168 different advocacy groups (Sierra Club 2013b). This was also 
accompanied by an online petition signed by over one million activists (Sierra Club 
2013b). On a smaller scale, Greenpeace USA collates stories from individuals calling for a 
change in policy in their ‘quit coal’ campaign (Greenpeace USA 2013c). Greenpeace have 
even used the term ‘positive energy policy’ to call for action: ‘[l]uckily enough, 
Greenpeace is itself only part of a much larger movement towards positive energy policy’ 
(Greenpeace USA 2013b). In terms of action, the Sierra Club note the role of ‘grassroots 
pressure’ in pushing for change towards clean energy, ‘across the U.S., cities, counties, 
and states are moving forward with clean-energy programs that save lives, create jobs, and 
keep our air and water clean’ (Sierra Club 2013a)11. 
 
Numerous campaigns by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth in particular have pushed 
energy policy towards renewables, including campaigns resulting in the shut-down of 
dangerous nuclear reactors that failed safety testing, exposing corruption in one of the 
Keystone XL reviews leading to further investigation, ending polluter subsidies and much 
more work and campaigns exposing human and environmental damage resulting from 
fossil fuel production and consumption (Friends of the Earth 2013a). Greenpeace 
continues to campaign to shut down coal plants in their Quit Coal campaign and for 
legislation to curb global warming (Greenpeace USA 2013a; see also Sierra Club 2013a; 
Hip Hop Caucus 2013). The link between energy and climate security is continually 
                                                          
11
 Here, the focus is on the United States, but the Sierra Club also help ‘communities in other countries who 
want to stop the destructive practices of the coal industry and move toward a clean energy future. Globally, 
the coal industry disproportionately harms the poorest and most vulnerable people, while doing little to 
reduce energy poverty’ (Sierra Club 2013a). 
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recognised, together with the need for multilateral cooperation: ‘[a] change in energy 
policy has to be connected to a change of climate policy. The United Nations (UNFCCC) 
climate talks therefore still remain central to the survival of our planet and a global regime 
for CO2’ (Greenpeace USA 2010b). There is a need to reconsider energy security, which 
needs to involve ‘all branches of government, including states and local jurisdictions, the 
public and private sectors, international partners, and individual citizens’ (CSIS and WRI 
2009b). This also needs to involve working ‘cooperatively with the global community to 
address energy security and climate change’ (CSIS and WRI 2009b). The number of actors 
and voices involved in rearticulating energy security is empowering in itself, particularly 
as a number of these campaigns have produced clear policy change. They also help to 
reorient discussions over energy security towards securing people and planet sustainably.  
 
The vast majority of these alternative notions of energy security vitally do not rely on 
exclusive referents, showing a clear contrast to dominant discourses by avoiding casting 
security in us/them, friend/foe terms. The referents they use vary from globally inclusive 
such as common security, or in some cases multiple, overlapping referents which are not 
organised in hierarchies. Most often, the emphasis is on protecting the environment and 
ecosystems both in their own right and in order to preserve the planet for continued human 
life. Sustainability is a key value promoted here. The World Resources Institute’s slogan is 
‘working at the intersection of environment and human needs’ (WRI 2013b). Greenpeace 
emphasises the need to change energy policy to avoid ‘disastrous consequences for Earth’s 
ecosystems and societies’ (Greenpeace USA 2007: 4). The Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) state that their purpose is  
to safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which all life 
depends…NRDC affirms the integral place of human beings in the environment (NRDC 2013a). 
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The security of human beings and the environment is often put above national or economic 
security concerns. On fracking, the Sierra Club state that ‘if drillers can’t extract natural 
gas without destroying landscapes and endangering the health of families, then we should 
not drill for natural gas’ (Sierra Club 2012). Likewise, Greenpeace emphasises the impacts 
of current energy policy on health: ‘Every day, millions of people whose stories you won’t 
hear are suffering the direct effects of our addiction to fossil fuels. Asthma, cancer, 
mutilated ecosystems, devastated communities’ (Greenpeace USA 2010b: 4). 
 
The conflict between current US energy security policy and climate security is often noted, 
with NRDC suggesting that the US is at ‘an energy crossroads’, with a choice between ‘a 
more sustainable energy future’ and developing ‘ever-dirtier sources of transportation fuel 
derived from fossil fuels – at an even greater cost to our health and environment’ (NRDC 
2013b). The need to address energy security and climate security together is highlighted by 
a report produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the World 
Resources Institute, who suggest that ‘the hard truth is that the United States--and the 
world--must now figure out how to achieve energy security and protect Earth’s climate’ 
(CSIS and WRI 2009a), emphasis added. Similarly, Greenpeace’s third energy [r]evolution 
report looks in practical terms at ‘how to develop a sustainable energy and climate policy’ 
(Greenpeace USA 2010b: 6). Changing our approach to energy security is vital, ‘for the 
sake of a sound environment, political stability, and thriving economies, now is the time to 
commit to a truly secure and sustainable energy future - a future built on clean 
technologies, economic development, millions of new jobs, and a liveable environment’ 
(Greenpeace USA 2007: 5).  
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Alternative representations of energy security that are based on inclusive referents and 
multiple actors and voices are more likely to produce security in themselves, by 
empowering actors to reproduce notions of energy security that do not rely on a traditional 
logic of national security emphasising competition to secure autonomy in terms of fossil 
fuel supplies. They reproduce positive energy security in both discourse and practice. 
While these groups ostensibly have no power to make policy they can and do put pressure 
on the government to change course. Dominant, negative energy security discourse and 
policy reproduce environmental and human insecurity, so energy security discourses which 
account for these are also more likely to produce outcomes where the security of 
individuals and the environment is not neglected in favour of the security of supplies to the 
state. 
 
Beyond reproducing positive constructions of energy security, these alternative practices 
call for policy change, including producing reports outlining alternative policy solutions 
which recognise the need for ‘the world’s nations, businesses and citizens…to 
fundamentally rethink current energy policies, practices and actions’, as ‘[the] fossil fuel-
based growth trajectory of the last century is no longer sustainable or economically viable’ 
(WRI 2013a). Greenpeace’s energy [r]evolution reports provide a blueprint for solving 
global warming. They reject fossil fuels, arguing that ‘renewable energy technologies can 
deliver the energy we need …but only with consistent support based on an understanding 
that solving global warming is our top energy priority’ (Greenpeace USA 2007: 7), as 
opposed to maximising fossil fuel production in the name of energy independence. They 
advocate ‘a change in the way that energy is produced, distributed, and consumed’, based 
on renewables, sustainability, ‘decoupling economic growth from the consumption of 
fossil fuels’, ‘respecting the natural limits of the environment’ and ‘creating greater equity 
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in the use of resources’  (Greenpeace USA 2007: 8; also Greenpeace USA 2010a). The 
NDRC rejects the exploitation of harder to reach, more expensive fossil fuels, ‘including 
tar sands, oil shale and coal’, stating that  
moving down this road has enormous consequences for the air we breathe, the water we drink, our 
climate, our wildlands and wildlife. NRDC is actively working to fight the infrastructure that would 
support increased production and use of these fuels (NRDC 2013b).  
 
Other campaigns providing policy solutions for moving towards a more positive and 
sustainable energy security policy include the ‘Greenscissors’ coalition, campaigning to 
cut environmentally harmful federal spending, including fossil fuel subsidises 
(Greenscissors 2012). Likewise, Friends of the Earth’s ‘Earth Budget’ campaign 
emphasises ‘prioritizing people, not polluters’ and the need to solve the budget deficit 
‘without harming the public and the environment’ (Friends of the Earth 2013d). 
 
Visions for positive energy security are articulated in a number of venues, including the 
following description of ‘a secure, low-carbon energy system’, where 
Energy is produced, delivered, and consumed without releasing harmful greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere. Society has adequate, affordable, and reliable energy to sustain improved standards of 
living. Communities are unaffected by global climate change because of successful efforts to 
mitigate emissions and adapt to unavoidable impacts. New technologies and fuel sources provide 
the basis for economic opportunity. The diversity of energy sources and suppliers alleviates the 
geopolitical tensions associated with competition for fossil fuel resources today (CSIS and WRI 
2009b: 14). 
 
The impact of such a change on geopolitical tension is also important, as competition 
would become unnecessary, enabling cooperative energy security practices to ‘to address 
energy security and climate change’ efforts jointly (CSIS and WRI 2009b: 5). Producing 
alternative energy policy reports and budget solutions is an essential part of rethinking 
energy security towards longer term solutions that do not produce insecurity for people or 
the planet they depend on to survive.  
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The key values promoted in positive energy security discussions are justice, equality and 
sustainability. Friends of the Earth aims to defend ‘the environment and champions a 
healthy and just world’ (Friends of the Earth 2013c). They explicitly advocate 
sustainability, ‘[b]ecause the environment belongs to all of us (and we to it), we must 
ensure that natural resources are used in a fair way so that all people can lead healthy, 
fulfilling lives, and breathe clean air, drink clean water and enjoy a stable climate’  
(Friends of the Earth 2013c). They emphasise a link between ‘the fight to safeguarding the 
planet and its resources’ and ‘the global struggle for social and economic justice’12 
(Friends of the Earth 2013c). The NRDC aim to ‘safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants 
and animals and the natural systems on which all life depends’, and they ‘seek to establish 
sustainability and good stewardship of the Earth as central ethical imperatives of human 
society’ (NRDC 2013a). The need for bottom-up action is emphasised by Greenpeace, 
who conclude that ‘[w]e cannot survive without an energy revolution. The keys to our 
future have been in the wrong hands for too long, and it will take all our strength to take 
them back. I hope you will join us’ (Greenpeace USA 2010b).  
 
6.2.2.2 China 
Overall, China has a less active civil society than the United States. However, the number 
of non-state advocacy groups is growing, particularly in the environmental sphere, as rapid 
economic growth in recent years has put increasing pressure on the environment. The 
relationship between the state and civil society is also very different compared with the 
United States
13
. Officially, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have to be registered 
with the state to operate legally, but as there are limits on numbers of NGOs allowed per 
                                                          
12
 In the process, they emphasise ‘working towards ensuring that in our struggle for a healthy and just world 
our words and actions uphold the rights and dignity of all peoples’ (Friends of the Earth 2013c) 
13
 For an in-depth discussion of this, see Yang (2005). 
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issue area, some environmental groups are registered as non-profit enterprises, some as 
student associations (which are less heavily regulated), and some groups remain 
unregistered (which is technically illegal), but still manage to operate publicly (Yang 2005: 
55). While the monitoring system suggests these groups have little independence from the 
state, they still manage to operate and campaign quite successfully. Often, the Chinese 
state’s own discourse is used ‘as a weapon of protest, resistance and collective action’ – 
for example, environmental groups draw on the state’s official policy of sustainable 
development to promote ‘an environmental discourse of democratic values and citizen 
participation’ (Yang 2005: 52). Many groups have strong international ties, originating as 
splinter groups of global environmental advocacy groups. This section will start by 
looking at how these groups use the language of security, before illustrating the reliance on 
multiple actors and voices, opening up the meaning of energy security and empowering 
non-state actors, the reliance on non-exclusive referents more likely to produce security 
when it comes to energy policy, the emphasis on positive longer-term outcomes and 
advocacy for change in policy, and the values promoted in these discourses.  
 
The language of security is often used by these groups, particularly by Greenpeace China. 
However, they promote a very different notion of security to traditional, national security. 
For example, ‘true energy security’ is said to start with climate change:  
If we are to address climate change, one of the principles must be equity and fairness, so that the 
benefits of energy services - such as light, heat, power and transport - are available for all: north and 
south, rich and poor. Only in this way can we create true energy security, as well as the conditions 
for genuine human security (Greenpeace China 2007: 15). 
 
The emphasis on equity and fairness will be discussed in more detail later, but presents a 
clear rejection of zero-sum thinking. Likewise, the link between energy and human 
security is important, providing a clear precedent for rethinking the referent of energy 
security towards securing human beings rather than citizens and state borders. Energy 
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security is seen as intimately linked with ‘environmental protection’ (Greenpeace China 
2010a: preface). Coal is highlighted as a key problem, contributing to climate change, 
portrayed as ‘the greatest threat to mankind’ (Greenpeace China 2013b). The number of 
coal mine accidents is also cited as a ‘direct security threat’ (Greenpeace China 2013b). 
 
Multiple non-state actors are contesting official energy policy in China, emphasising 
environmental protection and sustainability, often working with the government to produce 
change. The number of environmental protests is rapidly increasing, rising by 120% from 
2010 to 2011 (Duggan 2013). Likewise, ‘over 300,000 petitions were received on 
environmental matters during the 11
th
 Five Year Plan [2006-2010]’ (Feng and Wang 
2012). The nature of contestation has also changed – while protests used to focus on 
demanding compensation, they now make ‘broader demands for environmental protection’ 
(Feng and Wang 2012). They are often tolerated by the government, and are ‘sometimes 
successful in their goals’ (Duggan 2013). Moreover, while the government has 
traditionally attempted to close down contestation and protest, when it comes to 
environmental protection the government is increasingly working with NGOs (Feng and 
Wang 2012). There is a large and growing number of groups involved in contesting 
official notions of energy security, and many work with government and local 
communities, as well as academic institutions and research institutes. Greenpeace have 
produced surveys and undertaken field visits, taking part in community discussions about 
local environmental problems related to energy policy choices, particularly coal production 
and consumption, effectively promoting change to national energy policy  (Greenpeace 
China 2013b). Ecolinx provide environmental education ‘in partnership with government, 
academic institutions and NGOs’ to raise awareness of the link between climate change 
and energy, to encourage sustainability and energy conservation (Ecolinx 2013). The 
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Energy Foundation China likewise work with top energy policy decision-makers and 
experts to fund and develop best practice policies that shift ‘investment into modern, 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies’, producing policy changes at local 
and central levels (Energy Foundation China 2013a). The Global Environmental Institute 
works with government and civil society to ‘design, implement, and enforce socially and 
ecologically-sound development’ in China (Global Environmental Institute 2013a).  
 
Greenpeace emphasise the need for public participation, and worked with the government 
on the Renewable Energy Law produced in 2006 (Greenpeace China 2013c). They also 
lobby to ensure government action in international climate negotiations, to ‘move away 
from coal and to invest heavily in renewable energy and energy efficiency’ and for the 
public to ‘take personal action’ supporting the government in these areas, and work with 
Chinese academics ‘to publish research and policy recommendations’ to back up demands 
for action (Greenpeace China 2013f). The International Fund for China’s Environment 
(IFCE) works with the Chinese government, businesses and NGOs, also providing 
‘environmental education programs to improve Chinese peoples’ agency in the 
environmental movement’ (IFCE 2013). NRDC China works with the Chinese 
government to ‘develop policy solutions that can help China to develop sustainably and 
curb greenhouse gas emissions’ (NRDC China 2013)14. The number of NGOs and other 
groups involved illustrates the increasingly contested nature and meaning of energy 
security in China. The growing space for individuals and groups to contest and rearticulate 
energy security emphasising values like sustainability and environmental protection works 
to empower actors to both speak and practice energy security differently. The 
government’s emphasis on economic development is increasingly questioned, with a 2013 
                                                          
14
 They focus ‘on the intersection between climate and energy, and work to promote policies that can scale 
up clean energy resources like energy efficiency and renewable energy’ (NRDC China 2013). 
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survey finding that ‘nearly 80 per cent of Chinese residents believe that environmental 
protection should be a higher priority than economic development’ (China Daily 2013)15. 
 
Throughout these discourses, there is also a reliance on non-exclusive referents, securing 
people and the environment which they depend on to survive. There is a recognition that 
economic development cannot be done at the expense of the environment (Greenpeace 
China 2013b). When energy is linked with the global climate, the subject of security 
moves from states to people and ecosystems:  
Every day we damage our climate by using fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) for energy and transport. 
As a result, climate change is already impacting on our lives, and is expected to destroy the 
livelihoods of many people in the developing world, as well as ecosystems and species, in the 
coming decades (Greenpeace China 2007: 10) 
 
The impact of coal use on human health and the environment is emphasised (Greenpeace 
China 2010b). It is said to be causing ‘grave environmental damage’ and ‘threats to 
people’s health’ and without change in energy policy away from fossil fuels, China ‘will 
be unable to solve the grave problem of air pollution’ (Greenpeace China 2010b)16. 
Consequently, ‘China urgently needs to pursue a low-carbon sustainable development 
model’ (Greenpeace China 2010b). Greenpeace calls for China to ‘phase out dirty, 
unsustainable energy…emissions pose a real and present danger to both ecosystems and 
people’ (Greenpeace China 2007: 15). Ultimately, change towards a sustainable energy 
model is necessary to secure ‘the climate, environment and our health’ (Greenpeace China 
2013d)
17
. Continued and increased CO2 emissions from fossil energy is said to ‘impair the 
integrity of global ecosystems’ (Energy Foundation China 2013c). JUCCCE emphasises 
the cross-border nature of environmental issues, which makes it difficult to secure in 
                                                          
15
 This survey was carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center in Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 
March and April 2013, with 3,400 residents in 34 Chinese cities. 
16
 Reliance on coal in particular is emphasised as posing ‘a significant threat to public health, causing an 
estimated 500,000 premature deaths in 2008’ (Greenpeace China 2010b). 
17
 Similarly, the Global Environmental Institute promote ‘development that is economically, ecologically, 
and socially sustainable’ (Global Environmental Institute 2013a). 
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traditional, national security terms: ‘[u]nfortunately, China's growing pollution doesn't stop 
at its borders’ (JUCCCE 2013). Often, there is less separation between humans and the 
environment, with groups like WWF aiming to ‘stop the deterioration of the Earth's natural 
environment and to create a better future for humanity in harmony with nature’ (WWF 
China 2013). The emphasis on inclusive or multiple referents represents a rejection of 
zero-sum thinking and spatial exclusion, which in turn presents very different energy 
policy options and solutions to dominant energy security constructions.  
 
Like in the US, Chinese non-state actors produce reports outlining alternative policy 
solutions. This includes Greenpeace China, who produced an alternative policy outline 
emphasising the need to ‘phase out dirty, unsustainable energy’ (Greenpeace China 2007: 
15), as well as a number of other policy-focused reports outlining alternative policy 
solutions based on principles of sustainability and environmental protection (Greenpeace 
China 2013c). They argue that ‘solutions to climate change and energy crises already exist: 
clean, renewable energy, energy efficiency and an end to deforestation’ (Greenpeace China 
2013a). As part of their campaigns, Greenpeace continue to raise awareness of the link 
between energy and climate change by witnessing and documenting the impacts and link 
between the two, including ecosystem change and fossil energy pollution and using this to 
advocate change’ (Greenpeace China 2013e). Many of the programmes produced by 
Chinese non-state actors are practical and policy-focused, producing clear change in 
policy. NRDC have also worked with the government to help improve the implementation 
of China’s Renewable Energy Law, strengthened cooperation with US on climate and 
clean energy and advanced energy technology development (NRDC China 2013).  
 
CHAPTER 6 
245 
 
JUCCCE is ‘dedicated to transforming the way China creates and uses energy’, as ‘a green 
China is critical for a healthy world’ (JUCCCE 2013). As part of this, they undertake 
projects in a number of areas ‘such as Smart Grid, ecocities, green finance, and sustainable 
consumption’, working with government officials, universities, the private sector and 
NGOs’  (JUCCCE 2013). The Energy Foundation, meanwhile, provides clear policy 
initiatives by funding research to develop policy recommendations, which are then 
forwarded ‘through decision-making channels, for consideration’ (Energy Foundation 
China 2013a). If approved by the government, they then produce pilot programmes in 
different provinces to demonstrate success of policy, then propose national adoption 
(Energy Foundation China 2013a). Their CESP programme has a $29 million/year budget, 
funding projects ‘with the greatest carbon dioxide reduction benefits’ (Energy Foundation 
China 2013b). IFCE ‘has developed a range of influential programs facilitating 
partnerships and building capacity in China’s environmental movement’ (IFCE 2013)18. 
This even involves enhancing cooperation with other states. GEI currently work on 
enhancing US-China cooperation on ‘low-carbon planning and energy efficiency’, and 
have in the past worked on the US-China bilateral dialogue on these issues (Global 
Environmental Institute 2013b). Overall, energy policy solutions change when energy 
security is framed around the security of human beings and the need for environmental 
protection. Rather than reinforcing artificial state borders and securing these through 
increased exploitation of fossil fuels, the emphasis is on sustainable solutions to secure 
human beings. 
 
                                                          
18
 In the process, they have worked ‘with NGOs to improve their capacity, with companies to enhance 
China’s access to green technology, with policy makers to influence China’s environmental policy, and with 
environmental education programs to improve Chinese peoples’ agency in the environmental movement’ 
(IFCE 2013). 
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The values promoted by these groups, through discourse and policy initiatives and 
practices, include justice and equity as well as sustainability. The Global Environmental 
Institute emphasise a vision of ‘a diverse and healthy world shaped and shared by all, in 
which economic well-being is directly linked to ecological and social well-being’ (Global 
Environmental Institute 2013a). Energy security as understood by these groups is not zero-
sum: ‘[w]hat makes China sustainable can help make the world sustainable. And that's 
good for all of us’ (JUCCCE 2013). There is a focus on ‘equity and fairness’ as a key 
principle for ‘energy security, as well as the conditions for genuine human security’ 
(Greenpeace China 2007: 15). The limits of nature and resources is used to justify the need 
for ‘a fair distribution of benefits and costs within societies, between nations and between 
present and future generations’ (Greenpeace China 2007: 15). The need for sustainability 
is key, as China cannot have economic development at the expense of the environment 
(Greenpeace China 2013b). IFCE aim to ‘contribute to an increasing global awareness of 
the interrelations between environmental problems and human well-being’ (IFCE 2013). 
Overall, the emphasis on these values helps to contest and reconstruct official notions of 
energy security towards a more inclusive, fair and sustainable energy security.  
 
6.3 What does positive energy security look like?  
The alternative constructions analysed here represent a rather different kind of energy 
security to dominant constructions. They present an inclusive notion of energy security 
that does not rely on spatial exclusion and binary identities. It emphasises the need to 
secure beyond the state, reframing security away from national security and towards 
securing human beings and ecosystems, both in their own right and for human needs. 
Sustainability is a key principle behind these notions of energy security, emphasising the 
need for humans to coexist with nature in a way that does not compromise the social, 
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economic and environmental needs of future generations. The very existence of these 
alternative discourses and campaigns is also empowering, opening up the meaning of 
energy security beyond dominant discourses. Overall, they illustrate the constructed and 
contested nature of energy and security. Dominant energy security discourses in the United 
States and China are closely linked with a negative conception of national security which 
is both disempowering and reproduces insecurity for states, human beings and the 
environment. If ‘the primary subject of security is people – not states, nor elites, nor the 
affluent, nor the stronger’ (Walker 1988: 128), these discourses fundamentally fail to 
provide security in any meaningful way. However, the alternative discourses surveyed here 
illustrate the potential for thinking, speaking and practicing energy security differently.  
 
As constructed in these discourses, energy security is not exclusive – it does not need to 
focus on securing the state against threatening others. By focusing on securing human 
beings, societies, communities, ecosystems and the global climate, energy security 
becomes inclusive and more positive. They highlight that security does not have to be 
based on spatial exclusion. It can take a range of more inclusive forms, emphasising global 
or common security, or multiple, overlapping referents which do not stand in a binary 
relationship with each other, rather than a delineation between an ‘us’, to be protected, and 
‘other’, as threat. Thus, positive energy security here does not involve securing one 
referent against an ‘other’. Following this, it can have multiple referents, including 
individual human beings who need energy supplies to continue life as they know it, the 
global and local ecosystem/s which are threatened by traditional energy security practices, 
and perhaps even states. Most importantly, it highlights that others do not have to be 
‘other’ – ‘they may be different – but not cast as exclusion and inferiority’ (Walker 1988: 
166). Moving beyond exclusive notions of security helps to produce discourses which 
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secure people beyond the state, rather than reproducing negative notions of national 
security. In policy terms, this means local, national, regional and global state and non-state 
groups working together to secure energy supplies for human beings in a sustainable way 
that ensures the survival of a stable climate and ecosystem.  
 
In terms of values, these discourses move beyond national security/autonomy, to 
emphasise cooperation, sustainability and equality. Energy security is not constructed as a 
zero-sum issue requiring competition to maximise national power and autonomy. The 
limited and finite nature of energy resources is highlighted, but as a shared resource 
requiring sustainable extraction, rather than something to be traded between 
geographically-bound states for economic or strategic gain. Sustainability and cooperation 
are key here, with discourses emphasising the need to work together to share and develop 
cleaner energy technology and resources. Justice and equality are emphasised together 
with the need for a fairer distribution of resources. The values underlying these discourses 
ultimately emphasise the need to secure people rather than states, and to ensure the future 
survival of the planet both on its own and for future generations. Sustainability, justice and 
cooperation are essential to secure human beings now and in coming years.  
 
Lastly, these discourses are also empowering. They open up the meaning of energy 
security, as well as enabling a wider range of voices and agents to speak and act on energy 
security. Security theory and practice tends to limit discussions of agents or speakers of 
security to the state. While discussions have become increasingly open to questioning the 
referent or subject of security, the agent/speaker of security remains limited to the state, 
and the academic literature has been complicit in this – including securitisation theory, 
which presents a passive audience which accepts or rejects securitisation (Hoogensen 
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Gjørv 2012: 839)
19
. These alternative, more positive energy security discourses clearly 
illustrate that the state is not the only speaker or agent of security. This does not necessitate 
dismissing states completely – only the particular notion of national security which has 
become dominant. The state can still be an actor and can and should itself also pursue 
positive energy security. It can be a useful organising tool
20
. However, while the state can 
and should be a positive energy security actor, it needs to be one actor and speaker among 
many rather than the only actor. Positive security policy should not produce insecurity, 
which necessitates wider and more active referents as well as other actors alongside the 
state. If security is about people being secure, those people need to be empowered to speak 
and act security. A positive energy security secures human beings, creating the conditions 
for them to emancipate themselves, rather than imposing emancipation from above.  
 
As noted by Naomi Head, there is a relationship between communicative processes and 
legitimacy, which is relevant here. Ultimately, there is a need for ‘fair and reflective 
procedures’ that include a larger number of actors and discourses to develop legitimate 
policy (Head 2012: 197). Thus, positive energy security needs to be multi-actor 
(Hoogensen Gjørv 2012). In this sense, positive security is ‘a process of freeing up space 
for dialogue and deliberation – the diffusion of power to “speak” security’ (McDonald 
2007: 2). Moreover, to avoid presenting a totalising metanarrative or a theory that becomes 
reified and loses any critical edge, it is necessary to conceive of positive security as ‘a 
process rather than an endpoint’ (Wyn Jones 1999: 78). As such it can be a reflexive 
notion of progress that develops conceptually. Thus, it is vital to stop seeing security itself 
                                                          
19
 Interestingly, positive security as understood here shares many things with the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of desecuritisation as a sphere of democratic debate. However, the Copenhagen School do not 
see such ‘positive’ features as possible within the sphere of security. 
20
 Germany’s Energiewende, or ‘energy transition’, presents an excellent example here. It is a national plan 
to transform energy supply and demand to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase renewables and 
improve energy efficiency (Rommeney 2013). 
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in binary terms as positive/negative, recognising the full spectrum and variation of 
security, and working instead towards more positive security.  
 
The very existence of these alternative energy security discourses opens up the potential 
for changing thinking on energy security, by denaturalising conventional assumptions 
about what energy security is and who it is for. This highlights the limitations of the 
conventional energy security debate, discourse and practice. They illustrate that it is not 
only possible to re-think energy security, but that energy security is already being thought 
differently. It is vital to emphasise that there is no blueprint for how a positive energy 
security can be articulated, but rather that there are multiple notions of energy security, and 
that some of these are more positive than others, based on the assumption that energy 
security should provide security for human beings and the environment in which they live. 
Their consistent use of the language and grammar of security illustrate the contextual 
nature of the meaning and value of security – security means different things to different 
people in different times and spaces, and can be more positive or more negative, 
depending on how it is used. As understood in these discourses, security is not national 
autonomy or a stable free market, but stable ecosystems and secure human beings. It is 
concerned with sustainability and justice, and can and should be articulated, contested and 
practiced by agents beyond the state. In the end, ‘it is not necessary to reject the concept of 
security in order to think about peace and justice; just the particular understanding of 
security through which the concept has more or less been turned into its opposite’ (Walker 
1988: 161). The role and responsibility of the analyst is key here, as emphasising 
contestation opens up security as a concept, rather than closing it off. Ultimately, 
recognising that security is contested rather than fixed provides potential for change.  
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6.4 Implications  
What does this all mean for thinking, speaking and practicing energy security? Firstly, 
once the purpose of security is securing human beings and the environment, it becomes 
clear that dominant constructions of energy security are failing. Dominant energy security 
constructions in the United States and China continue to promote a negative notion of 
energy security as national security, which is making people, states and the environment 
less secure. However, there are a number of marginalised discourses contesting dominant 
notions of energy security, which rely on inclusive notions of security that secure human 
beings and the environment, emphasising sustainability and empowering non-state actors 
to speak and act security. These portray a very different, more positive, notion of security. 
To return to the central research questions of this thesis: how is energy security 
constructed in discourse and practice in the US and China? What does it mean to attach 
‘security’ to energy; what is the value of (energy) security; and should security be attached 
to energy? 
  
Firstly, energy security is constructed in very different ways depending on the actors and 
the meaning and referent of security. This has been illustrated in chapters four, five and 
six. Consequently, energy security works in different ways in different contexts, and 
attaching ‘security’ to energy has different meanings depending on what notion of security 
is used – sometimes it is more negative, and sometimes it is more positive. This illustrates 
the ‘constructedness’ of energy security and security. Thus, attaching security to energy 
can be positive or negative, and providing security for human beings and the environment 
necessitates moving towards a more positive energy security. Consequently, there is a need 
to recognise the contested nature of energy security to open up the meaning and work to 
move towards more positive notions of energy security in dominant discourse and practice.  
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While dominant discursive structures are often difficult to change, ‘they do have the 
potential for destabilisation and resistance’ (Hansen 2006: 212). This chapter has 
illustrated that it is not only possible to think energy security differently, but that this is 
already occurring. This has important policy implications, both illustrating that dominant, 
negative understandings of energy security continue to produce insecurity, and that change 
is possible. This thesis has illustrated that it is possible to think and practice energy 
security differently, but changing energy practice necessitates changing the understanding 
of security which underlies it. This does not have to mean the end of the state system, but 
it does necessitate a fundamental rethinking of state security practices. A positive energy 
security policy has to be based on sustainability, securing people and planet. Such policy is 
already being undertaken by some of the non-governmental organisations surveyed in this 
chapter. There is a need for multiple actors to provide positive energy security, among 
which the state remains important as a locus of power, resources and mobilisation. Using 
the framework developed here, it is possible to evaluate different energy security policies 
based on whether they promote more negative/positive notions of energy security, and thus 
to understand their value and move towards more positive notions of energy security. 
Moving towards more positive energy security is an incremental process that starts with 
opening up the meaning of energy security. 
 
Moving towards more positive energy security discourse and policy is possible, as 
illustrated by the fact that there are already alternative discourses of energy security in 
both official and non-official discourses. At the global level, in June 2013 the International 
Energy Agency released a ground-breaking report detailing the need to refocus on the 
relationship between energy and climate security (IEA 2013d). This notes that ‘the world 
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is drifting further and further from the track it needs to follow’, and emphasises the need to 
recognise that ‘the energy sector is the single largest source of climate-changing 
greenhouse-gas emissions and limiting these is an essential focus of action’ (IEA 2013d). 
The number and range of policy solutions for a more sustainable energy security produced 
by non-state groups shows that a more positive energy security policy is possible in 
practical terms (see, for example, Greenpeace USA 2007; Greenpeace China 2007). One of 
the most common arguments against such a change is the need for continued economic 
growth. However, climate change provides the necessary imperative: we can no longer 
view continued economic growth in the traditional sense as essential for national security. 
Energy security can no longer involve maximising domestic fossil fuel production: ‘a 
warming world may pose the gravest threat to survival we face’, and that necessitates 
rethinking notions of prosperity and economic growth as well as security (Jackson 2009)
21
. 
 
While there is little change in policy terms in the United States and China, the growing 
awareness illustrated in changing energy security discourses in both states does suggest 
there is potential for change. Some of the discourse of sustainability and human security 
has already slipped into official discourses, with growing consumption specifically 
regarded as a threat in China. Resonance and social context are noted as key factors 
affecting potential for change; following this, ‘security discourses are a product of a 
process of negotiation between political actors and the broader political community’ 
(McDonald 2012: 17). Thus, security is not just a top-down process where elites speak 
security and the audience accept or reject, but a two-way process of negotiation and 
construction. The growing number of groups and individuals in the United States and 
China contesting dominant energy security discourse and policy shows that the meaning 
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 Tim Jackson’s Prosperity without growth (2009) provides an excellent discussion and agenda for 
rethinking economics in these terms. 
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and purpose of energy security is increasingly questioned. This is particularly notable in 
China, as a traditionally top-down political system is increasingly challenged – 
‘environmental protests are becoming one of the biggest forms of social unrest in China’ 
(Duggan 2013). At a recent protest, a 24 year-old protestor was quoted in a local 
newspaper as saying  ‘“I hope this can be a good beginning for a dialogue between citizens 
and the government on major decisions”’ (Duggan 2013).  
 
This thesis has pointed to the need to open up the meaning of security to recognise notions 
of security that are not centred on national security or articulated by traditional actors. 
Security cannot be studied in the abstract, and means different things in different contexts 
– it can be negative, but it can also be more positive. The very range of energy security 
representations analysed here illustrates that ‘security’ as a concept is not fixed in 
meaning. This also illustrates the limits of securitisation theory, which is only useful for 
understanding very particular, negative (state) security practices. By dividing issues into 
spheres of ‘security’, understood in Schmittian, negative, friend/foe terms, and ‘politics’, 
understood as characterised by positive, open democratic debate (Wæver 2011: 420), the 
Copenhagen School fails to recognise that their positive sphere of open debate is not the 
opposite of security, but can in fact exist within security. It provides insights for the 
positive/negative security debate, illustrating that positive and negative security can co-
exist. Moreover, the empirical analysis of energy security indicates that positive 
conceptualisations of security may be more likely outside state discourses. While the 
empirical analysis done here is limited and it is difficult to know with certainty how far it 
can be generalised, there is much potential for future research on broader security 
constructions. While there is no such thing as absolute security and there is always room 
for improvement, security remains a useful frame through which to view energy once more 
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positive notions of security are relied on. It retains positive connotations and mobilising 
power (McDonald 2012: 18).  
 
This approach can open up avenues for theorising security positively beyond energy, as 
exploring potentials for security to be different allows a possibility to reorient the meaning 
of security (see Trombetta 2008)
22. Trombetta’s study of the link between the environment 
and security highlights that attaching ‘security’ to an issue may not be as simple as 
securitising it, but the characteristics of the issue being securitised also impact on the 
meaning of security (Trombetta 2008). Thus by highlighting more democratic, positive 
notions of (energy) security, the meaning of security itself can gradually be changed. In 
this sense, attaching security to energy may actually be positive for reconceptualising 
security, transferring meaning both ways: if security produces energy, energy also 
produces security: they are mutually constitutive. Alternative discourses change the 
meaning of security to empower actors beyond the state to speak and act security, 
reorienting the referent of security away from exclusive notions of national security and 
towards people, necessitating a sustainable energy security that secures people and the 
environment on which they depend. Vitally, security remains important: it is ‘always 
powerful and never inconsequential, no matter how messy, frivolous or inconsistent the 
actors’ use of the word may be’ (Ciută 2009: 310).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The need for change in thinking on energy policy has been recognised for a long time, but 
there has been little progress. As early as 1987, the World Commission on Environment 
                                                          
22
 It is important to note that as this research looks specifically at energy security, it is difficult to say how far 
the insights are useful for security more broadly. It raises some important questions, however, and clearly 
shows the need for further research into the value of security in other empirical contexts.  
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and Development (WCED)
23
 was established by the United Nations in response to 
growing concerns about deteriorating resources and environment. It defined the meaning 
of ‘sustainable development’, noting that ‘[h]umanity has the ability to make development 
sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987: section 3: 27). It noted the need for a fairer distribution of global 
resources and the need for ‘effective citizen participation in decision making and greater 
democracy in international decision making’ (1987: secton 3: 28). It also emphasised the 
need for renewable sources of energy to ‘form the foundation of the global energy 
structure during the 21st Century’ (1987: section 4: 62). Finally, it stated that  
A safe, environmentally sound, and economically viable energy pathway that will sustain human 
progress into the distant future is clearly imperative. It is also possible. But it will require new 
dimensions of political will and institutional cooperation to achieve it (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987: section 4: 65) 
 
This thesis suggests that the negative, national security constructions of energy security in 
dominant discourse and practice make possible a ‘business as usual’ approach to energy 
policy that continues to ignore the human and environmental insecurity it reproduces. 
Consequently, any change in thinking on energy security has to involve broadening the 
subject of security to ‘people in general…rather than just the citizens of states’ (Walker 
1988: 121). It has to move from securing borders and state autonomy to ensuring the 
survival of humanity and the ecosystems necessary for continued human existence as we 
know it. Energy security both can, and is, being conceived differently. It is contested, and 
it is this contestation which provides potential for change.  
 
                                                          
23
 Sometimes referred to as the Brundtland Commission as it was chaired by former Norwegian prime 
minister Gro Harlem Brundltand. 
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Once ‘security’ is no longer conceived solely as referring to the state’s autonomy in the 
realm of energy supply, phrased as ‘national security’, but rather as referring to multiple, 
non-exclusive referents, such as the global environment and the people who rely on it, the 
solutions to the challenges of energy security are required to take on a more sustainable 
and long-term character. They actually provide security. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Profound changes are required in the way our society produces and transforms 
energy – nothing short of a paradigm shift is required.  
 
(United Nations 2010) 
 
 
Energy security is one of the most important issues today, bearing direct impact on the 
continued survival of human civilisation as we know it. Problematically, contemporary 
understandings of energy security are closely linked with a traditional understanding of 
both energy and security: the emphasis remains on fossil fuels, and the security of the state 
remains at the centre. Not only is this understanding of energy security outdated, it is also 
counterproductive. As energy increasingly becomes incorporated in state security agendas, 
attempts by states to respond paradoxically produce insecurity; as currently understood, 
state pursuit of energy security makes states, human beings and the environment less 
secure. To understand this puzzle, this thesis has analysed the relationship between energy 
and security. Ultimately, energy cannot be understood as a security issue in isolation. The 
world is increasingly interconnected, and the growing speed of environmental and climate 
change ‘makes the necessity of rethinking security unavoidable’ (Dalby 2009: 172). 
 
This thesis has raised questions over the meaning and ethics of energy security, discussing 
who or what should be secured, who speaks security and for what purpose, and whether 
security practice is useful or positive when it comes to energy. In this process it has argued 
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that security is not unequivocally ‘good’, or ‘positive’, but that security means different 
things and works in different ways depending on how it is used. It affirms an ethical 
commitment to making human beings the primary subject of security, following Walker 
(1988: 128). The growing interdependence of human beings and the environment, 
moreover (see Dalby 2009), make a stable environment and climate a necessity for people 
to be secure, today and in future years. Problematically, while energy security is 
undoubtedly increasingly important, it has been under-interrogated conceptually. The 
existing academic literature focuses primarily on solutions to energy security understood 
as secure supplies at stable prices.  
 
In contrast, the focus here has been on investigating how energy security is represented 
and practiced, in short, how it is constructed; and how ‘security’ works in this process. In 
this way, this thesis builds upon a conceptual interest in energy security to analyse how it 
works in two different empirical contexts, using this to construct an account of the 
relationship between energy and security which is both conceptually developed and 
empirically informed. Ultimately, the purpose is pragmatic - to generate useful knowledge 
to understand how energy security works. The central research question, ‘how is energy 
security constructed in discourse and practice in the US and China’, has been addressed by 
looking both at dominant state constructions and marginalised state and non-state 
constructions of energy security, with a focus on what security does to energy in different 
constructions. Dominant state constructions are overwhelmingly negative, emphasising the 
need for continuous and secure (state) supplies of fossil fuels at stable prices, in the name 
of national security and continued economic growth. The state is reproduced as the 
referent object of energy security, with ‘others’ constructed as threatening and hostile, with 
a focus on energy independence or self-sufficiency in both states enabling a continued 
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focus on maximising domestic fossil fuel supply and production. Over time, while it is 
rarely defined, continuing high consumption of limited, finite and depleting resources is 
causing increasing tension as more and more states scramble for what is left. With this, the 
concept of energy security has evolved from describing a need for secure supplies to 
become almost synonymous with national security. 
 
However, in both states there are alternative, more positive notions of energy security in 
the discursive space. In official discourses, they are a more recent development and so far 
remain marginalised while traditional understandings remain dominant. Consequently, 
they rarely filter into policy practice. In the non-state sphere, however, a growing number 
of groups is contesting dominant notions of energy security, and putting forward their 
own, more positive notions of energy security. These are centred around sustainability, and 
take an inclusive approach to the referent object of ‘security’, focusing on the securing of 
human beings and ecosystems, while also arguing in favour of a more inclusive policy 
process that allows for a wider range of actors and speakers of energy security. As 
understood in these positive discourses, security is not national autonomy or a stable free 
market, but stable ecosystems and secure human beings. Thus, if we look outside dominant 
constructions and traditional spaces, it becomes clear that energy security is increasingly 
contested. 
 
Official constructions of energy security both legitimise and marginalise by establishing 
dominant notions of energy security as ‘common sense’, enabling particular policy choices 
in the name of energy security, while delegitimising others. They make possible a 
‘business as usual’ approach to energy policy that continues to ignore the human and 
environmental insecurity it reproduces. However, this thesis has gone beyond challenging 
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dominant, naturalised assumptions about energy security to explore alternative 
‘possibilities of being in the world’ (Berenskoetter 2011: 648). Locating more positive 
constructions of energy security in practice begins to disrupt traditional, more negative 
notions, and as such can open up space to move towards more positive constructions of 
security. The importance of locating these constructions in existing practices has been 
highlighted throughout as both a way to avoid imposing an abstract notion of emancipation 
and a means of ensuring focus on feasible forms of change, since these alternative 
understandings of energy security already exist in the discursive space. Vitally, it enables a 
positive energy security agenda to harness the power in ‘security’, while rejecting 
exclusionary conceptualisations of security. 
 
A traditional understanding of energy security that serves only the security interests of 
states is no longer useful or justifiable. Ultimately, if security is about long-term survival, 
then the national security project has failed. Any change in thinking on energy security has 
to involve broadening the subject of security to ‘people in general…rather than just the 
citizens of states’ (Walker 1988: 121). It has to move from securing borders and state 
autonomy to ensuring the survival of humanity and the planetary ecosystems necessary for 
continued human existence as we know it. Once the threat is no longer conceived solely as 
one affecting national (military/economic) security, but multiple, non-exclusive referents, 
such as the global environment and the people who rely on it, the solutions required by 
energy security become more sustainable and longer-term. 
 
This thesis has argued that energy security in the United Stated and China is contested. It 
has shown that energy security means different things in different contexts, and it is 
sometimes more ‘positive’, and sometimes more ‘negative’ in connotations, character and 
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consequences. Using this, it has argued that dominant constructions of energy security are 
problematic and can be characterised as negative. However, if we look beyond these 
dominant constructions it is clear that energy security is sometimes constructed much more 
positively. This argument has been built over the course of six substantive chapters. 
 
The first three chapters dealt with the literature, theory, research design and methods. 
Chapter one presented a critical review of the existing energy security literature, divided 
into ‘logics’ of security. Because of the relationship between academic and policy 
discourses, the texts analysed in chapter one contain both primary and secondary 
material/data (Hansen 2006: 83) and as such contributed to the empirical analysis 
presented. This chapter argued that the mainstream literature on energy security can be 
divided into realist and liberal logics of security, with some authors combining the two to 
present a ‘comprehensive’ version. However, while advancing different arguments and 
solutions to energy insecurity, these authors pursue logics of security with significant 
points of underlying similarity, based as they are upon similar assumptions about the 
international system and political order. The effect of this is to limit energy security 
conceptually, effectively limiting the parameters of the energy security debate and closing 
off avenues of consideration which this thesis argues are essential to an analysis that 
addresses the actual security needs of people and planet. The chapter then discussed the 
limited existing critical work on energy security. While this literature remains 
underdeveloped, it does open up the space and agenda of energy security studies to 
question the traditional understandings. However, it remains abstract and theoretical, with 
few studies looking at how energy security is constituted in particular empirical cases. 
Likewise, the existing critical literature does not consider the ethics of energy security in 
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any depth. An assertive normative dimension is important, and lacking in much critical 
work on the topic. 
 
Chapter two outlined the conceptual framework underlying the thesis, starting with a 
discussion on methodology, before outlining critical constructivism as an approach. It then 
discussed energy and security and the relationship between them in more detail, drawing 
on critical approaches to security. It outlined the relationship between this research and 
securitisation theory, before discussing the ethics of energy security and normative 
agendas in critical security studies. Lastly, it discussed the emerging literature on the 
‘value’ of security, outlining where this approach differs from existing ones, and 
suggesting that the value of security needs to be assessed in a way that appreciates that it 
may vary between different contexts. Chapter three presented the research design and 
methods, starting with a discussion on research design and case study analysis, choice of 
cases and choice of discourses to study, linking this both with my normative agenda and 
the role of power, and with a pragmatic and reflexive agenda, highlighting the need for 
reflexivity
1
 and being open about choices made during the research process. The chapter 
also discussed practical issues affecting research design. This was followed by a discussion 
on research methods divided into data collection and data analysis, addressing both 
interviews and virtual archives. 
 
Chapters four, five and six presented the empirical work undertaken. Chapter four 
presented an analysis of dominant energy security constructions in the United States, 
beginning with a contextual discussion on the policy-making process and history of energy 
in the United States, before analysing energy security policy between 2004-2012 and the 
                                                          
1
 Reflexivity is important to allow ‘researchers to trace out the ways in which very specific instances of their 
positionality affect their research accounts and the knowledge they claim on the basis of those accounts’ 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 102). 
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discourses which made those policies possible. Chapter five followed the same structure, 
presenting the analysis of dominant energy security discourse and practice in China. 
Chapter six drew out the official constructions of energy security in chapters four and five, 
relating these to the debate over ethics and security. This was then used to develop a notion 
of negative energy security. The chapter then went beyond this to draw out the contested 
nature of energy security, looking at marginalised alternative, more positive notions of 
energy security, looking at both official – state – and non-state constructions and drawing 
out key themes. Finally, it used this to develop an understanding of what a more positive 
energy security can look like, and the implications for thinking, analysing, speaking and 
practicing energy security differently. As such, it placed the research back into the debate 
on the value of security, presenting a framework for understanding the value of security in 
context. It illustrated the contested nature of energy security, the potential to disrupt 
dominant official notions of energy security and highlight the potential for change. 
 
 
Contribution  
The primary contribution of this thesis lies in bringing together conceptual insights from 
critical approaches to security with empirical cases from the subfield of energy security 
studies to understand how energy is constructed as a security issue, arguing in the process 
that the result is a failure ultimately to provide security in any meaningful sense. As has 
been noted, despite the growing significance of ‘energy security’ within the realm of 
policy the concept itself has largely escaped critical scrutiny. Likewise, critical work has 
tended to look at ‘security’ as an abstract whole rather than energy specifically, and where 
it has touched on the issue of energy it has thus far not engaged in the level of empirical 
detail offered by this thesis. As an increasingly important area of research, energy security 
CONCLUSION 
265 
 
provides new insights for critical security studies, most notably raising questions about 
how security in particular ‘works’ – and what it ‘does’ – when attached to energy. Thus, 
this research presents the first in-depth critical empirical analysis of energy security 
constructions, going beyond abstract calls to redefine security to analyse how it is used and 
what security itself means in different constructions, showing that energy security is 
contested and drawing on alternative, positive constructions to illustrate and open up the 
space for change. 
 
To this end, the thesis provides in-depth and empirically rich analysis of how energy 
security is understood and constructed in discourse and policy in the US and China, 
drawing on over 700 documents and original interview data with experts and policy-
makers. In this process, it illustrates a clear problem with the way in which energy security 
is approached: it does not, and cannot, produce security. Problematically, the existing 
energy security studies literature overlooks the construction of energy as a security issue 
and remains focused on solving state fossil fuel supply problems, rather than questioning 
or interrogating what this very specific understanding of energy security does. It is clear 
that the meaning of energy security is contested, particularly once we look at notions of 
energy security promoted by non-state actors. However, because of its narrow focus, the 
existing literature on energy security cannot make sense of this contestation. Moreover, as 
discussed previously, it fails to recognise that a (negative) understanding of energy 
security contributes to and reproduces insecurity. Likewise, it cannot provide any potential 
for changing existing policy or  moving away from the current energy security dynamic. 
By drawing on critical approaches to security, this thesis highlights the constructed and 
contested nature of energy security, in the process opening up potential for movement 
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towards more ‘positive’ energy security practices. This has clear implications for thinking, 
analysing, speaking and practicing energy security differently. 
 
In turn, applying critical approaches to understand energy security raises theoretical 
questions about how ‘security’ works and what it ‘does’ when attached to energy. Energy 
poses new challenges for understanding security; most notably illustrating that ‘security’ 
does not work the same way in all contexts. Overall, energy security is contested – it 
means different things to different people in different contexts. While some constructions 
of energy as security are negative, others are more positive. This raises important 
theoretical questions about the importance of context for understanding the value of 
security and the potential for moving towards more ‘positive’ energy security discourse 
and practice.  
 
Critical approaches are often too quick to dismiss security. While it has been used in 
problematic ways by states, and has often had the very negative consequences that these 
authors suggest, security has also historically had many positive connotations and 
consequences. In effect, the meaning of security is not fixed, and neither is its value. 
Ultimately, something about security is desirable; there is a reason that states have been 
able to use the concept to justify a growing number of policies. This thesis has argued that 
there is something about security that is worth attaining, but that there is a clear need to 
distinguish between different notions of security based on their value. Security has a lot of 
power, and given that it sometimes already has a positive value it is worth recognising 
positive security constructions which often lie outside the remits of both traditional and 
critical theories of security. Generally, these theories have struggled to capture these more 
positive notions of security, and the ongoing contestation. By drawing on these, and 
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highlighting the contested nature of security, this thesis has argued that it is possible to 
move towards more positive security practices. Rather than imposing an abstract notion of 
emancipation, therefore, the emphasis here is on resistance and contestation – alternative 
practices – and giving marginalised voices the power to speak security, without ignoring 
traditional voices. Consequently, there is a need to study positive security practices – in 
discourse and policy, state and non-state – to ground alternative, positive notions of 
security in existing, alternative political practices, highlighting contestation over security 
rather than closing the concept down. 
 
Vitally, understanding the ethics and politics of security is a key part of the critical security 
studies project, in which it has so far not delivered on its promise (Browning and 
McDonald 2013). This thesis has added an empirical study of energy security in the United 
States and China to this project. Ultimately, it has sought to move away from abstract 
theorising of security towards a more pragmatic, policy-relevant approach, using empirical 
analysis of a range of sources to illustrate that energy security constructions range from 
more negative to more positive, using already existing constructions of energy security to 
develop an idea of what a more negative and a more positive energy security policy looks 
like. This has suggested that security can never be unequivocally ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but is 
always contextual and always changing.  
 
Of course, attempts to reimagine the world are necessarily always ‘partial and situated’ 
(Weldes et al. 1999: 21), However, the overall aim here has been to encourage wider 
theoretical and conceptual debate over the concept of energy security in a changing world, 
rather than to impose one account of energy security as the only viable approach. As such, 
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the approach suggested here is an alternative, not a replacement, and certainly not the only 
alternative.  
 
This research also has some implications for the fields of energy security studies, critical 
security studies, and for IR more broadly. It shows that energy security studies needs to 
become more reflective, to recognise how and why they use the term energy security, and 
how the way in which they use it works to enable particular policy choices
2
. It has also 
begun the process of problematising the notion of energy security. Both realist and liberal 
energy security discourses fail to consider resource depletion and limitation. 
Problematically, dominant academic and policy discourses of ‘energy security’ remain 
centred on fossil fuels, and oil in particular, and so in a sense mainstream energy security 
is also finite. Ultimately energy security is not just about securing supplies at stable prices. 
Saying and/or claiming that it is involves taking an implicit ethical stand, and this needs to 
be recognised. While there are some signs of change in thinking on energy security, these 
have yet to filter into policy in any significant way (for example, see Ahmed 2013). It is 
important to note that as this research looks specifically at energy security, it is difficult to 
say how far its insights are useful for understanding security more broadly. It raises some 
important questions, however, and clearly shows the need for further research into the 
value of security in other empirical contexts. Likewise, it suggests there is a need to study 
positive security practices – in discourse and policy, state and non-state – to ground 
alternative, positive notions of security in existing, alternative political practices, 
highlighting contestation over security rather than closing the concept down. Moreover, 
more empirical areas of study in International Relations need to engage more openly with 
ethics and normative choices, as there is little dialogue between theorists and those 
                                                          
2
 It is important to note that an expanded definition of energy security opens up the number of contemporary 
energy security challenges (Sovacool 2010a: 11-31). However, it is essential to be clear what exactly we 
mean when we talk about energy security. 
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focusing more directly on policy questions (for a more in-depth argument on this, see Price 
2008b). 
 
Limitations and future research 
Like all research constrained by time and practical concerns, this research has a number of 
limitations. I made the deliberate choice to focus on how energy security is constructed, 
pursuing a critical constructivist approach. There is no analysis of intentions behind these 
constructions, as the focus is on what they do, in terms of enabling policy choices. In this 
sense, it has covered a gap, analysing energy security constructions and what they do in-
depth, which has not previously been explored in this way. However, it does not offer 
solutions to energy security as traditionally understood, providing no in-depth discussion 
of how to provide states with secure energy supplies at stable prices. This does not mean 
that this is of no concern, merely that this is dealt with better elsewhere and is outside the 
boundaries of this research, which focuses on the limitations of such an approach when it 
comes to providing for security more broadly conceived.  
 
Likewise, the research looks only at two empirical cases, during a limited time period and 
with limited resources, focusing primarily on how the concept of energy security is 
constructed. Much more research needs to be done into how energy security works. The 
decision to focus only on two empirical cases was taken in order to ensure depth, given the 
lack of previous work on the constructed nature of energy security. Likewise, the focus on 
the US and China as states where energy security is a big concern presents a dominant 
notion of energy security which is likely to differ from how energy security is understood 
in states which do not have the same energy needs. On the other hand, as the US and China 
are both the largest energy consumers and the largest carbon dioxide emitters globally, 
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which in a sense makes their energy choices the most problematic and thus the most 
important to understand. Moreover, the analysis of marginalised discourses presents a 
starting point, illustrating contestation rather than the entirety of competing discourses. 
Thus in empirical terms, this project began with states, but it does not end there. Of course, 
the research only provides one, situated answer to how energy security is constructed. As 
such, it does not claim to provide the singular neutral or objective ‘truth’, but rather to 
suggest one possible solution to how we can rethink energy security and move forward 
towards more positive energy security practices.  
 
It is clear then that there is much space for future research. While this research opens the 
space for change, more work, both in the academy and in the realm of public and policy 
advocacy, needs to be done to change thinking on energy security. Theoretically, much 
more work is needed to resolve the tension between relativism and critical theory in 
critical constructivism. There is also a need for more study of the contested nature of 
security, especially non-state understandings and constructions of security. Such work also 
needs to consider how we can study the value of security in cases where (in)security 
concerns are not, and perhaps cannot be, articulated (Hansen 2000).  
 
In the area of energy security, more work needs to be done on discourses on energy 
security surrounding specific events. This could include periods of price volatility vs 
periods of calm, oil spills, and politically significant events relating to energy security. 
Cultural and visual representations of energy security would be another interesting area for 
future research. Likewise there is a need for further research into non-state and/or 
everyday notions of energy security – a focus group study with the general public 
discussing what they see as the key priorities when it comes to energy security would be 
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particularly interesting. Alongside this, further research into the role of the energy industry 
in shaping policy in different countries would add another layer of depth. Lastly, more 
research needs to be done into energy governance, energy poverty and inequality, and the 
relationship between energy and development.  
 
This research has drawn on normative approaches to security to attempt to envision a more 
positive notion of energy security, based on sustainability, human welfare and 
participation. It presents only a beginning, but it is clear that it is time to rethink energy 
security. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: List of Interviews 
 
Name Location Relevance 
Zha Daojiong Beijing Academic at Beijing University, researches US-
China energy relations 
 
Qu Xinhua Beijing Renmin University, researches China’s 
international energy policy, has also done work 
for the Energy Research Institute in the NDRC 
 
Gao Shixian Beijing Works in the Energy Economics and Strategy 
Research Center of the Energy Research Institute 
of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 
 
Erica Downs Washington DC Works at Brookings, as a Chinese energy policy 
expert 
 
Kevin Tu Washington DC Works at Carnegie, researches China’s energy 
and climate policies, used to work for Sinopec 
 
Joanna Lewis Washington DC Works at Georgetown University, researches US-
China cross border technology innovation in 
clean energy research and development, the 
evolving nature of US-China relations on energy 
and climate 
Jin Canrong Beijing Works at Renmin University, director of Center 
for Energy Research, expert on US-China 
relations more broadly 
Robert Cekuta Washington DC Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
Energy Resources, US State Department (deals 
with international energy policy) 
Casey Delhotal Washington DC Director, East Asian Affairs, Office of Policy 
and International Affairs, US Department of 
Energy  
 
DoE official Washington DC Official working in Department of Energy 
(background) 
 
Banning Garrett Washington DC Works at the Atlantic Council, US-China energy 
and climate relations expert, has worked on 
strategic dialogues with China since 1981 
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David Pumphrey Washington DC Works at Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (Energy and National Security Program), 
also ex-Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Energy Cooperation at the 
Department of Energy 
 
Robert McNally Washington DC 2001-2003 served as the top international and 
domestic energy adviser on the White House 
staff, in 2003 was Senior Director for 
International Energy on the National Security 
Council 
 
Caitlin Campbell Washington DC US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission Staff Energy Analyst 
 
Jeremy Schreifels Washington DC Works for the Environmental Protection Agency, 
designs climate programs and works on US and 
Chinese climate policy 
 
Jerry Taylor Washington DC Works at the Cato Institute, researching 
international oil markets  
 
Kenneth 
Lieberthal 
Washington DC China expert at Brookings, former special 
assistant to the president for national security 
affairs and senior director for Asia on the 
National Security Council from August 1998 to 
October 2000 
 
Dennis Sherman Washington DC International energy advisor, used to work for 
Exxon-mobil, in international energy strategy 
 
Taiya Smith Washington DC Used to work for the US Treasury department, 
led the founding of many of the key US-China 
energy dialogues in the 2000s under Secretary 
Paulson, including the Ten Year Framework 
 
Elizabeth 
Wishnick 
Washington DC Chinese foreign and energy policy expert at 
Columbia University 
 
David Goldwyn Phone interview State Department’s Coordinator for International 
Energy Affairs 2009-11, also former U.S. 
Government Assistant Secretary of Energy for 
International Affairs, worked on energy policy 
during the Clinton administration. Created 
Global Shale Gas Initiative and took part in a 
number of bilateral dialogues with China. Has 
also published extensively on energy security. 
Anonymous Beijing  - 
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Anonymous Beijing - 
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